Margin Account Vs Cash: Which is Better for You

Cash/Margin Account vs. RRSP Trading

Hi - I don't want to use my TFSA to make day/swing trading income due to risks/CRA. But is it better to trade inside my RRSP or Cash account? RRSP - my gains will be taxed like income come RRIF which I don't think is fair- CRA should only tax contributions but that's life...I can make $200-$3000 every week in capital gains. Thanks
submitted by donksky to PersonalFinanceCanada [link] [comments]

Cash vs Margin Accounts and Day Trade Limits of Each.

Cash vs Margin Accounts and Day Trade Limits of Each. submitted by MoarGPM to Webull [link] [comments]

Cash vs Margin account for day trading on IB?

Newbie here, been "day trading" (sort of) on Robinhood for the past few weeks. Ran into the issue of being marked as PDT and blocked from selling certain stocks I had recently purchased.
Considering:
-I am starting with a small account balance of $1.5-2k
-I am trying to save as much in fees as possible to keep my daily percentage gains high (reason why I decided on IB as my new broker)
-I would like to have account deposits/withdrawals go thru as quickly as possible (preferably the same day I deposit)
-(Not as important as the above requirements) Would like to have the option of trading options (pun intended)
It would be better to go with a cash account right? Or are there benefits to day trading with a small balance margin account that I'm not seeing? Thanks in advance for the advice!
submitted by makeshiftbakedkids to Daytrading [link] [comments]

Got flagged as PDT on a cash account, can I still trade?

Hi, I recently made too many day trades on my cash account without letting the cash settle. I was informed that my account has been flagged and I can’t day trade for 3 months or raise my account to 25K.
Does this mean no day trading at all or I can still do so with settled cash?
submitted by k_dot33 to RobinHood [link] [comments]

Margin Isn't Dangerous & Why I'd Still Use It If I Had Less Than $25,000

Margin Isn't Dangerous & Why I'd Still Use It If I Had Less Than $25,000

Cash vs. Margin


TL;DR- Use Margin if you're trading securities and either above or below 25k. If you know how to size positions, it won't matter if you move $4,000 into a trade or $4,000,000. As long as you sized the position correctly. If you're limited to 3 trades, then take 3 PERFECT trades: https://imgur.com/a/SpPOERQ

I see lots of people discussing contrasting ideas although they attempt to justify using both. Here are some things I see said and written frequently from people that doesn't add up for me:

  • "Use a cash account to avoid PDT" - (Totally fine, in some cases such as certain options traders. Not if you're trading securities.)
  • "Risk 1% of your account" - (So if your account is at $25,500, I risk ~$255 and if I lose 2R I'm below PDT. Doesn't sound too great to me if I were to lose the first 2 straight trades.)
  • "Margin is a double-edged sword" - (It's only dangerous if you don't set hard stops or size your positions correctly.)
  • "Never take on a trade that is worth more than your account" - (I can agree if you were swing trading but in terms of IntraDay trading, this is hindering your ability to grow your account. If you're risking $100 on a trade that costs less than your account value.. then $25 on a trade because of your account value.. then you're adding unneeded variables. Remember: "Consistency.")


The Predictive Model I built lays out all valid trades within the report range as well as \"Perfect Trades\" that I consider \"Textbook\". The report range is between a 30 day range. Between 4-17-20 to 5-17-20. Total \"Perfect Trade\" count is 9 trades. Even if I were limited to 3 trades per week. I'd be able to trade them with less than 25k on margin. The stats reflect $100 risk I've set on a different tab. (The \"W\" is just a graphic I made for \"Winning\")

It doesn’t matter if you move $4,000, $40,000, or $4,000,000 into a position. As long as you’re risking the same. Your Trading Account's performance is based off of risk. Such as:
•Sharpe ratio
•RRR
•Number of R’s in 1 week/month/quarter. (Example: I made 7R this week. If my R is $100. I made $700)

If I were to go back to when I was below $25,000 some years ago. I'd still use a margin account while being limited to 3 trades per week. Here's why:

Formulas you have to know:
Position size formula = Risk ÷ Stop Size
Stop Size Formula = Entry - StopLoss

Example 1a:

Stock ABC,
Entry = $10.00
StopLoss = $9.90
StopSize = 10¢
Risk = $100
In Live Trading: $100 ÷ $0.10 = 1000 Shares
1,000 shares at $10.00 = $10,000 position

Example 1b:

Stock XYZ,
Entry = $385
StopLoss = $383.00
StopSize = $2.00
Risk = $100
In Live Trading: $100 ÷ $2.00 = 50 Shares
50 shares at $385 = $19,250 position.

*$10,000 CASH account: CANNOT trade Stock XYZ and must wait 3 days for his entire account to settle after trading Stock ABC. If it was a margin account, they'd still be able to take 2 more trades this week.
*$10,000 MARGIN account: CAN trade Stock XYZ and can trade both scenarios while still able to trade 1 more time in a 5 day rolling period.

Then the next point made is, "Just won't trade anything above $20".


Ok. great rebuttal, but why?

Let's remember this: StopSizes aren't always directly correlated to the price of a stock. YES you're more likely to have a wider StopSize on a higher priced stock and a tighter StopSize on a lower priced stock. But remember this: of slippage on 1,000 shares is 10% of his risk ($10)... It will be even more slippage if his stop loss market order is hit. Even a Sell-StopLimit order will have slippage within the amount you allow for when you enter a position.
Stock XYZ would have to be slipped 20¢ just to equate the amount of slippage on Stock ABC.Highly liquid and available stocks such as AAPL, AMD, NVDA etc don't have 20¢ spreads. Not even 10¢. Rarely 5¢. Most of the time. Just a couple cents. Of course there could be more right out of the open but the spread in my years of experience is tightened within 2 minutes of the open.
Yes, these small amounts in pennies do hold lots of merit if you're looking at having any longevity in this business, it WILL add up over the years.

Both trades have the same risk [in perfect world theory].

If both stop market orders were hit (StopLoss). Both traders would exit with a $100 loss on each. Although 1 trade required $10,000 in capital and the other trade required $19,250 in capital.
Use margin. If I had to go back to when I had less than $25,000 in my account, I'd still do it the same way I did it with margin. I highly suggest using margin even if you’re limited to 3 trades per week. I get asked all the time when I began trading. If you watched my last video, I showed my first ever deposit with Scottrade (Old brokerage that was bought out by TDA a few years ago) in 2015 although I don't consider that's when I started trading because I didn't treat it the way I do today.
I really consider myself starting as a trader in 2017 when I:
•Wrote a business plan
•Understood statistics
•How to research.
All this being said, slowly over time I noticed that I am taking less and less trades and increasing my risk size. Why?
EV: Expected Value.


- Margin has zero negative effect if you're sizing your positions the same every time. Margin allows you to take on more expensive positions that are showing your edge.

Bonus: Being limited to 3 trades a week isn't fun, I remember that feeling from years ago. Just remember to take 3 perfect trades a week. Sometimes "Perfect Trades" don't work out in your favor while some subpar situations hit target. Some weeks you might take your 3 "Perfect Trades" by Tuesday. Some weeks you might take only 1 "perfect trade". If you follow my watchlists on Twitter (Same handle as my Reddit), I keep my Day Trading Buying Power transparent. Not always is it growing perfectly linear. And not always am I posting every single day because sometimes, my edge isn't there. Just because the market is open doesn't mean you HAVE to trade.
My watchlists aren't littered with 15+ tickers. Rarely do they have more than 7. That may work for other traders, but for me, I demand quality. It's either there or it isn't. No reason to force a trade. I'd rather focus heavily on a few tickers rather than spread myself thin across multiple.
Trading isn't supposed to be exhilarating or an adrenaline rush. It can be boring. I said that in the post I wrote back in April.
Also if you make money, even if its just $20 in a month. Take that money out and buy something. Shrine it. Cherish it. You ripped that money out of WallStreet. Be proud of it. It takes a lot of courage to do this business. Realize that the P/L is real money. Sometimes even just buying a tank of gas or a book will help you realize that. Spend it from time to time. Get something out of your trading account. You may or not be trading for long, get something that is tangible to always remember the experience in case you don't last. Make it your trophy.

That's all I've got for right now. Maybe I'll make another post or 2 before the year ends. I hit my 1 year full-time mark in September.
Best wishes!
-CJT2013
submitted by CJT2013 to Daytrading [link] [comments]

