Margin Call Example: Trading With Just A $100 Deposit

Bitcoin Margin Trading

User guides and tips for margin trading bitcoin. Trade bitcoin futures with 10x to 20x leverage.
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XMR Trader, the Official Monero Trading Subreddit

The official Monero trading subreddit. Discuss price movements, market dynamics, news, and trades involving Monero here.
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Kumex - Margin Trading 20x Leverage

Kumex - Margin Trading 20x Leverage submitted by VladimirCarlRiley to CryptoMarkets [link] [comments]

KuCoin - Margin Trading 20x on Kumex

submitted by KKYohanne234 to cryptotrading [link] [comments]

Click image for more information Create a KuCoin account in just 10s and start trading to achieve up to 20x returns on margin trades and 100x returns on futures trades. Stake some of your favorite coins to earn up to 50% interest. Participate in raffles, giveaways, and airdrops.

Click image for more information Create a KuCoin account in just 10s and start trading to achieve up to 20x returns on margin trades and 100x returns on futures trades. Stake some of your favorite coins to earn up to 50% interest. Participate in raffles, giveaways, and airdrops. submitted by gettinbitz to FreeCrypto [link] [comments]

Increase Your Trading By 20x By Using KuMEX Margin Trading

submitted by mithens to cryptoinvestments [link] [comments]

KuCoin Launches Bitcoin Margin Trading Platform with up to 20X Leverage

KuCoin Launches Bitcoin Margin Trading Platform with up to 20X Leverage submitted by Crypto-Economy to cryptoeconomynet [link] [comments]

Binance [BNB] Officially Launches the Margin Trading Feature with up to 20X Leverage

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Margin Trade BNB on Delta Exchange | 20x Leverage

Delta Exchange has listed BNB perpetual swaps. Now, go long/short on BNB with 20x leverage.
These contracts are quoted in USD and margined & settled in BTC.
Trade BNB Here: https://www.delta.exchange/app/trade/BNB/BNBUSDQ
Besides BNB, Delta also offers some exciting alts for margin trading.
submitted by shubhrez007 to BNBTrader [link] [comments]

How can Facebook, a company growing revenues at 50% with 85% gross margins and $40B net cash, trade at 20x forward earnings?

It's outrageous! It's unfair!
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How can Facebook, a company growing revenues at 50% with 85% gross margins and $40B net cash, trade at 20x forward earnings?

It's outrageous! It's unfair!
submitted by Jowemaha to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Bitfinex’s LEO tokens now listed on Delta Exchange and available to trade. Long/ short LEO with up to 20x leverage. The contract is margined and settled in $USDC.

Bitfinex’s LEO tokens now listed on Delta Exchange and available to trade. Long/ short LEO with up to 20x leverage. The contract is margined and settled in $USDC. submitted by jeffyal to bitfinex [link] [comments]

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading submitted by desantis to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading

BTCC Announces Launch of Pro Exchange Allowing 20x Margin Trading submitted by BTCNews to BTCNews [link] [comments]

Margin Trade with 10x/20x leverage on OKCoin. (Guide)

Margin Trade with 10x/20x leverage on OKCoin. (Guide) submitted by fractalhedge to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Dot-Com Survivors Give Their Verdict on the Current Tech Boom

submitted by uncertainlyso to SecurityAnalysis [link] [comments]