$PSTG: PURE STORAGE for them, PURE TENDIES for you

$PSTG: PURE STORAGE for them, PURE TENDIES for you
This is actually my first DD I've ever posted so fuck you and forgive me if this doesn't work out for you.I've been looking at $PSTG for a while now and if my buying power didn't get so fucked from my decision to buy 8/7 UBER puts, I would have been already all over this play.
What had got me looking into Pure Storage was an unusual options activity alert. I've looked into this company before but didn't entirely understand what they do. Now after looking at them again, I'm still not exactly sure wtf they do....BUT I've gotten a better clue. Basically what I got from my research is that these guys fuck with "all-FLASH data storage solutions (enabling cloud solutions and other low-latency applications where tape/disk storage does not meet the needs)."......and ultimately what this all means to me is that these are the motherfuckers making those stupid fast laser money printers with the rocket ships attached. And that's something I'm interested in.
Now, here is the DailyDick you all degenerates have all been fiending for:
Fundamentally: PureStorage remains one of the few hardware companies in tech that is consistently growing double motherfucking digits, yet remains constantly cucked and neglected by investors (trading at 1.9x EV/Sales).
https://preview.redd.it/ek7ugjsewnf51.png?width=1118&format=png&auto=webp&s=f9c7e72c95e450a105e44223937422d896eeeb21
The 36 Months beta value for PSTG stock is at 1.62. 74% Buy Rating on RH. PSTG has a short float of 7.28% and public float of 243.36M with average trading volume of 3.16M shares. This was trading at around $18 on Wednesday 8/5 when I started writing this and as of right now, it's about $17.33 💸
The company has a market capitalization of ~$4.6 billion. In the last quarter, PSTG reported a ballin'-ass profit of $256.82 million. Pure Storage also saw revenues increase to $367.12 million. IMO, they should rename themselves PURE PROFIT. As of 04-2020, they got the cash monies flowing at $11.32 million . The company’s EBITDA came in at -$62.81 million which compares very fucking well among its dinosaur ass peers like HPE, Dell, IBM and NetApp. Pure Storage keeps taking market share from them old farts while growing the chad-like revenue #s of 33% in F2019, 21% in F2020, and 12% in F1Q21.
Chart of their financial growth since IPO in 2015:
https://preview.redd.it/gwlmy82v4nf51.png?width=640&format=png&auto=webp&s=b6508cd5f641da4086b70d8b8007da034e982fd7
At the end of last quarter, Pure Storage had cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities of $1.274B, compared with $1.299B as of Feb 2, 2020. The total Debt to Equity ratio for PSTG is recording at 0.64 and as of 8/6, Long term Debt to Equity ratio is at 0.64.Earning highlights from last quarter:
  • Revenue $367.1 million, up 12% year-over-year
  • Subscription Services revenue $120.2 million, up 37% year-over-year
  • GAAP gross margin 70.0%; non-GAAP gross margin 71.9%
  • GAAP operating loss $(84.9) million; non-GAAP operating loss $(5.4) million
  • Operating cash flow was $35.1 million, up $28.5 million year-over-year
  • Free cash flow was $11.3 million, up $29.0 million year-over-year
  • Total cash and investments of $1.3 billion
I bolded the Subscription Services Revenue bullet because to me that's a big deal. Pure Storage keeps them coming back with products such as Pure-as-a-service and Cloud Block Store and everybody knows that the recurring revenue model is best model. Big ass enterprises buy storage from vendors such as Pure Storage in the cloud to prevent vendor lock-in by the cloud providers. $$$ >!💰<
What are Pure Storage's other revenue drivers? Well these motherfuckers also have the products to address the growth of Cloud storage as well as the products to drive the growth of on-prem storage. For on-prem data center, Pure sells Flash Array to address block storage workloads (for databases and other mission-critical workloads) and FlashBlade for unstructured or file data workloads. On-prem storage revenue is mainly driven by legacy storage array replacement cycle.
https://preview.redd.it/01su6chrwnf51.png?width=1129&format=png&auto=webp&s=16e6a705f9392291bc0c3932c815802d9101365e
So far, it seems like Pure Storage's obviously passionate and smart as fuck CEO has been spot on with his prediction of the flash storage sector's direction. Also seems like he's not camera shy either. Pure Storage's "Pure-as-a-Service and Cloud Block Store" unified subscription offerings is fo sho gaining momentum it. This shit is catching on with enterprises, both big and small. COVID-19 increased the acceleration of our digital transformation and the subsequent shift to the cloud. This increased demand in data-centers is going to drastically help Pure Storage's future top and bottom line. To top it off, NAND prices are recovering! (inferred from MU earnings). I expect Pure Storage to get some relief on the pricing front because of this which obviously in turn should improve revenues.
PSTG's numbers look pretty good to me so far but are they a good company overall? Even when scalping and trading, I don't like to fuck with overall shitty companies so I always check for basic things like customer satisfaction, analyst ratings/targets, broad-view industry trends, and hedge fund positioning.. that sort of thing.Pure Storage stands out in all of these fields for me.
https://preview.redd.it/4n0e5nve5of51.png?width=373&format=png&auto=webp&s=495416bb6f5a2dab77f3ac483ca4d9510b39037c
Customers like Dominos Pizza and many others all seem to be happy AF with no issues. I can hardly even find a negative review online. Their products seems to be universally applauded. Gartner and other third party independent analysts also consider Pure Storage's product line-up some of the best in the industry.
The industry average for this sector is a piss poor 65.Pure Storage has a 2020 Net Promoter Score of 86
https://preview.redd.it/3w51io8yvmf51.png?width=698&format=png&auto=webp&s=4f7d06825d0ad9d126216e5069af2f9c3636f86a
Enterprises are upgrading their existing storage infrastructure with newer and more modern data arrays, based on NAND flash. They do this because they're forced to keep up with the increasing speed of business inter-connectivity. This shit is the 5g revolution sort to speak of the corporate business world. Storage demands and needs aren't changing because of the pandemic and isn't changing in the future. The newer storage arrays are smaller, consume less power, are less noisy and do not generate excess heat in the data center and hence do not need to be cooled like the fat fucks at IBM need to be. Flash storage arrays in general are cheaper to operate and are extremely fast, speeding up applications. Pure Storage by all accounts makes the best storage arrays in the industry and continues to grow faster than the old school storage vendors like bitchass NetApp, Dell, HPE and IBM.
Pure Storage’s market share was 12.7% in C1Q20 and was up from 10.1% in the prior year - LIKE A PROPER HIGH GROWTH COMPANY.HPE, NetApp and IBM, like the losers they are, lost market share.According to blocksandfiles.com, AFA vendor market share sizes and shifts are paraphrased below:
  • “Dell EMC – 34.8% (calculated $766m) vs. 33.7% a year ago
  • NetApp – 19.3% at $425m vs. 26.7% a year ago
  • Pure Storage – 12.7% at calculated $279.7m vs. 10.1% a year ago
  • HPE – 8.4% – $185m vs. 10% a year ago"
Pure has been gaining marketshare almost every year since it began selling storage arrays in 2011. Pure Storage is consistently rated the highest for the completeness of vision as this chart shows:
https://preview.redd.it/5agj17gcgnf51.png?width=428&format=png&auto=webp&s=da9c6389baccab85261d6e0f71b3474e84b90d3c
Hedge Funds are on this like flies on shit.
Alliancebernstein L.P. grew its position in Pure Storage by 0.5% in the 4th quarter. Alliancebernstein L.P. now owns 104,390 shares of the technology company’s stock worth $1,786,000 after purchasing an additional 560 shares during the last quarter.
Legal & General Group Plc grew its position in Pure Storage by 0.3% in the 1st quarter. Legal & General Group Plc now owns 258,791 shares of the technology company’s stock worth $3,213,000 after purchasing an additional 753 shares during the last quarter.
Sunbelt Securities Inc. acquired a new stake in Pure Storage in the 4th quarter worth $4,106,000.
CENTRAL TRUST Co grew its position in Pure Storage by 79.8% in the 2nd quarter. CENTRAL TRUST Co now owns 3,226 shares of the technology company’s stock worth $56,000 after purchasing an additional 1,432 shares during the last quarter.
Northwestern Mutual Wealth Management Co. grew its position in Pure Storage by 203.0% in the 1st quarter. Northwestern Mutual Wealth Management Co. now owns 2,312 shares of the technology company’s stock worth $28,000 after purchasing an additional 1,549 shares during the last quarter.
Also, everybody's favorite wall street TSLA bull, Cathie Wood has been busy steadily purchasing big lots of PSTG for her ARK ETF funds for a while now...Even going as far as selling TSLA in order to re-balance!
https://preview.redd.it/zjxuakjosnf51.png?width=1125&format=png&auto=webp&s=f34abdd3b35791eb207d31d72ea0f6fb11beec30
https://preview.redd.it/bkf1uzb2tmf51.png?width=2048&format=png&auto=webp&s=a9870ec41cfb4ce468ba61d83f2f8a4151927a4e
Hedge funds and other institutional investors own 78.93% of the company’s stock and it seems like more are piling in every day.
Tons of active options, too -Pretty good volume lately with the spreads looking decent.
Over 5,000 September $20 Calls added just on 8/3 alone 🤔
Order flow helps my thesis here, showing a recent influx of big dick money moving into PSTG.
https://preview.redd.it/liychuhblnf51.png?width=592&format=png&auto=webp&s=ca6a60d54a9eb8bd9e32e0ef70992b8282c29e70
Google Search Trends showing uptick in interest: SPY420 baby
https://preview.redd.it/joo0b9wxinf51.png?width=1710&format=png&auto=webp&s=24eb18f18be18b9b771ff1911c09c5479ba2f1a0
Robinhood Trends showing the YOLO is trending up
https://preview.redd.it/4gk5yjdxmnf51.png?width=1538&format=png&auto=webp&s=76c4b114c133c493c84386d1705f85229f5f7d44
Increased job postings on LinkedIn all across the globe, further supporting the idea that Pure Cloud Adoption is looking strong.
https://preview.redd.it/5zenasprznf51.png?width=1092&format=png&auto=webp&s=a492e227e2208fe89925c9b7fe365634f7ffde6a
Technically: This broke out through down-trend line a couple of days ago and as of right now looks to be pretty oversold. Looks like its found support at the 50 DMA and zooming out , the chart just looks like to me that it's coiling up for a big breakout.
https://preview.redd.it/wxtz8minmnf51.png?width=1208&format=png&auto=webp&s=7baabbd3e8f97dfc8bd0d5bfa512613c2eea4921
These fucking shorts are going to get squeezed out hard. Potential short squeeze coming?
https://preview.redd.it/lh8lp08funf51.png?width=1533&format=png&auto=webp&s=921b6684369e25e94f00ed96a404458028e540c8
**So what's the play?**I'd like to see RSI break out of the downtrend and the divergence between price & momentum ends at some point. If/when RSI breaks out, I want to play this thing aggressively with bullish call calendar spreads....THAT IS IF I HAD SOME FUCKING BUYING POWER (FUCK YOU UBER)....Soooo really what I'll be doing is asking my wife's boyfriend sometime this weekend for a loan. That way on Monday I can buy some $PSTG 9/18 $17.5 & $20 calls at open and YOLO my saddness away for a week.God forbid, I might even buy of those things called "shares" I heard about from /investing if at all possible because in all honesty, I really do feel like this is a good company to hold in a long term growth portfolio.Pure Storage is NOT looking like your average KODK prostitute to flip or scalp and actually more like someone you'd bring home to your dads.
EARNING DATE: 8/25
Pure Storage has a history of beating estimates and rocketing up. Over the last 20 quarters, the company beat revenue 17 quarters by an average of $4.9 million or about 3%. Out of the three times that the company missed on revenues, once was due to supply fuck-ups at one of its distributors and the other two times were due to Average Selling Prices declining faster than the company forecasted. Higher-than-expected ASP declines (due to NAND oversupply) is one of the risks of the storage business...but then again NAND prices look to be recovering now if MU's earning isn't fucking with us and telling us fibs. Big money is forecasting revenue to be around $396 million, essentially flat year-over-year, and EPS of a disrespectful ass penny....Fuck that conservative ass guidance! I think PSTG is going to blow that shit out the water. This chart shows Pure Storage’s past performance and we all know for sure that past performance = future results.....right?
https://preview.redd.it/4xflpezdhnf51.png?width=623&format=png&auto=webp&s=c1660a80a1a1821ef8098791a8cee632e25f1445
My Prediction: After ER8/25, Pure Storage will hit new 52 week highs.$20.50 - $23.50 is my guess. Bold prediction, $27.50+ by the EOY and $50 by December 2021.
tldr: PSTG 9/18 $17.5 & $20 calls

edit: for those that bought into this, I'm in this with you!
Let's pray for a rebound next week. also, Fuck Cisco!
submitted by OnYourSide to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Baseball Card Flipping Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to Flipping [link] [comments]

Beating the UK brokerage via true arbitrage - £8k -> £98k ($128k) since 21st April

Beating the UK brokerage via true arbitrage - £8k -> £98k ($128k) since 21st April
Alright you American autists, here's a gains post from the UK across the pond - listen up because it's pretty incredible, managed to screw over our broker to turn ~£8k into £98k / $128k USD by reading the small print, true u/fuzzyblankeet style.

https://preview.redd.it/9mlup18v0q951.png?width=343&format=png&auto=webp&s=aea1393d304d16063d62d54d30cc5be9b23d937a
Unfortunately, we don't have options trading, commission free robinhood which crashes, or any other US based degeneracy, but instead we British chaps can trade "CFDs" ie. 'contracts-for-difference', which are essentially naked long / short positions with a 10-20% margin (5-10x leveraged), a 'holding cost' and you could theoretically lose more than your initial margin - sounds like true wallstreetbets autism, right? Well grab a lite beer (or whatever you lite alcoholic chaps drink over there) and strap in for this stuff:
So, CMC Markets, a UK based CFD brokerage, wanted to create a West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil 'Spot' product, despite WTI contracts trading in specific monthly expirations which can thus have severe contango effects (as all of you $USO call holders who got screwed know) - this was just a product called "Crude Oil West Texas - Cash", and was pegged to the nearest front-month, but had no expiry date, only a specific holding cost -> already a degenerate idea from their part.
So in early April, just before when the WTI May-20 expiry contract 'rolled' at **negative** $-37, the "WTI Cash" was trading at $15 at the time, but the *next* month June-20 expiry was still $30+ we (I am co-running an account with an ex-Goldman colleague of mine) simultaneously entered into a long position on the "WTI - Cash" product, and went short on the "WTI Jun-20 expiry", a pure convergence play. Sure enough, the June-20 tanked the following week, and we made over £35k, realised profits. But meanwhile the May-20 also tanked, and we were down £28k. But rather than realise this loss, we figured we could just hold it until Oil prices recover, and profit on both legs of the trade.
However, CMC Markets suddenly realised they are going to lose a lot of money with negative oil prices (Interactive Brokers lost $104m, also retards), so they screwed everyone holding the "WTI - Cash" product trading at $8 at the time, and pegged it to the December 2020 expiry trading at $30, with a 'discount factor' to catch up between the two.
https://preview.redd.it/zjjzyahx0q951.png?width=517&format=png&auto=webp&s=9523bab878f06702133631f12c1109081f299f65
Now fellow autists, read the above email and try to figure out what the pure arbitrage is. CMC markets will charge us a 0.61% **per day** holding cost (calculated as the 10x levered value of whatever original margin you put up, so in our case £8k*10x=£80k*0.61% = £500 per day, £1.5k on weekends for extra fun) on our open positions, but also "increase" the position value by 0.61% per day vs. the **previous day's** WTI - Cash value. Got it yet? No? Still retarded? Here's where maths really helps you make tendies:-> If your 'cost' is fixed at 0.61% of your original levered position, but your 'gains' are 0.61% of the previous day's position, then your gains will be ever increasing, whereas your costs are fixed.
So we added some extra £££ (as much as we could justifiably put into a degenerate 10x levered CFD account) and tried to see if it works. Long story short, it does. At this point in July we were making **over £1k per day on a £8k initial position*\* regardless where the WTI Dec-20 fwd moved.
Unfortunately, eventually CMC markets realised what utter retards they were, and closed down the arbitrage loophole, applying the holding costs to the previous day's value. But not before we turned £8k into £98k, less holding costs.
https://preview.redd.it/uh0f8knz0q951.png?width=553&format=png&auto=webp&s=c7e629f72de5aeb4e837ccef44ecae708f058bee
Long story short, puts on $CMCX they're total retards, and given what a startup robinhood / other brokerages are, never assume that only they are the ones taking your tendies away, sometimes you can turn the tables on them!
submitted by mppecapital to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

M1 Plus Review

Intro:
Bought into M1 Plus from a $60/yr Promotion 2 months ago. I had an investment account already, and even one of the first spend accounts. I had declined the offer for M1 Plus at $125/yr.
This is a first review of M1 Plus after two months of use and a bit of a dive into the value of its features from a financial and user experience point of view.
Value:
This is a pretty simple one. Do the math. The interest vs. your other checking account multiplied by the amount of cash you’d be keeping in there for M1 Spend. If you’re borrowing from M1 too, the 1.5% difference (or whatever difference there is between M1 Borrow and your next best offer) multiplied by the amount of money you’d like to borrow. If all these add up to greater than whatever annual fee is offered, go for it.
Otherwise, it’d be a very expensive metal card. But if 4 waived ATM fees go a long way to save you money, that should be worth considering too, however, there are tons of cards and products that’ll waive said fees, some even for unlimited transactions and no upfront cost. Just because M1 is offering this benefit as part of a premium package doesn’t mean it’s impossible to find for free somewhere else.
XP:
It is a great experience. I constantly invest lumps of $500 into my portfolio all the time. It’s quick, easy, and immediately fulfilling. Not that other brokerages don’t do this. But M1 is clearly focused on showing you your long term progress on your investment goals. It uses a money weighted return formula so that you know how much your capital has been making you to easily compare to the return of bank accounts and investments. There’s a reason their product is called “Invest” and not “Trade”, more on that later. But this means it’s primarily suited for this purpose. During the Covid crash, I took to Robinhood to place my Put Options on the S&P because high frequency derivatives trading and M1 basically speak different languages. All this to say, it feels amazing to watch your investments accounts slowly creep up as you continue to dollar cost average into the market, but this has some drawbacks.
Pies. While fun and easy to build, mix and match, they are not a very common mechanic to implement on amateur portfolios. Selling stocks can be quite the process on M1, and the platform will try its darnest to discourage you from making any but the most basic adjustments to your portfolio. Its really only suited for the “set it and forget it” mindset, which is not to say you can’t mess around with your money as you please, but it’s just so perfect for investing and watching your money grow with a long time horizon. The plots will show you your progress and encourage you to keep a regular deposit schedule. But try trading into and out of a stock, or a set amount of shares, or even thinking about playing with derivatives and other financial instruments: slim pickings.
The numbers make a lot of sense, too. I’ve been investing for about 5 years now, and my latest craze has been leverage. I’ve read about how the optimal leverage ratio for the S&P on average was 2.0 or 100% levered up, and looked up the historical comparisons to corroborate. Shopping around for margin accounts and available capital, it’s tough to beat the 2% rates at the moment. I’ve been slowly levering up during the latest market rally to great effect and the low interest really pumps up those numbers. Having this much cheap capital, not just for leverage, but also for life is worth more than just the time value of money. I would make the point that this is made even more valuable by having all your financial services on the same platform, as you really get to do with your money as you please and move it around to withdraw it to your hearts content.
My real issue was with Spend. Not a problem with the product but myself, in trying to justify the annual fee. I weighed how much money it would make sense to keep in Spend as opposed to an online savings account. To keep cash a couple of months ago, it made more sense to opt for ally or marcus as they were offering close to 1.55% on cash. But as their rates have plummeted, getting 1.0% on a CHECKING account has been an absolute godsend in this crazy economy. This account works for just about anything with the notable exception of checks... in a checking account which I suspect is the reason for the “Spend” branding the product was marketed with. When it’s hard to even find 1% on a savings account, a 1% APY on checking is no-worries approach to cash investment.
Ultimately, having all of these balances displayed together on the Transfers tab is huge in terms of consumer experience. This, however, should not be a replacement for true “Dashboard” that could show an overview of all your money moves and account balances.
Ideas:
M1 Trade. Admittedly, I do see how this can be very contrary to the philosophy, product and experience that M1 has worked to create. That being said, thinking that your customer will always prefer to have their money invested into automatically allocated pies is a little short-sighted.
Opening a much more DIY Trading product on M1 would of course have them incur tons of costs in handling and verifying transactions of all the individual financial, but many places already offer such services for free, some are even profitable at it. An M1 Trade product would also need integrating the Invest product because regardless of what you’re doing on the platform, you still consider your money your investments and want to see it all together. Pies and individual Buys would have to play nice together, and that does sound like a difficult endeavor.
I keep a couple of accounts with different mixtures of my pies for all my purposes. I also handle the investments for a few of my family members, which will become relevant shortly. You can obviously set up as many accounts as you wish and move money into them as you desire, but this can get you into some warmer water. If two of your pies hold most the same securities and you just want to have a different pie for a different account, you’ll have to call up to pause trading so that your pies have a chance to get to know each other and not force you to sell and buy right back into the same assets just to incur the taxes. It’s a bit of a hassle, and I would argue, on purpose.
For Pies themselves, I often find myself wanting to make small tweaks to pies but then quickly let it go as removing slices would automatically trigger a massive sell off that incurs taxes. From a conversation with tech support, I gathered that the best way to do this was simply pause trading on your account, and change the pie you want all your money to go into. Editing pies is fine and easy, but completely swapping a pie for another one led me to believe that it would sell put of all my holdings even if the old and new pie had many of those same holdings. If this is me being stupid, good, if it’s a gap in features, I hope M1 lets you simply swap a pie for any other and gives you the option either sell everything, sell only what is 0 in the second pie, or sell nothing and simply continue aiming for the allocation of the new pie without touching your previous investments.
Lastly, an iPad app. I’m a big fan of the iPad and the iPad Pro in particular. I’ve found myself using it far more than my laptop which is now strictly reserved for long work sessions (I write and edit for a YouTube Channel) and watching content in groups of people (15” MBP Speakers are the stuff of legend). But for anything else, I subconsciously grab the iPad. It’s annoying to have the website be the best M1 experience on the iPad. I understand that making a compelling iPad investing app is its own mountain to climb, but a lot of the Mobile app’s functionality can be ported over without too much of a hassle. Charles Schwab has an iPad app based 99% on the iPhone app that still performs all the same functions, just on the bigger screen, which is the whole point of the iPad in the first place. While it’s not a top shelf iPad app (there are only a select few) the Schwab app is lovely and I’m begging M1 for anything that doesn’t force me to use my iPad in portrait mode to use a blown up iPhone app. Again, this app doesn’t have to be a world beater, just a decent looking and bigger version of the iPhone app that would go a long way to boost the M1 customer experience.
Closing Remarks:
Obligatory YMMV disclosure: it’s about the math, I won’t bore you with my own, but I was just over the line when it made sense for me to opt into the $60/yr promo.
That being said, M1’s value has been a lot about the experience. The future of finance is free. No brokerage should be making money on transaction commissions or administrative fees, it’s a relic from the before times when you needed people who knew people on wall street to do your trading. At this point its not even worth any perceived convenience.
The clever ones reading this will point out that, while true, many brokerages already offer a wide variety of free services. Many of them, even, that M1 doesn’t offer.
The true spirit of this review is to express my personal opinion on the value of M1 Plus and how the customer experience is its edge in the ebrokerage market. Rates are competitive, but it is a brand new way to consider finance and its role in your life and society.
TL;DR
Spend is pretty competitive for a checking account, and as long as you’re not using checks too often, its a no brainer for anyone with close to $10,000 in cash just sitting somewhere.
Invest is beautiful, but the free version is exactly as good, more windows means very little with the limited trading you’re allowed to do anyway.
Borrow is brilliant, hella flexible and competitive rates.
8/10 Would recommend to a friend.
submitted by TomasFCampos to M1Finance [link] [comments]

AEF - A Misunderstood Superannuation Fund

AEF - A Misunderstood Superannuation Fund
Although AEF uniquely benefits from the structural tailwinds of both superannuation and ethical investing, we believe it remains misunderstood as an expensive traditional fund manager.