PRPL Nurples- Why purple valuation just might make your NIPS hard - DD inside

PRPL Nurples- Why purple valuation just might make your NIPS hard - DD inside
All- I have received hundreds of DM asking where the stock is going. I have received questions such as: where do you think it stops, is it over valued, undervalued, should my mom invest, should i Yolo, should i sell and take profits? blah, blah blah. Here is some DD- stop asking me about where this ends up because I don't know for sure but I have some Feely Good estimates. I hope this post makes your nipples hard and if it doesn't you're probably a gay bear.
I am going to give you a quick run down of what my expectations are for Q2 earnings and it will include the good, the bad and the ugly. The ugly being the warrant accrual that will hurt GAAP.
First of all, There is little that needs to be determined for Q2 top-line as they have already released April and May Sales. April Sales Came in around ~62M based on my math and May Sales came in at 88M and some change. Based on these numbers, we can safely assume that we will at a minimum have somewhere around 225M in revenue for the quarter by using the average of April and May to determine June. I believe 225M to be on the low side and I have continued to up my estimates as I believe E-commerce is still thriving, especially purple. Purple continues to climb the web traffic ladder and has moved up another ~500 spots to be the 13,000 most popular site in the world.

For simplicity sake, I am going to use some historical numbers to estimate profits. If you'll look at previous posts that I've made then you'll see how I arrived at these numbers. There are some quick napkin calculations below. We can safely assume that the average wholesale selling price of a mattress is ~1350 dollars and we can assume that GM for wholesale is around 30%. This means the average cost of a mattress to manufacture is ~945 on average. From my previous posts, we knew that pre Covid the business was split by units, not by gross sales. On average, wholesale consumed 50% of capacity and DTC consumed 50% of capacity. In order to determine average DTC selling price then we can equation .5*1350 + .5*(DTC Price) = 1900. PRPL indicated their average selling price per mattress was ~1900.00, I found this in their s-3.
-----------------------------------
.5*1350 + .5*(DTC Price) = 1900=========== DTC average price is 2450.00, 1350 is average Wholesale price.
DTC Margin is ~62% Estimated
Wholesale Margin ~30% Estimated
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Historically, advertising costs have been about 30% of revenue. I have been tracking advertisement for purple and from a TV cost standpoint, they have not increased their commercial count at all in the last three months. See link, PRPL is still only performing 125 commercials per day. This commercial rate has held steady for 6 months.
https://www.ispot.tv/brands/tqU/purple-mattress

I believe purple has increased their ad spend online but I believe it will be proportional to their new capacity on a unit basis.
Previously purple had 6 Machines of capacity and spent 38M in advertising, I believe they will spend (7/6)*38M which is 44M or roughly 15M per month. Just because revenue is up, doesn't mean they will spend more per unit- they are capacity constrained and that is terribly inefficient.
----------------------------------
The following table shows my best guesses on their major category costs. This includes the gross Margin and the other costs subtracted from the Gross Margin.
April May June (Est) Total Revenue net revenue effect
Gross Margin from Wholesale 6M*30% 17.3*30% 20M*30% $13M
Gross Margin from DTC 56M*62% 71M*62% 55M*62% $112M
SG&A Costs (3.5)M (3.5)M (3.5)M ($10.5)M
Research and Development (1)M (1)M (1)M ($3)M
Advertising (15)M (15)M (15)M ($45)M
Profit Non GAAP ----------- ----------- --------- 66.5M or 1.23 EPS
Warrant Accrual ($35M)
Profit GAAP Estimated $31.5M or .59 EPS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we used 66.5M, PRPL would report 1.23 EPS on an adjusted Basis.
The warrant Accrual will unfavorably push the EPS down on a GAAP basis and we will likely see something around .59 EPS. If they can achieve this for the next 4 quarters then in a years time there is a huge potential for stock increases based on the following P/E's.

GAAP est. Non GAAP Est.
EPS Annualized $2.36 $4.92
Stock price assuming 8x P/E $18.88 $39.36
Stock Price assuming 12x P/E $28.32 $59.04
Stock Price assuming 15x P/E $35.4 $73.8
Stock Price assuming 20x P/E $47.2 $98.4

People may say that this is super inaccurate..... but if you look at the following cash statement then you will realize that PRPL has been generating more than 1M per day in cash for the last two months - that is absolutely insane.

purple has generated 70M in cash in 60 days.
Mark my words, PRPL is going to be more profitable than TPX this quarter. TPX reported earnings of .68 EPS today on revenue of 665M. TPX is trading at 80+ per share. if purple reports a similar .68 EPS then it would be valued about 60% lower than TPX on an EPS basis. if purple posts EPS of ~1 dollar then it would be undervalued as compared to TPX by about 80%.