The Opportunity
Australian Ethical Funds (ASX.AEF) is a public market superannuation fund manager. The perception of the company itself vs. the industry is nicely summarised by the two figures below. Herein lies the opportunity.

https://preview.redd.it/jhvvua1t5oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e511deb4411e81840ffcf8b635e1d8f7b78eeb6e
AEF is a renowned Australian fund manager that fits within the ESG trend. It represents one of the only pure play superannuation investments in the Australian public market, with 67% of funds under management (FUM) coming from superannuation. The stock bounced exceptionally from a low of $2 in March, reaching a high of $9 in June, and has since retraced towards the low $4s. Previously, the business traded at $6+ following its announcement of end of year FUM and expected earnings figures. On 8th August IOOF Holdings (ASX.IFL) – 19.9% shareholder – announced it was divesting 15% of its stake in AEF. IOOF is a peer and platform provider which offers AEF products to its clients. The investment was sold at $5.24 vs. market price of $5.90. IOOF disclosed it was selling its AEF investment (at a gain) to raise much needed liquidity. The block trade was viewed negatively by the market, with AEF immediately re-rating to below $5.24 and trending downwards (towards low $4s) ever since. The current share price of $4.17 (24 August close) implies the stock is trading at ~51x FY20 earnings guidance, which is slightly above historical levels despite substantially improved performance and outlook. We suspect that the FY20 results will be aligned with guidance (as demonstrated historically) provided in the quarterly FUM update and guided earnings figures. Results have also been positive across its peers throughout mid to late August (see ‘Roadmap’).

https://preview.redd.it/t4oy3ksu5oj51.png?width=478&format=png&auto=webp&s=e2a88ef0bf70fba2e85d36bc71a1df2994217dcf
Company History
AEF began as Australian Ethical Investments (AEI) in 1986 and was owned by 600 insider shareholders before listing. It is a superannuation fund – so revenue is derived from fees on managing invested funds. By 2005, the business managed four unit trusts and a superannuation fund:
· Australian Ethical Balanced Trust (est. 1989)
· Australian Ethical Equities Trust (est. 1994)
· Australian Ethical Income Trust (est. 1997)
· Australian Ethical Large Companies Share Trust (est. 1997)
· Parent of Australian Ethical Superannuation (est. 1998)
The investments of the trust and super fund are guided by ‘The Charter’ – a series of positive and negative investment screens that must be taken into account when selecting securities for inclusion.

https://preview.redd.it/cye711106oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=60c149549d7d752c26108c662ec319b56ebf371a
In July 2005, the government enacted policy that afforded more choice to individual employees with regards to their superannuation provider (marking the beginning of a positive era for the superannuation industry). In that same year, AEF registered for a superannuation license which it was granted in 2006. Back in 2005/06 the company did not split out superannuation FUM, but FUM increased from $311m in Jun-05 to $380m in September-05 following this policy shift – suggesting there was an existing demand for ethical investment products in superannuation.
From 2005 to 2011, AEF grew total FUM from $311m to $644m, despite muted FUM growth through the GFC-era. In 2012, the business began separating out its superannuation FUM-growth to improve its visibility. This era saw FUM increasing from $617m in 2012 to $4.05bn as at 30 June 2020.
From 2016-19 reduction in FUM-based fees has seen suppressed revenue growth vs. FUM growth. This has resulted in several step changes in FUM-based revenue margins (revenue / FUM) as a result of lower overall fees earned on products. We view this shift as a positive in the long-run since AEF has competitively priced its funds, entrenching their competitive advantages (discussed below) and reducing the temptation that fee-conscious members switch funds. Since AEF has ratcheted the cost of their funds downwards (often ahead of their peers and industry averages), we believe fee compression improves the durability of AEFs revenue compared to peers who are yet to compress their margins.

https://preview.redd.it/fcq5jog26oj51.png?width=453&format=png&auto=webp&s=d194c8778727e9adf1ebc162e6b181d8207cc292
Business Model
AEF has a relatively simple business model – revenue is derived from fees on managing invested funds. The funds it manages includes retail, institutional and wholesale (non-super) funds, as well as superannuation funds. We are most interested in the superannuation business although the direct and indirect benefits associated with the funds management business are a noteworthy component to the brand and investment management infrastructure (i.e. ideation / performance fee generating / high performing ESG). Until 2012, AEF did not explicitly separate its super vs. non-super FUM. We believe this contributed to its (mis)perception as a traditional fund manager rather than a superannuation fund. Thankfully, since 2012 AEF has provided details relating to the composition of its FUM (below), and noticeably the growth in its superannuation FUM has been the driving force of the business.

https://preview.redd.it/6ccbtqm36oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=6fb4e11064313ca9ab7b57186b2eddc6be62b928
Competitive Advantage
1. Superannuation Exposure: Superannuation FUM is higher growth and lower risk than traditional managed funds. Superannuation funds are regulated to grow at 9.5% due to the Superannuation Guarantee (the Australian Government mandated superannuation contribution). The regulatory framework could see this increase up to 12% in the medium-term and 14% in the long-term. For the purpose of our analysis, we have assumed a constant 9.5% contribution – so any increase would be additional upside. More importantly, excluding fulfilling conditions of release (i.e. death) an individual's superannuation cannot be withdrawn until retirement. Much like the Superannuation Guarantee, withdrawals are also mandated on a schedule that increases as a percentage of FUM with age (beginning at 4% and increasing to 14%). Consequently, the minimum inflows and withdrawals are predictable (and we note the vast majority of individuals do not deviate from these minimum levels due to inertia). Because of this mandated growth, Australia has the fourth largest pension sector in absolute terms and second largest relative to GDP (below). In 2020, the total superannuation pool is ~$2.1trn and growing. It is estimated that by 2040 superannuation assets could be as much as $9trn according to the Australian Treasury.

https://preview.redd.it/wenevil56oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=c2210a8e26816af1ebf798d82c414c61760c5d5e
Alternatively, traditional managed funds are subject to redemption risk, caused (typically) by performance and myopic investor behaviour associated with general market movements. Therefore, FUM growth for traditional managed funds must be attracted through marketing and distribution channels. This inextricably links fund inflows and outflows to performance and marketing efforts, which in turn causes a clientele that is more expensive to acquire and retain, and a more volatile pool of assets. Alternatively, traditional managed funds may access capital through secondary capital raisings and the reinvestment of distributions; both of which are a country mile from a 9.5% government mandated contribution.
Logically, we wondered which (listed) asset could provide us with exposure to the exceptionally robust superannuation tailwind. We will not spend too much time detailing the industry dynamics and public market players as there is a lot of information to be found in various prospectus’ (see Raiz or OneVue prospectus). The main thing to understand is that superannuation funds can be separated into five buckets:

https://preview.redd.it/jyykix976oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=07e96ebc246a565546e400ef87018d3d3360cd48
After screening for diversified financials and financials businesses on the ASX there were 53 players with at least some revenue linked to superannuation. The revenue exposure desired is revenue linked to superannuation FUM (explained further in the ‘Valuation’). However, it is important to understand that gaining access to this lucrative industry is difficult for several reasons:
· Private industry funds – the gems of the industry have been private superannuation funds such as CBUS, Hostplus, and ESTA. We cannot access them as public market investors.
· Conglomerate financials – it is possible to gain some retail superannuation exposure within the banking majors such as CBA, WBC, ANZ and NAB. However, they represent insignificant exposure by revenue and profit and the stocks are driven by other risk and growth factors.
· Fund managers – fund managers may directly manage retail superfunds or SMSF funds such as Magellan, Platinum and Perpetual. However, there is limited visibility over superannuation FUM exposure.
· Superannuation adjacency businesses – superannuation exposure can also be housed within wealth / platform advisers such as like HUB24, Netwealth and OneVue. However, to varying degrees, these businesses are not purely exposed to superannuation-FUM linked revenue.
· Pure play sub-scale – the final example can be found in Raiz, which is a sub-scale business that has ~$450m in FUM of which 85% is funds management. It is possible to envisage this business as an AEF in 10-15 years with larger superannuation FUM exposure. Although the superannuation exposure representing $70m in FUM currently (vs. AEF $2.72bn) is vastly inferior to AEF.
For this reason, AEF is the closest to a pure play (at scale) superannuation player.
Putting this together, we believe AEF is likely to continue to grow its FUM at 20% p.a. YoY. This is principally due to AEF's ability to acquire new members and retain existing members. Therefore, to monitor this continued FUM growth going forward we encourage readers to look out of the number of superannuation members added in these upcoming results and beyond. AEF has grown its member base YoY consistently in an industry which has, on average, been relatively flat in terms of member growth. In 2019 AEF was the highest growing superannuation business in Australia across the previous 5-years.

https://preview.redd.it/c4t7jx596oj51.png?width=226&format=png&auto=webp&s=51e47aa607470ce6482ed30352183a6cf6043bff
1. Ethical, Social and Governance (ESG): Beyond the obvious tailwinds in superannuation, AEF is also exposed to another important trend: ESG. Needless to say, ESG investing is becoming not only popular but almost mandatory for corporate money managers. Younger demographic investors are increasingly concerned with the ethical and social impacts of corporate activity. This report by Harvard and another by State Street provide some interesting commentary on the issue. ESG ETFs have been growing at a CAGR of >30%, and State Street forecasts that the global ESG ETF market will increase from US$170bn in 2020 to US$1.3trn in 2030. Momentum for ESG ETFs has been building specifically in Australia, where AUM surged almost 300% — from A$554.1m in 2017 to A$2.2bn in 2019.
Whilst the ESG-shift has been occurring since the 2010s, State Street argue that COVID-19 will only further catalyse this shift by highlighting the inherent inequalities in society and health care systems, in turn, spurring social conscience. We note the following data points as indicators of this more recent catalyst:
· Perpetual’s recent acquisition of Trillium, a US-based ESG fund, shows the desire of traditional asset managers to become exposed to this space.
· BlackRock has started publishing more frequently and consistently on ESG trends and continued rolling out ESG products.
· Forager’s investment blog received frequent commentary from investors talking about negative screening on their gambling holdings which has never been the case in the past.
The key insight is that a growing proportion of the investment community through time is becoming concerned with ESG issues and this will drive fund flow. Industry data is pointing to the fact that this is a prolonged structural shift rather than a short-term trend.
2. Performance: AEF has improved upon their exposure to structural industry trends in superannuation and ESG through excellent fund performance. AEF's performance (below) has been consistently strong across all of their strategies (we highly recommend reading page 4 of Sequoia's June 15, 2020 "Investor Day Transcript" to highlight how governance and performance are complimentary). Such strong performance not only disincentivises members from switching to competitors and assists member acquisition, but also significantly enhances earnings at the group level. For instance, FY20 guidance provided on 7 July 2020 vs. 22 June had a midpoint difference of ~$2m. Given the long track record of the managers it is expected performance will remain strong.

https://preview.redd.it/p6shg5nc6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e65acb553371c6bc7c1f70ddfdf153e9e625117a

https://preview.redd.it/mtn23k7d6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=9a7ba471248070f9f05216cdf5bbcab2a1f9102b
Valuation
Key:
· FUM = funds under management
· FUA = funds under administration
· MA = managed accounts
· FU\ = total funds (FUM + FUA + MA)*
Valuing a Superannuation Member: Our valuation technique here will be somewhat unconventional. We will attempt to value the lifetime revenue per member (LRM) for AEF and for a traditional fund and then highlight the incongruity of their relative valuations.
The long-term nature of lifecycle retirement saving (and by virtue the true value of a superannuation fund) demands a long term perspective. Fortunately, the mandated nature of AEFs cash flows facilitates evaluating the lifetime value of a superannuation member. To estimate the LRM we consider the following: (i) life cycle expectations (i.e. retirement age and life expectancy); (ii) salary expectations; (iii) superannuation contribution rate; (iv) investment returns; (v) member "type;" (vi) fee structure; and (vii) a discount rate.
We begin by assuming a member makes $5,000p.a. at age 20, which grows to $130,000p.a. through the middle of their working life (35-50) and then declines to $90,000p.a. at 65 (noting these are gross values not inflation adjusted). Since the average member account balance for AEF is ~$60,000 (FUM of $4.05bn ($2.72bn of which is superannuation) / 43,000 members = $60,000 as at 30 June 2019), we can roughly assume that the average age of their member is between 30-35, which places them at the profitable end of this member acquisition cycle. Further, this member regularly contribute 9.5% of their earnings to their superannuation, which compounds at a rate of 6% p.a. Moreover, the prototypical member starts working / paying superannuation into AEF at age 20, retires at age 65, and redeems according to the minimum withdrawal schedule until age 85. However, how many members live according to this prescribed lifecycle; supported by an uninterrupted working life? What about people that take time off to raise children, either returning to part-time work or full-time work? We can model these archetypes also, which assumes much lower income growth and some years of earning no income. If we assume that society is roughly split into thirds by these archetypes (i.e. 1/3 uninterrupted, 1/3 interrupted and return part time, 1/3 interrupted and return full time), then we can calculate a weighted average LRM for the average member. Compressing fees by more than half to 50bps and assuming a 7% discount rate we arrive a weighted average discounted LRM of ~$18,000.
Whilst comparing this to the average member in another non-super fund is difficult for an array of reasons (i.e. average acquisition age, average income, average balance, average contribution, redemption allowance etc.), we can loosely estimate what this looks. Adopting the same framework as above, to estimate the LRM of an average managed fund member we must first define the managed fund member "archetype." First, we assume the average traditional fund member has a higher income profile (as lower income earners typically do not invest in managed funds). We tweak the income profile to peak at $180,000 between 35-50 and taper down to $120,000 by age 65. Second, we assume the acquisition age is 30 years rather than 20 to reflect that most individuals do not invest in traditional managed funds until later in life. Thirdly, we account for the non-compulsory nature of managed fund contributions. If we start with the marginal savings rate (10-year average of ~7%) as a proxy for available funds for investment and increase this to align with our ‘managed funds’ archetype who has higher income to 15%. We then assume that from this 15%, about 1/3 will be invested into a managed fun (or ~5%). Therefore, for our individual earning $180,000 during peak working years, this is an annual contribution of $7,200. Finally, we increase the discount rate to 9% since because redemptions are more likely in a traditional fund. Using these alternative assumptions, we arrive at a LRM of ~$5,000.
The significant difference in LRM helps explain why a superannuation business can command a much higher multiple of FUM or earnings. Further, we believe our estimate of LRM for a traditional fund manager is quite bullish (i.e. overstated) due to the following: (i) it assumes the individual works full-time for their entire life; and (ii) it assumes the individual stays with the fund from age 30 to 65 and makes uninterrupted and stable contributions. Although dollar cost averaging is touted as an eighth wonder of the world, we are doubtful it is applied as often as it is spoken.
Trading Multiples Valuation: Valuing AEF on a relative basis is difficult given the lack of peers. Against traditional fund managers (i.e. Magellan, Perpetual and Platinum), which trade between 5-20x earnings, and superannuation exposed platforms (i.e. Netwealth and Hub24), which trade between 25-40x earnings, AEF looks relatively expensive. We are acutely aware that AEF is currently (at ~$4.2) trading at 12.6% of FUM and ~51x earnings; and at its peak (~$9) was trading at 25% of FUM and 120x earnings. We believe the valuation difference is driven by the quality of the FUM managed and, therefore, the quality of the earnings growth.
Given their high alignment to superannuation, NWL and HUB are the two most comparable firms to AEF. As the trailing figures show, AEF appears to be trading on par with its peers. However, an important nuance is the trailing figure for AEF is based on 2019 earnings, whilst for NWL and HUB it is based on FY20 earnings given they have already reported. As such, on a like-for-like basis AEF’s ‘trailing’ earnings multiple (based on the mid-point of management’s guidance) is actually ~51x. This means it is trading below NWL and HUB, despite the fact that the majority of those businesses’ FU* is linked to FUA rather than FUM, which has a lower monetisation rate. Not to mention, the split between superannuation and managed funds is not as clearly delineated as is the case with AEF. What is also evident is limited analyst coverage of AEF and lack of forecast guidance assisting the market to predict growth (as is the case with NWL and HUB).
Relative to traditional fund managers (i.e. PPT, PTM and MFG), we note the substantial difference in FUM and business quality. AEF hosts the highest monetization rate (Rev/FUM), even whilst facing fee compression, with the highest FUM growth among its investment management peers. Furthermore, we expect EBIT margins will improve from ~30% toward its larger traditional fund managers peers due to economies of scale over time that we believe will more than offset any fee compression. AEF has also supported a very high ROE due to its sticky clientele and service-based business model. The combination of: (i) best in class monetization; (ii) high LTM and increasing membership base; (iii) improving margins; and (iv) high ROE will make for an incredible growth engine on earnings in the long term. Thus, AEF is a higher quality business with ~4x+ the LCM of a traditional fund trading at only a 2-3x premium using current ratios...

https://preview.redd.it/nffeuvef6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e0aed3fcb4464355aa965ed151d6dc2e484ff4b8
Risks
We note the following investment risks with AEF:
  1. Fee Compression – The funds management industry is subject to fee compression across both funds and superannuation funds. There has already been a lot of restructuring of AEF’s fees since 2016. The investment product(s) they advocate is also one that serves an ethical / moral dimension and can arguably be charged at a premium above market. Notwithstanding fee compression beyond that which we have considered would place downward pressure on margins.
  2. Member Attrition – The stickiness of AEF's membership base is a hallmark of their competitive advantage although this could be reversed over time due to poor performance or corporate mismanagement. We encourage the reader to keep an eye on member growth and net inflows over time.
  3. Product Reproduction – There is no official IP upon ESG investing and new products are increasingly being promoted to capture market share of this growing market. We believe AEF's early mover and strong brand serve to mitigate this risk.
  4. Regulatory Risks – Changes in the superannuation regulatory environment can be material. This has long been debated within the public domain although it has been viewed as politically unfavourable to change the superannuation system without a reasonably long lead time and grandfathering provisions, which we hope would make any changes unlikely and less meaningful.
Investment Roadmap
Peers’ Earnings Updates: In summary, the FY20 results of peers indicate that businesses with revenues dependent on investment funds have performed quite strongly during this period.

https://preview.redd.it/np04rasg6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=0de02bee60036e9bd71068815e618c2f3711db24
Earnings Announcement: Earnings release on 26 August 2020 should provide for the first catalyst to remind the market of the AEF's fundamental performance. The key figures here will be superannuation FUM, superannuation members and FY20 earnings. AEF will also provide ongoing quarterly FUM announcements, with the following update due in early October. We may also see a mid-August FUM figure in the most recent announcement. Finally, AEF has historically provided updated FUM in back-dated results announcements. Evidence of this occurring can also be found in HUB's most recent announcement:

https://preview.redd.it/jz8frxfi6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=325d7973e1eb6c98e714dea69306b1ebf8ab0cc7
Private Market Activity: Whilst we think that a private equity buyout is unlikely for AEF, further media exposure and transaction data points should help the public value these assets. There have been some recently executed and rumoured deal activity in the space through 2020. Notably, KKR – one of the largest US-based global private equity funds – bought a 55% stake in Colonial First State valued at ~$3bn from CBA. The implied valuation was ~16x EBITDA, despite the quality of business model and LTM of members being substantially weaker than AEF. There is similar PE interest in NAB’s MLC Wealth, with US funds CC Capital and FC Flowers on second round bids for the asset. NAB's MLC Wealth business caught the attention of Carlyle, BlackRock, and KKR earlier in the year although deals were not executed. The interest from KKR in Colonial is particularly notable, given Scott Bookmyer (KKR partner) who refers to Australian superannuation as the ‘the envy of the western world’. We believe AEF may benefit indirectly from private equity interest, which will confirm both the long-term value and viability of their business model.
submitted by Bruticus91 to ASX_Bets [link] [comments]

Selling Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
I also keep a few cards for my personal collection (more on that below). Here are the cards I have kept so far.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to baseballcards [link] [comments]

Baseball Card Flipping Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to Entrepreneur [link] [comments]

CAMS IPO Analysis

IPO Filings/DRHP’s are some of the best places to learn from when you are trying to understand the company and industry it operates in. In this letter, we will delve into the IPO filing of CAMS (the largest RTA in the country)

Introduction:

Shareholders

Shareholding pattern is available here. The subreddit does not let us post pictures.

Growth Drivers:

Services provided by RTA’s to AMC’s:

Revenue Model:

In addition, RTA’s also have offer similar services to insurance companies for policy servicing of e-insurance policies. There are 4 insurance repositories in India :

Competitive Landscape

Following are the are the mutual fund registrar and transfer agents operating in India:
See market share and total AUM of top fund houses here.
CAMS services the 4 out of the top 5 AMC’s and 9 of the 15 largest AMC’s. It has been able to manage and hold on to its market share in the last few years: See chart here.
CAMS is the clear leader vs/ peers in profitability with RoE of 29.5% , PAT margin of 19% and witnessed the revenue CAGR of 20% over 2016-19: See chart here.
CAMS also has a 3X higher business per branch despite having only 22% higher number of branches than Karvy: See chart here.
There are multiple reasons for the oligopolistic nature of the RTA industry leading to significant entry barriers:
CAMS also has a significant presence in insurance repository market: Given the miniscule penetration of e-policies, there is a significant headroom for growth in this market.