I hope your NIPS are tender now. Hope this helps you understand why I believe PRPL to be so undervalued.
submitted by dhsmatt2 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Amazon Will Be The Next $2T Company – Why it’s Undervalued

Forget the hype about Tesla, Amazon is undervalued and is the safest place to park your money. I breakdown the reasons why below. Excuse the long post, but I like helping people make $. TLDR at the end.
The only way to look at Amazon's business is to separate it out into three very large businesses, I will break down each and why I believe the company as a whole is undervalued:
A/ Retail & Marketplace - this is the consumer facing portion of their business where Amazon buys at wholesale and then sells to shoppers. The latter (Marketplace), is the faster growing and more profitable business unit, now accounting for over 55% of all orders. Sellers use FBA and sell their products to shoppers directly where Amazon takes a ~7%-~15% fee depending on the category.
B/ AWS – fast growing cloud business operating at 26% gross margins with a $50B run-rate growing 30% YoY (do you know how crazy it was typing that out?)
C/ Amazon Media Group - this includes their fast growing advertising business, Twitch, Amazon Music, and Amazon Prime Video. This is the least-known portion of their business, but is the fastest growing with highest margins.
Retail & Marketplace
There’s not much to say here, other than Amazon does roughly ~$250B in sales and growing 30% YoY on average here. For reference, Walmart does ~$500B. Even if you gave the retail/marketplace portion of Amazon’s business a conservative valuation of $500B (2x revenue), it’s a very large business. Now, take into consideration how much they are emphasizing 3P sellers and private label products, Amazon’s profitability metrics will greatly improve in this business as it lowers its overhead so the business in value will continue to grow. This also fails to mention their breadth of their FBA business and how many sellers use the product offering. If anyone has sold anything on Amazon or knows someone that does, 99% of sellers use FBA because of how easy, convenient, and cost-effective it is. With the tailwinds associated with COVID, this business will likely surpass 30% YoY growth, which is just incredible growth #s for a business this large. In comparison, Walmart is usually <10% YoY growth when it comes to their revenue metrics.
My valuation of the business = ~$500B - $750B
AWS
AWS is projected to do around $50B-$60B in sales for 2020. Latest public analyst valuations peg it around ~$500B, which I believe is unfair. For reference, MongoDB is trading at 20x revenue, Crowdstrike, DOCU, Datadog, all SAAS/cloud providers are trading at 20x or even more!
Valuing AWS as a standalone business for anything less than $500B would be under-representing just how large and fast-growing this business is. Growing at 30% YoY at a $50B run-rate is just unfathomable. If we were looking at this at a 20x revenue multiple (which I believe it would be valued at a 20x multiple if it was a standalone company), AWS would be at a $1 trillion market cap alone. It's the de-facto choice for start-ups, even as Azure continues to take customers away, AWS is the leader for all new tech/start-up companies and will continue to see massive tailwinds as the entire economy shifts to cloud-based offerings. COVID has also accelerated this business as usage is undoubtedly up for their core segment of customers, while customers that are most affected (restaurants) are not really AWS-like customers.
My valuation of this business unit = $650B
Amazon Media Group
Advertising – Many people don’t know much about this business, but you know the products you click on while you’re shopping around on Amazon? It’s safe to say a bunch of those products are paying Amazon significant dollars on a PPC basis (pay-per-click) to surface higher in the search results. This business generated $14 billion in revenue in 2019. Google, the leader in advertising, is valued at 10x revenue, so this business alone is probably worth close to $16B after 2020 alone. $FB did $73B in revenue trailing 12 months, this would mean FB is about 4.5x the size of Amazon's Advertising business ALONE. I just compared FB as a whole to Amazon's "side-business" in Advertising.
Twitch – this is a tough business to value, but Needham and others have pegged it at ~$15 billion alone. It’s the clear leader in online streaming and Microsoft recently shutdown Mixer (their Twitch competitor). The possibilities here are endless, look for Amazon Advertising to plug in their data capabilities to target viewers of live streaming events with products soon. Twitch will soon be merged into the advertising ecosystem to begin serving targeted ads to viewers. Think ad-supported streams where there is some sort of revenue share back to the streamers. This feeds into the ecosystem where content creators make more $ (won't leave), advertisers get access to a valuable niche audience, and Amazon reaps the benefits of high-value/profitable advertising at 65% gross margins.
Prime Video – the most surprising stat for Prime Video is that 20% of Prime members sign up primarily for Amazon Prime Video. With over 150M subscribers, analysts peg the value of Prime Video alone at $200b. Amazon has also entered the OTT ad-supported streaming market with IMDB TV (ad-supported free television). This is exclusive inventory that Amazon can offer to brands to advertise on, and compete directly with ROKU, which is valued at 15X revenue.
Lastly, Amazon Music has 30M subscribers. Apple has 60M, and Spotify 100M. Amazon Music (Who the fuck uses it, is already half the size of Apple Music and about a 3rd of Spotify...)
Because all the businesses aren’t broken out, it’s tough valuing the entire Media Group business, but it honestly could be in the range of anywhere b/w $300B-$600B off the synergies and potential for expansion. Again, as a standalone business, this suite of products would have public market investors salivating over the growth potential.
Hidden Value (Areas of Opportunity)
I went this entire DD without mentioning the huge competitive MOATs around voice (Echo = the leader), as well as their entire logistics/ground fulfillment network, Amazon GO stores, and their venture in the medical health space. Because it's nearly impossible to value these things as a whole, you can basically pencil w/e you want here from a valuation perspective.
Amazon Retail/Marketplace Business - $650B
AWS - $650B
Amazon Media Group - $400B
Hidden Value - Go stores, Fulfillment Network, Self-driving, Echo (voice), Whole Foods, Medical Venture with JP Morgan & Berkshire = $300B
Total = $2B
TLDR: Amazon is undervalued at a $1.6B market cap, and the stock will be up to $3500 in the next year. Business units valued as stand-alone companies would be valued way more, growth potential is endless, and COVID has accelerated trends in favor of Amazon for the next 5 yrs.
- Longterm bag holder
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AEF - A Misunderstood Superannuation Fund