Risks:

CAMS Overview:

Business Structure:

See chart here.
CAMS operates in 7 business verticals namely: Mutual Funds Services Business, Electronic Payment Collection Services Business, Insurance Services Business, Alternative Investment Fund Services Business, Banking and Non-Banking Services Business, KYC Registration Agency Business and Software Solutions Business
Mutual Fund vertical services
Electronic Payment Collection services:
Manage end-to-end automated clearing house transaction and electronic clearance services and service mutual funds, non-banking financial companies and insurance for automated payments
Insurance services:
Scrutinizing and processing of applications, training and onboarding of new insurance agents, submission of proposals, scanning, indexing and data entry, reminding policyholders of payment receipts
Alternative Investment Fund Services:
Similar to MF
Banking and Non Banking Services
Customer interface and back office processing
KYC Registration Agency Business:
Maintain KYC records on behalf of capital market intermediaries registered with SEBI, eliminating the need to repeat KYC procedure.
Software Solutions Business:
Software solutions business through subsidiary, SSPL which owns, develops and maintains the technology solutions for mutual fund clients, with a team of 362 people .

Employees:

Dividend Distribution Policy:
Notes on financial information:
Valuation :
Other comments:
Given that the growth in the CAM’s business with be primarily driven by the clients’ AUM growth , unless CAMS acquire more clients (which looks difficult to high entry barriers) and low pricing power, the earnings growth in the future will be largely in line with industry AUM growth.
Note: All the notes are based on the filed CAMS IPO prospectus , please consult your financial advisor for advice before investing in any product.

P.S - Apologies. A lot of the charts are images that cannot be posted on this subreddit. However, all of these are available on the source article - https://www.thegalacticadvisors.com/post/computer-age-management-services-decoded.
submitted by GalacticAdvisors to IndiaInvestments [link] [comments]

Due Diligence: Toromont Industries Ltd. - Building Together For An Exciting Future

Due Diligence: Toromont Industries Ltd. - Building Together For An Exciting Future
Hi,
This is my first attempt at writing a DD report. I hope it makes sense.
Just a few cautionary words:
  • Grammar (and English in general) is not a skill of mine. There will be a few parts that you might have to decipher, good luck.
  • I tried not to provide too much commentary and stick to the facts. I know you are spending your valuable time reading this and you probably don't want to listen to some random guy on the internet pontificate.
  • For those of you who are easily offended/triggered, can't take a joke, or sarcasm isn't your taste, DO NOT click the spoilers.
Lastly, the following is just my findings, by no means is it a representation of all the information out there. It is just the baseline for me to have confidence in becoming an owner of the Company. Do your own due diligence or talk to a financial advisor to find what is best for you and your financial situation.
Happy reading!

Highlights

  • Over the last 5 years the stock price has more than doubled.
  • Toromont dominates market share over everything east of Manitoba in Canada.
  • Customer base is heavily diversified, giving the Company many opportunities to expand into multiple industries.
  • Dividend has increased for 31 consecutive years. It has been paid for 52 consecutive years
  • The management team is extremely knowledgeable and have a good track record

Introduction

Toromont Industries Ltd. (TSE:TIH) provides specialized equipment in Canada and the United States. The Company operates two business segments: The Equipment Group and CIMCO. The Equipment Group supplies specialized mobile equipment and industrial engines for Caterpillar Inc. (NYSE:CAT). Customers for this business segment vary from infrastructure contractors, residential and commercial contractors, mining companies, forestry companies, pulp and paper producers, general contractors, utilities, municipalities, marine companies, waste handling companies, and agricultural enterprises. CIMCO offers design, engineering, fabrication, and installation of industrial and recreational refrigeration systems.
The Company was founded in 1961 and operates out of Concord, Ontario. As at December 31, 2019, Toromont employed over 6,500 people in more than 150 locations across central/eastern Canada and the upper eastern United States.
The primary objective of the Company is to build shareholder value through sustainable and profitable growth, supported by a strong financial foundation.

Description of the 2 Main Business Segments

  1. The Equipment Group includes the following 6 business units:
  • Toromont CAT: one of the world’s largest Caterpillar dealerships which supplies, rents, and provides product support services for specialized mobile equipment and industrial engines
  • Battlefield Equipment Rentals: supplies and rents specialized mobile equipment as well as specialty supplies and tools.
  • Toromont Material Handling: supplies, rents, and provides product support services for material handling lift trucks
  • AgWest: an agricultural equipment and solutions dealer representing AGCO, CLAAS and other manufacturers’ products
  • SITECH: provides Trimble Inc (NASDAQ:TRMB technology products and services. Trimble is a SaaS company that provides positioning, modeling, connectivity, and data analytics software which enable customers to improve productivity, quality, safety, and sustainability. Target industries: land survey, construction, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, asset tracking, mapping, railways, utilities, mobile resource management, and government.)
  • Toromont Energy: supplies, constructs, and operates high efficiency power plants up to 50 MW, using Caterpillar's leading power generation technologies. Toromont Energy operates plants that supply energy to hospitals, district energy systems, and industrial processes.
  • Performance in this segment mainly depends on the activity in several industries: road building and other infrastructure-related activities, mining, residential and commercial construction, power generation, aggregates, waste management, steel, forestry, and agriculture.
  • Revenues are driven by the sale, rental, and servicing of mobile equipment for Caterpillar and other manufacturers to the industries listed above.
  • In addition, Toromont is the MaK engine dealer for the Eastern seaboard of the United States, from Maine to Virginia.
  • MaK engine is a marine diesel engine manufactured by Caterpillar
  1. CIMCO is a market leader in the design, engineering, fabrication, installation and after-sale support of refrigeration systems
  • Performance in this segment is dependent on the activity in several industries: beverage and food processing, cold storage, food distribution, mining, and recreational ice rinks.
  • CIMCO has manufacturing facilities in Canada and the United States and sells its solutions globally.
  • CIMCO services the ice rinks of 23 out of 31 NHL teams. So if you are watching a game and the ice is shitty, you know who to blame… the Ice Girls, obviously.
  • For those of you who live in the GTA and have skated on The Barbara Ann Scott Ice Trail at College Park, the trail was created using CIMCO proprietary CO2 refrigeration technology.

Management

CEO, Scott J. Medhurst has been with the company since 1988. He was appointed President of Toromont CAT in 2004 and he came into his current position as President and CEO in 2012. He is a graduate of Toromont’s Management Trainee Program.
CFO, Mike McMillan joined the executive team in March of 2020. His predecessor, Paul Jewer is retiring this year and has been working with McMillan during the transition period.
VP and COO, Michael Chuddy has been with Toromont since 1995.
On average, leaders have 29 years of business experience and have served at Toromont for 19 years. Seeing long tenures, good stock performance, excellent business planning and execution is usually a sign of strong leadership. In addition, insiders hold more than 3% (~$175 million) of the company’s outstanding shares. Medhurst owns more than 170 thousand shares, Chuddy owns just under 100 thousand shares and the former CEO and current Independent Chairman of Board of Directors, Robert Ogilvie owns more than 2 million shares, making him the 4th largest stockholder. High insider ownership typically signals confidence in a company's prospects. Compare this to Toromont’s main Canadian competitor, Finning, where insiders own less than 0.4% ($12 million) of the company (this number varies depending on where you look, I just took the highest one I found).
Recently insiders have been selling stock (Figure 1). I cannot speak to the reasons why insiders are selling but the remaining position owned by the insider is sizable and demonstrates that the executive still has confidence in the company. Some of the reasons insiders sell are: they don't believe in the company’s future, they need money for personal use, they are rebalancing their portfolio, among others.
Figure 1: Buy and selling activity of insiders (the data is from MarketBeat, so take that for what it's worth).
On a somewhat unrelated but still related note, 50% of Toromont employees are also shareholders.

Growth Strategies

Toromont has five growth strategies (expand markets, strengthen product support, broaden product offerings, invest in resources, and maintain a strong financial position). I chose to focus on the following two strategies, as they seemed most prevalent.
  1. Expand Markets
  • Toromont serves a wide variety of end markets: mining, road building, power generation, infrastructure, agriculture, and refrigeration. This allows for many opportunities for growth while staying true to their core competency. Further expansion into new markets doesn't require Toromont to build a whole new business model or learn the intricacies of the new industry because their products stays the same. Thus, the main concern is the application/selection of the products for the customer.
  • Expansion is generally incremental. Each business unit focuses on market share growth and when the right opportunity presents itself, geographic expansion is archived through acquisitions.
  1. Strengthening Product Support
  • In an industry where price competition is high, product support activities represent opportunities to develop closer relationships with customers and differentiate Toromont’s product and service offering from competitors. After-market support is an integral part of the customer's decision-making process when purchasing equipment.
  • Product support revenues are more consistent and profitable.

Growth Through Acquisition

Rapid growth in this industry is generally driven through acquisitions. Toromont has gone through multiple acquisitions since the 90’s:
  • Acquisition of the Battlefield Equipment Rentals in 1996
    • Toromont grew Battlefield from one location to 82 locations
  • Acquisition of two privately held agricultural dealerships in Manitoba to form AgWest Equipment Ltd
  • Acquisition of Hewitt Group of companies in Q3 2017 for a total consideration of $1.0177 billion
    • $917.7 million cash ($750 million of which was finances through unsecured debt) plus the issuance of 2.25 million Toromont shares (equating to $100 million based on the 10 day average share price)
Acquisition of Hewitt Group of companies
This acquisition allowed Toromont to make headway into the Quebec, Western Labrador, and Maritime markets, as Hewitt was the authorized Caterpillar dealer of these regions. Hewitt was also the Caterpillar lift truck dealer of Quebec and most of Ontario and the MaK marine engine dealer for Québec, the Maritimes, and the Eastern seaboard of the United States (from Maine to Virginia).
Toromont had total assets of $1.51 billion before the acquisition, the acquisition added $1.024 billion in assets, nearly doubling the balance sheet (look at Figure 2 for more details about the acquisition).
Figure 2: (all numbers are in thousands) The final allocation of the purchase price was as of Dec 31, 2018, Note 25 of 2018 Annual Report. $1.024 billion was added to the Toromont’s B/S
Large acquisitions like this one can be the downfall of a company. Here are some of the risks highlighted by management at the time of the acquisition:
  • Potential for liabilities assumed in the acquisition to exceed our estimates or for material undiscovered liabilities in the Hewitt Business
  • Changes in consumer and business confidence as a result of the change in ownership
  • Potential for third parties to terminate or alter their agreements or relationships with Toromont as a result of the acquisition
  • Whether the operations, systems, management, and cultures of Hewitt and Toromont can be integrated in an efficient and effective manner
In 2018, the Company started and successfully completed the integration of the Maritime dealerships acquired through Hewitt under Toromont’s decentralized branch model (bottom up approach). Under a decentralized model, regional leadership make business decisions based on local conditions, rather than taking top down mandates. A bottom up approach is an advantage in businesses like Toromont where the customer mix can vary vastly from region to region. It allows for decision-making that is better aligned with customemarket needs and more attuned to the key performance indicators used to manage the business. In 2019, the integration of the decentralized branch model was implemented in Quebec after its success in Atlantic Canada in 2018. Successful integration of Hewitt into the Toromont family shows the depth of industry and business knowledge possessed by the management team. Being able to maintain inherited customer relationships and ensure low turnover is no easy feat. Many companies have completely botched these kinds of acquisitions. One that comes to mind is Sobeys (the second largest food retailer in Canada) acquiring Safeway for $5.8 billion. Three years later, they wrote off $2.9 billion as a loss because they did not anticipate the differences in consumer habits in Western Canada vs Eastern Canada, among other oversights.
The result of the acquisition and Hewitt’s integration with Toromont’s existing business produced a 39% increase in EPS in 2018 and 14% increase in 2019.

Dividend

Toromont pays a quarterly dividend and has historically targeted a dividend rate that approximates 30 - 40% of trailing earnings from continuing operations.
In February 2020 the Board of Directors increased the quarterly dividend by 14.8% to $0.31 per share. This marked the 31st consecutive year of increasing dividends and 52nd consecutive year of making a dividend payment. The five-year dividend-growth rate is 12.09%.
Table 1: Information about the last eight dividends

Risks/Threats and Mitigation

Dependency on Caterpillar Inc.
It goes without saying that Toromont’s future is heavily dependent on Caterpillar Inc. (NYSE:CAT). For those who don't know, Caterpillar is the world’s leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines, and diesel-electric locomotives. It has a market cap in excess of $68 billion. All purchases made by Toromont must be made from Caterpillar. This agreement has been standing since 1993 and can be terminated by either side with 90 days notice.
Given that the vast majority of Toromont’s inventory is Caterpillar products, Caterpillar’s brand strength and market acceptance are essential factors for Toromont’s continued success. I would say that the probability of either of these being damaged to an unrecoverable point are low, but at the beginning of this year, I would have said the probability of the world coming to a complete stop was very low too and look at what happened. Anything is possible. The reason this is a major consideration is because it's a going concern issue. Going conference is an accounting term for a company that has the resources needed to continue operating indefinitely until it provides evidence to the contrary. This term also refers to a company's ability to make enough money to stay afloat or to avoid bankruptcy. If there was irrevocable damage to Caterpillar’s brand, Toromont is no longer a going concern, meaning the company would most likely be going bankrupt or liquidating assets. The whole Company might not go under because the CIMCO, SITECH, and AgWest business units would survive but, essentially ~80% of the business would be liquidated.
In addition to the morbid scenario I laid out above, Toromont is also dependent on Caterpillar for timely supply of equipment and parts. There is no assurance that Caterpillar will continue to supply its products in the quantities and time frames required by Toromont’s customers. So if there is supply chain shock, like the one we just saw, there is the chance that Toromont will not have access to sufficient inventory to meet demand. Which in turn would lead to the loss of revenue or even to the permanent loss of customers.
Again, both of these threats have low a probability of occurring but either could single handedly cripple Toromont’s business. As of now, Caterpillar continues to dominate a large market share (~38% as per Gurufocus) in the industry against large competitors like John Deere, CNH Industrial, Cummins, and others.
Caterpillar's stock has been on a slow decline for a couple years but that is due to reasons beyond the ones that directly concern Toromont’s day-to-day operations. I would say if you don't believe in Caterpillar’s continued market share dominance, investing in Toromont is probably not for you.
Shortage of Skilled Workers
Shortage of skilled tradesmen represents a pinch point for industry growth. Demographic trends are reducing the number of individuals entering the trades, thus making access to skilled individuals more difficult. Additionally, the company has several remote locations which makes attracting and retaining skilled individuals more difficult. The lack of such workers in Canada has caused Toromont to become more assertive and thoughtful in their recruitment efforts.
To combat this threat, Toromont has/is:
  • Recruited 303 technicians to achieve growth targets
  • Created 208 student apprenticeship programs
  • Working with 19 vocational institutions in Toronto to teach about best practices and introduce the Company as a future employer to students
As a result of these initiatives and others, Toromont saw their workforce grow by ~8% 2019. Growing the workforce is one of the primary building blocks for future growth.
Cyclical Business Cycle
Toromont’s business is cyclical due to its customers' businesses being cyclical. This affects factors such as exchange rates, commodity/precious metal pricing, interest rates, and most importantly, inventory management. To mitigate this issue, management has put more focus on increasing revenues from product support activities as they are more profitable than the equipment supply business and less volatile.
Environmental Regulations Affecting Customers
Toromont’s customers are subject to significant and ever-increasing environmental legislation and regulation. This leads to 2 impacts:
  1. Technical difficulty in meeting environmental requirements in product design -> increased costs
  2. Reduction in business activity of Toromont’s customers in environmentally sensitive areas -> reduced revenues
Threats such as these come with a business of this type. As an investor in Toromont, you can't do much to mitigate these kinds of threats because it's out of your hands. Oil and gas, mining, forestry, and infrastructure projects are major drivers of the Canadian economy, so I think there will always be opportunity for Toromont to make money, regardless of government action.
Impact of COVID19
While the company had been declared as an essential service in all jurisdictions that it operates in, Q1 2019 results were lower as a function of COVID19 reducing activity in many sectors that Toromont services. Decline in mining and construction projects lead to a decrease in demand for Toromont products in the latter part of the quarter. Revenues were trending for 5-7% growth for the quarter before the effects of COVID19 were felt.
Management cannot provide any guidance on how to evaluate the impact of COVID19 on future financial results. They are focusing on ensuring the continued safety of employees and working with customers and the jurisdiction they operate in to evaluate appropriate activity levels on a daily/weekly basis. Lastly, management is keeping a close eye on how this crisis has led to an increase in A/R delinquencies and financial hardship for customers.
The Executive Team and the Board of Directors have taken a voluntary compensation reduction. Wage increase freezes and temporary layoffs have been implanted on a selective basis. Management believes that expanding product offerings and services, strong financial position, and disciplined operating culture positions the Company well for continued growth in the long term.
Competition
Toromont competes with a large number of international, national, regional, and local suppliers. Although price competition can be strong, there are a number of factors that have enhanced Toromont’s ability to compete:
  • Range and quality of products and services
  • Ability to meet sophisticated customer requirements
  • Distribution capabilities including number and proximity of locations
  • Financing through CAT Finance
  • E-commerce solutions
  • Reputation
  • Financial health

Main Competitor in Canada: Finning International Inc.

Finning International Inc. (TSE:FTT) is the world's largest Caterpillar dealer that sells, rents and provides parts and service for equipment and engines to customers across diverse industries, including mining, construction, petroleum, forestry and a wide range of power systems applications. Finning was founded in 1933 and is headquartered in Vancouver, Canada.

Toromont Industries Ltd Finning International Inc.
Market Cap $5.84B $3.02B
Price $65.66 $18.49
Dividend Yield 1.87% 4.36%
Number of Employees >6,500 >13,000
Revenues (ttm) $3.69B $7.57B
Trailing P/E Ratio 19x 11x
Price/Book 3.71x 1.35x
Profit Margin 7.71% 3.54%
Places of Operations Manitoba, Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador, most of Nunavut, and the Northeastern United States British Columbia, Yukon, Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, a portion of Nunavut, UK, Ireland, Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile
Table 2: A quick comparison between Toromont and Finning.
I am sure there are some people looking at this table and thinking Finning looks rather promising based on the metrics shown, especially in comparison to Toromont. Finning’s dividend yield, P/E, and price/book look more attractive. Their top line is 2x. Not to mention it operates worldwide and is the only distributor in the UK, while Toromont only operates in half of Canada.>! Before you go off thinking “I need to use my HELOC to buy some Finning,” as some people on this subreddit are prone to do, ask yourself: do you see any cause for concern in the metrics listed above? !<
One glaring question I have is: why is Finning trading at half of Toromont’s market cap given that it operates internationally and has twice the number of employees and revenues of Toromont?

Q1 2020 Financial Results


Figure 3: Q1 2020 Income Statement
Overall operating income, net earnings, and EPS all decreased even though Toromont saw an increase in revenue for the quarter compared to Q1 of 2019.
  • All of these decreases were contributed to COVID19, as the pandemic lead to increases in costs
Historically, Q1 has always been Toromont’s weakest quarter. Q1 accounts for ~20% of yearly earnings and is consistently the least profitable quarter. Toromont’s profit margin generally ranges from 5%-9% progressively increasing into the later half of the year. This is good news for investors with the thesis that the economy will return to "somewhat normal" in the latter half of this year. The majority of the earnings for 2020 are still on the table for Toromont to earn. If current conditions persist, or there is a second wave and lockdown later in the year, we will most likely see a regression in Toromont’s growth to last year’s levels or even lower.
Assuming the world does return to “normal,” many of Toromont’s customers (especially in mining and construction) may try to catch up for lost time with increases to their operational activity, leading to an increase in Toromont’s sales for the remainder of the year. Of course this is a major assumption but it’s a possibility.
Below is a comparison of the last eight quarters. You can see the clear cyclical nature of their business.
Figure 4: Last eight quarters of earnings

Sources of Liquidity

Credit
  • Toromont has access to a $500 million revolving credit facility, maturing in October 2022
  • On April 17 2020 they secured an additional $250 million as a one year syndicate facility
Cash Position
  • Cash increased by 22.6 million for the quarter
  • Cash from operations increased 13% Q1 2020 compared to Q1 2019
  • The company also drew $100 million from their revolving credit facility
  • $4 million dollars of stocks were repurchased during Q1 2020
Given their access to $750.0 million dollars of credit and cash on hand equaling $388.2 million, the Company should have sufficient liquidity to operate if COVID19 and its aftermath persist for an extended period of time.

Financial Analysis

Analysis of Debt
Historically, Toromont has had very low debt levels. The spike in late 2017 was due to the acquisition of Hewitt. Management paid off the debt aggressively in 2018. At the end of December 2019 Toromont had $650 million of debt maturing between 2025 and 2027. As a result of COVID19 the company has taken on more debt. This additional access to debt accounts of the slight uptick in historical debt in 2020 (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Toromont’s historical debt, equity, and cash
The long-term debt to capitalization ratio is a variation of the traditional debt-to-equity ratio. The long-total debt to capitalization ratio is a solvency measure that shows the proportion of debt a company uses to finance its assets, relative to the amount of equity used for the same purpose. A higher ratio means that a company is highly leveraged, which generally carries a higher risk of insolvency with it.
The debt-to-equity ratio is at 47% and debt-to-capitalization ratio is 32%, Toromont has $388 million in cash that could be used to pay down debt by nearly 50% and bring the net debt-to-equity to 23% and net debt-to-capitalization to 18%. As mentioned before, management is holding on to cash to insure sufficient liquidity during these times.
The implication of these ratios is that Toromont does not take on large amounts of debt to finance growth. Instead the Company leverages shareholders equity to drive growth.
For comparison, Finning has a debt-to-equity ratio of ~100% (it differs between WSJ, 99%, and Yahoo Finance, 101%). The nominal amount of their total debt is ~$2.2 billion, which gives them a long-term debt to capitalization ratio 62%. Finning carries $260 million in cash.
Figure 6: Toromont’s debt-to-capitalization and debt-to-equity ratios
Profitability Ratios
Return on equity (also known as return on net assets) measures how effectively management is using a company’s assets to create profits.
Toromont’s return on equity is generally around 20%. Go to Figure 6 to look at the ROE for the last 4 years. In comparison, Finning has had a ROE of ~11% for the last three years, about 3% in 2016 and a negative ROE in 2015 (as per Morningstar).
Return on capital employed (ROCE) tries to find the return relative to the total capital employed in the business (both debt & equity less short-term liabilities). Toromont’s ROCE (ttm) for March 31 2020 was 22%. This means for every dollar employed in the business 22 cents were earned in EBIT (earnings before interest and tax). Finning had a ROCE of 11% as of December 2019.
Liquidity Ratios
Working capital is the amount of cash and other current assets a business has available after all its current liabilities are accounted for. In the last ten years, Toromont’s working capital has fluctuated between 1.6 at its lowest (2018) to 2.8 at its highest (2016). At the end of 2019 it was at 1.8. Meaning current liabilities equate to 60% of current assets.
Interest coverage ratio is used to determine how easily a company can pay their interest expenses on outstanding debt. Toromont has an interest coverage ratio 15x (as per WSJ). Finning on the other hand is at 4x. At this point I feel like I'm just beating up on Finning.
For those of you who made it this far, I have to admit something to you. This whole post is just a facade to ask you a question that has never been asked on this subreddit before: Should I buy BPY.UN? It keeps going down and I'm worried if I buy it, it will keep going down and I'll lose money. I don't want to lose money. Although if you go through my post history, you'll see I've been looking at/buying penny stocks.