AEF - A Misunderstood Superannuation Fund
Although AEF uniquely benefits from the structural tailwinds of both superannuation and ethical investing, we believe it remains misunderstood as an expensive traditional fund manager.

The Opportunity
Australian Ethical Funds (ASX.AEF) is a public market superannuation fund manager. The perception of the company itself vs. the industry is nicely summarised by the two figures below. Herein lies the opportunity.

https://preview.redd.it/jhvvua1t5oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e511deb4411e81840ffcf8b635e1d8f7b78eeb6e
AEF is a renowned Australian fund manager that fits within the ESG trend. It represents one of the only pure play superannuation investments in the Australian public market, with 67% of funds under management (FUM) coming from superannuation. The stock bounced exceptionally from a low of $2 in March, reaching a high of $9 in June, and has since retraced towards the low $4s. Previously, the business traded at $6+ following its announcement of end of year FUM and expected earnings figures. On 8th August IOOF Holdings (ASX.IFL) – 19.9% shareholder – announced it was divesting 15% of its stake in AEF. IOOF is a peer and platform provider which offers AEF products to its clients. The investment was sold at $5.24 vs. market price of $5.90. IOOF disclosed it was selling its AEF investment (at a gain) to raise much needed liquidity. The block trade was viewed negatively by the market, with AEF immediately re-rating to below $5.24 and trending downwards (towards low $4s) ever since. The current share price of $4.17 (24 August close) implies the stock is trading at ~51x FY20 earnings guidance, which is slightly above historical levels despite substantially improved performance and outlook. We suspect that the FY20 results will be aligned with guidance (as demonstrated historically) provided in the quarterly FUM update and guided earnings figures. Results have also been positive across its peers throughout mid to late August (see ‘Roadmap’).

https://preview.redd.it/t4oy3ksu5oj51.png?width=478&format=png&auto=webp&s=e2a88ef0bf70fba2e85d36bc71a1df2994217dcf
Company History
AEF began as Australian Ethical Investments (AEI) in 1986 and was owned by 600 insider shareholders before listing. It is a superannuation fund – so revenue is derived from fees on managing invested funds. By 2005, the business managed four unit trusts and a superannuation fund:
· Australian Ethical Balanced Trust (est. 1989)
· Australian Ethical Equities Trust (est. 1994)
· Australian Ethical Income Trust (est. 1997)
· Australian Ethical Large Companies Share Trust (est. 1997)
· Parent of Australian Ethical Superannuation (est. 1998)
The investments of the trust and super fund are guided by ‘The Charter’ – a series of positive and negative investment screens that must be taken into account when selecting securities for inclusion.

https://preview.redd.it/cye711106oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=60c149549d7d752c26108c662ec319b56ebf371a
In July 2005, the government enacted policy that afforded more choice to individual employees with regards to their superannuation provider (marking the beginning of a positive era for the superannuation industry). In that same year, AEF registered for a superannuation license which it was granted in 2006. Back in 2005/06 the company did not split out superannuation FUM, but FUM increased from $311m in Jun-05 to $380m in September-05 following this policy shift – suggesting there was an existing demand for ethical investment products in superannuation.
From 2005 to 2011, AEF grew total FUM from $311m to $644m, despite muted FUM growth through the GFC-era. In 2012, the business began separating out its superannuation FUM-growth to improve its visibility. This era saw FUM increasing from $617m in 2012 to $4.05bn as at 30 June 2020.
From 2016-19 reduction in FUM-based fees has seen suppressed revenue growth vs. FUM growth. This has resulted in several step changes in FUM-based revenue margins (revenue / FUM) as a result of lower overall fees earned on products. We view this shift as a positive in the long-run since AEF has competitively priced its funds, entrenching their competitive advantages (discussed below) and reducing the temptation that fee-conscious members switch funds. Since AEF has ratcheted the cost of their funds downwards (often ahead of their peers and industry averages), we believe fee compression improves the durability of AEFs revenue compared to peers who are yet to compress their margins.

https://preview.redd.it/fcq5jog26oj51.png?width=453&format=png&auto=webp&s=d194c8778727e9adf1ebc162e6b181d8207cc292
Business Model
AEF has a relatively simple business model – revenue is derived from fees on managing invested funds. The funds it manages includes retail, institutional and wholesale (non-super) funds, as well as superannuation funds. We are most interested in the superannuation business although the direct and indirect benefits associated with the funds management business are a noteworthy component to the brand and investment management infrastructure (i.e. ideation / performance fee generating / high performing ESG). Until 2012, AEF did not explicitly separate its super vs. non-super FUM. We believe this contributed to its (mis)perception as a traditional fund manager rather than a superannuation fund. Thankfully, since 2012 AEF has provided details relating to the composition of its FUM (below), and noticeably the growth in its superannuation FUM has been the driving force of the business.