Key Performance Measures

Below is a chart with key financial measures for the last four years. A few things I want to highlight:
  • Toromont had large capital expenditure last year (most of it went to increasing inventory) so they have the choice to keep capital expenditure down this year and preserve cash
  • From the start of 2018 (aka end of 2017) to the end of 2018 Toromont stock was down about 3% while the TSX Composite was down more 12% and S&P was down 7%. This stock has a history of out performance not only on the upside but also on the downside. I'll go into a bit more detail in the next section.
Figure 7: Summary of key financial measure for the last four years

Price Chart Comparisons

I don't do technical analysis. To those who do, good luck to you because let's be real, you'll need it. This section is just to get an idea of past performance and evaluate the opportunity cost of investing in Toromont compared to a competitor or a board based index fund.
I thought it would be easier to look at pictures as opposed to reading a bunch of numbers off a table.
For the sake of not creating a picture album of screenshots, I just looked at charts for the last 5 years. If you're interested in looking at different time intervals you can do so on google finance.

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. Finning International Inc.
Figure 8: Five year price chart of TIH v. FTT
These are the only two Caterpillar distributors on the TSX, making them direct comparisons. If I was looking for exposure to this industry, I would be choosing between these two companies (on the TSX anyways). There isn't really much to evaluate here. It's like they saying: “A picture is a thousand words,” or in this case, it's 128%. If you have time, go look at the graph from August 1996 to now. I can safely say it hasn't been much of a competition. Toromont has outperformed by ~2500% in stock price appreciation alone. If you're a glass half full kind of person, I guess you could look at this disparity as Finning having enormous upside. LOL

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. S&P 500 Index
Figure 9: Five year price chart of TIH v. VFV
If I'm not buying individual stocks, I’m buying the S&P 500 and to a lesser extent a Nasdaq index fund. This gives me a second look at the opportunity cost of my money. The story is not as bad as the Finning comparison. If you had bought $100 dollars of Toromont stock 5 years ago, it would have turned into $207 today, whereas the same $100 dollars in VFV would have became $157.
Just a quick aside, you can see the volatility in Toromont’s stock is much higher compared to the VFV. VFV has a relatively smooth trend upwards while Toromont trends upwards in a jagged path. This is the risk of single stocks, they move up and down more erratically, leading inventors who don't have a grasp of the business or conviction in their pick to panic sell or post countless times on Reddit asking why their stocks keep going down. “I bought the stock last week and it's done 3% already, do you guys think it’s going bankrupt? I thought stonks only go up???”

  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. S&P/TSX Capped Industrials Index
Figure 10: Five year price chart of TIH v. ^TTIN
The S&P/TSX Capped Industrials Index isn't my favourite comparison for Toromont because its constituents cover many industries ranging from waste management (WCN), to railways (CNCP), to Airlines (AC, lol, had to mention it. I miss the days when there were double digits posts about AC. I wonder where those people have gone, because I can tell you where AC stock has gone... absolutely nowhere). Regardless, I used TTIN because I deemed it a better comparison to Toromont than the entire TSX. The story is on par with the other two comparisons. Toromont’s out performance is significant.
I just threw this bonus chart in here because when I saw it, I was like BRUHHH (insert John Wall meme)… It's completely unsustainable but that's impressive given the vast differences between the two.
  1. Toromont Industries Ltd v. NASDAQ-100
Figure 11: Five year price chart of TIH v. ZQQ
Now, of course, past performance does not dictate future results and all that good stuff, but it really gets you thinking about how the rewards disproportionately favours winners compared to the overall market. People are generally happy getting market returns (i.e. the just buy VGRO people) but being able to pick even a few winners really pays. This reminds me of the Warren Buffet quote: “diversification is protection against ignorance.” The context of the quote is that if you are able to study a few industries in great depth and acquire a wealth of knowledge, you can see returns astronomically higher than those who diversify across the board market. The problem then becomes you put yourself at risk of having all your eggs in one basket. Look at what's happening with Wirecard in Europe right now. This is why the real skill in investing is managing risk.

Analyst Price Targets and Estimates

The prince targets set for by analysts range from $63-$81. The average price target is ~$72, with the majority of targets within the 70-$71 range. Given the current price of $65.66, there is a ~10% upside. These price targets haven't changed much due to COVID19 even though revenues and EPS forecasts have been downgraded for 2020. The consensus estimate on 2020 revenues is $3.36 billion, down from the actual revenues of $3.69 billion in 2019 and the consensus EPS for 2020 is $3.01 down from actual EPS of $3.52 for 2019 and $3.10 for 2018. The fact that revenues and EPS forecasts have been downgraded, yet price targets remain untouched, for the most part, indicates that the effects of COVID19 are expected to be short-lived.
Figure 12: Earnings and estimate ranges for Toromont. Note: EPS numbers in this graphic are diluted EPS numbers.

Valuation

Multiples
Assuming P/E ratio stays the same as it has been for the last 12 months (~19x) and EPS goes down to ~$3.00 (as per analyst consensus), the implied price would be $57.
Using the last 12 months of revenues, the EV-to-Revenues ratio is at 1.56x. Assuming that ratio stays the same and with revenues estimated to be ~$3.36 billion, enterprise value (EV) comes out to $5.2416 billion. Using Q1 2020 figures for shares outstanding (82.015 million), cash ($388.182 million), and debt ($745.703 million), the implied price for a share is $58.94*.
\Note: Enterprise Value is equal to market cap plus total debt minus cash.)
Dividend Discount Model
The dividend discount model (DDM) is a method of valuing a company's stock price based on the theory that its stock is worth the sum of all of its future dividend payments, discounted back to their present value.
The average dividend growth rate is 12% for the last 5 years is 12%. There is no way Toromont can increase the dividend at this pace in the long term, thus, I chose a long term dividend growth rate of 5%. This is the assumed rate in perpetuity. The required rate of return will equal WACC, 6.85% (averaged from 2019 Annual Report). The dividend over the last year is $1.16 (two payments of $0.27 in 2019 and two payments of $0.31 for 2020).
The fair value equals $65.84.
Figure 13: DDM calculation.

Closing Thoughts

There is no doubt that Toromont trades at a large premium. The current P/E is 19x and the CAPE ratio (Shiller P/E) is 26x. The fair value of the Company as per Morningstar research is in the mid $60 range.
Based on all valuations I did and analyst price targets, I would start buying in the high $50 range or maybe the very low $60 range, but my belief in the company has to do with long term thematic trends and how the Company operates, rather than today's price. Although I have to admit, the price does look more attractive now than it did in the beginning of June when the stock hit new all time highs. It seems like the only companies hitting new all time highs these days are tech companies, so it's refreshing to find a non-tech company achieving the same feat.
Toromont is not going to double next year or the year after that. It is a relatively low margin business, with slow growth and a cyclical business cycle. I like that the Company has strong financials, low debt, and good management. They don't take shortcuts or unwarranted risk. Future growth will mostly be driven through acquisition, but management is cautious with acquisitions and don't overextend themselves. One of the biggest problems Finning has been facing for the last couple years is political and social turmoil in South American countries which is affecting their mining clients and thus affecting revenues/margins.
The Q2 earnings are reported on July 22 202. We should have a clearer picture on the prospects of the Company from management. Hopefully we have a better idea of the COVID19 situation by then too. Regardless, I think the company is in a position where its services will always be in demand so short term fluctuations are not something that shake my confidence in this pick.

Limitations and Further Areas of Research

By no means is this an exhaustive due diligence report. This is enough for me to feel confident in the business and its trajectory. Limitations/further areas of the research include:
  • Looking into the growth of each sector Toromont services and extrapolating that growth to calculate Toromont’s future growth opportunity.
    • As per IBIS Research the heavy equipment rental market in Canada is ~$8.3 billion. It grew 1.1% yearly for the last 5 years.
    • The US market is estimated to be $47 billion, with an average growth of 2% for the last 5 years
      • Sorry but I couldn't get my hands on future projections as each report is $750
  • More research into competitors
    • I chose to include Finning only for simplicity’s sake. But there are many other competitors like:
      • United Rentals (NYSE:URI) provides similar services to Toromont/Finning in 49 U.S. states, 10 Canadian provinces, Puerto Rico and four European countries. The only thing being they aren't distributors for Caterpillar.
      • Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc (TSE:RME) sells, leases, and provides product and warranty support for agriculture and industrial equipment in Western Canada
      • Holt Cat, N C Machinery, Ziegler CAT (none of these companies are publicly traded)
  • Further analysis can be done on the B/S and accounting treatments.
  • The effects of automation in the industry
    • Distributors in the US have started working with industrial automation companies to provide autonomous construction equipment on rent to contractors
      • Sunstate Equipment Co.'s partnership with Built Robotics
  • I was not able to do a discounted cash flow, which would be critical to finding the intrinsic value for Toromont and having true confidence in the company and its trajectory.
  • Further analysis of CIMCO and prospects of future growth
    • Based of the financials, CIMCO seemed like a small part of the business, which is why I mainly focused on the Caterpillar dealership side
These are not all the limitations or areas of further research, they are just the glaring one that came to mind.
>! I know I took a few shots at people in this post. It's all in good jest. If you're offended well.... maybe you should be. I don't know, you have to figure that out on your own or you could make a post on Reddit asking random people on the internet whether you should be offended or not. !<
Remember I'm not an expert, I'm just a random guy on the internet.

Disclosure

I am long Toromont. This information is not financial advice. Please do your own research and/or talk to a financial advisor. All data provided is current prior to the market opening on June 29, 2020. Inconsistencies in data can be due to many reasons, the foremost being that data was spruced from multiple different websites.
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