https://preview.redd.it/6ccbtqm36oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=6fb4e11064313ca9ab7b57186b2eddc6be62b928
Competitive Advantage
1. Superannuation Exposure: Superannuation FUM is higher growth and lower risk than traditional managed funds. Superannuation funds are regulated to grow at 9.5% due to the Superannuation Guarantee (the Australian Government mandated superannuation contribution). The regulatory framework could see this increase up to 12% in the medium-term and 14% in the long-term. For the purpose of our analysis, we have assumed a constant 9.5% contribution – so any increase would be additional upside. More importantly, excluding fulfilling conditions of release (i.e. death) an individual's superannuation cannot be withdrawn until retirement. Much like the Superannuation Guarantee, withdrawals are also mandated on a schedule that increases as a percentage of FUM with age (beginning at 4% and increasing to 14%). Consequently, the minimum inflows and withdrawals are predictable (and we note the vast majority of individuals do not deviate from these minimum levels due to inertia). Because of this mandated growth, Australia has the fourth largest pension sector in absolute terms and second largest relative to GDP (below). In 2020, the total superannuation pool is ~$2.1trn and growing. It is estimated that by 2040 superannuation assets could be as much as $9trn according to the Australian Treasury.

https://preview.redd.it/wenevil56oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=c2210a8e26816af1ebf798d82c414c61760c5d5e
Alternatively, traditional managed funds are subject to redemption risk, caused (typically) by performance and myopic investor behaviour associated with general market movements. Therefore, FUM growth for traditional managed funds must be attracted through marketing and distribution channels. This inextricably links fund inflows and outflows to performance and marketing efforts, which in turn causes a clientele that is more expensive to acquire and retain, and a more volatile pool of assets. Alternatively, traditional managed funds may access capital through secondary capital raisings and the reinvestment of distributions; both of which are a country mile from a 9.5% government mandated contribution.
Logically, we wondered which (listed) asset could provide us with exposure to the exceptionally robust superannuation tailwind. We will not spend too much time detailing the industry dynamics and public market players as there is a lot of information to be found in various prospectus’ (see Raiz or OneVue prospectus). The main thing to understand is that superannuation funds can be separated into five buckets:

https://preview.redd.it/jyykix976oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=07e96ebc246a565546e400ef87018d3d3360cd48
After screening for diversified financials and financials businesses on the ASX there were 53 players with at least some revenue linked to superannuation. The revenue exposure desired is revenue linked to superannuation FUM (explained further in the ‘Valuation’). However, it is important to understand that gaining access to this lucrative industry is difficult for several reasons:
· Private industry funds – the gems of the industry have been private superannuation funds such as CBUS, Hostplus, and ESTA. We cannot access them as public market investors.
· Conglomerate financials – it is possible to gain some retail superannuation exposure within the banking majors such as CBA, WBC, ANZ and NAB. However, they represent insignificant exposure by revenue and profit and the stocks are driven by other risk and growth factors.
· Fund managers – fund managers may directly manage retail superfunds or SMSF funds such as Magellan, Platinum and Perpetual. However, there is limited visibility over superannuation FUM exposure.
· Superannuation adjacency businesses – superannuation exposure can also be housed within wealth / platform advisers such as like HUB24, Netwealth and OneVue. However, to varying degrees, these businesses are not purely exposed to superannuation-FUM linked revenue.
· Pure play sub-scale – the final example can be found in Raiz, which is a sub-scale business that has ~$450m in FUM of which 85% is funds management. It is possible to envisage this business as an AEF in 10-15 years with larger superannuation FUM exposure. Although the superannuation exposure representing $70m in FUM currently (vs. AEF $2.72bn) is vastly inferior to AEF.
For this reason, AEF is the closest to a pure play (at scale) superannuation player.
Putting this together, we believe AEF is likely to continue to grow its FUM at 20% p.a. YoY. This is principally due to AEF's ability to acquire new members and retain existing members. Therefore, to monitor this continued FUM growth going forward we encourage readers to look out of the number of superannuation members added in these upcoming results and beyond. AEF has grown its member base YoY consistently in an industry which has, on average, been relatively flat in terms of member growth. In 2019 AEF was the highest growing superannuation business in Australia across the previous 5-years.

https://preview.redd.it/c4t7jx596oj51.png?width=226&format=png&auto=webp&s=51e47aa607470ce6482ed30352183a6cf6043bff
1. Ethical, Social and Governance (ESG): Beyond the obvious tailwinds in superannuation, AEF is also exposed to another important trend: ESG. Needless to say, ESG investing is becoming not only popular but almost mandatory for corporate money managers. Younger demographic investors are increasingly concerned with the ethical and social impacts of corporate activity. This report by Harvard and another by State Street provide some interesting commentary on the issue. ESG ETFs have been growing at a CAGR of >30%, and State Street forecasts that the global ESG ETF market will increase from US$170bn in 2020 to US$1.3trn in 2030. Momentum for ESG ETFs has been building specifically in Australia, where AUM surged almost 300% — from A$554.1m in 2017 to A$2.2bn in 2019.
Whilst the ESG-shift has been occurring since the 2010s, State Street argue that COVID-19 will only further catalyse this shift by highlighting the inherent inequalities in society and health care systems, in turn, spurring social conscience. We note the following data points as indicators of this more recent catalyst:
· Perpetual’s recent acquisition of Trillium, a US-based ESG fund, shows the desire of traditional asset managers to become exposed to this space.
· BlackRock has started publishing more frequently and consistently on ESG trends and continued rolling out ESG products.
· Forager’s investment blog received frequent commentary from investors talking about negative screening on their gambling holdings which has never been the case in the past.
The key insight is that a growing proportion of the investment community through time is becoming concerned with ESG issues and this will drive fund flow. Industry data is pointing to the fact that this is a prolonged structural shift rather than a short-term trend.
2. Performance: AEF has improved upon their exposure to structural industry trends in superannuation and ESG through excellent fund performance. AEF's performance (below) has been consistently strong across all of their strategies (we highly recommend reading page 4 of Sequoia's June 15, 2020 "Investor Day Transcript" to highlight how governance and performance are complimentary). Such strong performance not only disincentivises members from switching to competitors and assists member acquisition, but also significantly enhances earnings at the group level. For instance, FY20 guidance provided on 7 July 2020 vs. 22 June had a midpoint difference of ~$2m. Given the long track record of the managers it is expected performance will remain strong.

https://preview.redd.it/p6shg5nc6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e65acb553371c6bc7c1f70ddfdf153e9e625117a

https://preview.redd.it/mtn23k7d6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=9a7ba471248070f9f05216cdf5bbcab2a1f9102b
Valuation
Key:
· FUM = funds under management
· FUA = funds under administration
· MA = managed accounts
· FU\ = total funds (FUM + FUA + MA)*
Valuing a Superannuation Member: Our valuation technique here will be somewhat unconventional. We will attempt to value the lifetime revenue per member (LRM) for AEF and for a traditional fund and then highlight the incongruity of their relative valuations.
The long-term nature of lifecycle retirement saving (and by virtue the true value of a superannuation fund) demands a long term perspective. Fortunately, the mandated nature of AEFs cash flows facilitates evaluating the lifetime value of a superannuation member. To estimate the LRM we consider the following: (i) life cycle expectations (i.e. retirement age and life expectancy); (ii) salary expectations; (iii) superannuation contribution rate; (iv) investment returns; (v) member "type;" (vi) fee structure; and (vii) a discount rate.
We begin by assuming a member makes $5,000p.a. at age 20, which grows to $130,000p.a. through the middle of their working life (35-50) and then declines to $90,000p.a. at 65 (noting these are gross values not inflation adjusted). Since the average member account balance for AEF is ~$60,000 (FUM of $4.05bn ($2.72bn of which is superannuation) / 43,000 members = $60,000 as at 30 June 2019), we can roughly assume that the average age of their member is between 30-35, which places them at the profitable end of this member acquisition cycle. Further, this member regularly contribute 9.5% of their earnings to their superannuation, which compounds at a rate of 6% p.a. Moreover, the prototypical member starts working / paying superannuation into AEF at age 20, retires at age 65, and redeems according to the minimum withdrawal schedule until age 85. However, how many members live according to this prescribed lifecycle; supported by an uninterrupted working life? What about people that take time off to raise children, either returning to part-time work or full-time work? We can model these archetypes also, which assumes much lower income growth and some years of earning no income. If we assume that society is roughly split into thirds by these archetypes (i.e. 1/3 uninterrupted, 1/3 interrupted and return part time, 1/3 interrupted and return full time), then we can calculate a weighted average LRM for the average member. Compressing fees by more than half to 50bps and assuming a 7% discount rate we arrive a weighted average discounted LRM of ~$18,000.
Whilst comparing this to the average member in another non-super fund is difficult for an array of reasons (i.e. average acquisition age, average income, average balance, average contribution, redemption allowance etc.), we can loosely estimate what this looks. Adopting the same framework as above, to estimate the LRM of an average managed fund member we must first define the managed fund member "archetype." First, we assume the average traditional fund member has a higher income profile (as lower income earners typically do not invest in managed funds). We tweak the income profile to peak at $180,000 between 35-50 and taper down to $120,000 by age 65. Second, we assume the acquisition age is 30 years rather than 20 to reflect that most individuals do not invest in traditional managed funds until later in life. Thirdly, we account for the non-compulsory nature of managed fund contributions. If we start with the marginal savings rate (10-year average of ~7%) as a proxy for available funds for investment and increase this to align with our ‘managed funds’ archetype who has higher income to 15%. We then assume that from this 15%, about 1/3 will be invested into a managed fun (or ~5%). Therefore, for our individual earning $180,000 during peak working years, this is an annual contribution of $7,200. Finally, we increase the discount rate to 9% since because redemptions are more likely in a traditional fund. Using these alternative assumptions, we arrive at a LRM of ~$5,000.
The significant difference in LRM helps explain why a superannuation business can command a much higher multiple of FUM or earnings. Further, we believe our estimate of LRM for a traditional fund manager is quite bullish (i.e. overstated) due to the following: (i) it assumes the individual works full-time for their entire life; and (ii) it assumes the individual stays with the fund from age 30 to 65 and makes uninterrupted and stable contributions. Although dollar cost averaging is touted as an eighth wonder of the world, we are doubtful it is applied as often as it is spoken.
Trading Multiples Valuation: Valuing AEF on a relative basis is difficult given the lack of peers. Against traditional fund managers (i.e. Magellan, Perpetual and Platinum), which trade between 5-20x earnings, and superannuation exposed platforms (i.e. Netwealth and Hub24), which trade between 25-40x earnings, AEF looks relatively expensive. We are acutely aware that AEF is currently (at ~$4.2) trading at 12.6% of FUM and ~51x earnings; and at its peak (~$9) was trading at 25% of FUM and 120x earnings. We believe the valuation difference is driven by the quality of the FUM managed and, therefore, the quality of the earnings growth.
Given their high alignment to superannuation, NWL and HUB are the two most comparable firms to AEF. As the trailing figures show, AEF appears to be trading on par with its peers. However, an important nuance is the trailing figure for AEF is based on 2019 earnings, whilst for NWL and HUB it is based on FY20 earnings given they have already reported. As such, on a like-for-like basis AEF’s ‘trailing’ earnings multiple (based on the mid-point of management’s guidance) is actually ~51x. This means it is trading below NWL and HUB, despite the fact that the majority of those businesses’ FU* is linked to FUA rather than FUM, which has a lower monetisation rate. Not to mention, the split between superannuation and managed funds is not as clearly delineated as is the case with AEF. What is also evident is limited analyst coverage of AEF and lack of forecast guidance assisting the market to predict growth (as is the case with NWL and HUB).
Relative to traditional fund managers (i.e. PPT, PTM and MFG), we note the substantial difference in FUM and business quality. AEF hosts the highest monetization rate (Rev/FUM), even whilst facing fee compression, with the highest FUM growth among its investment management peers. Furthermore, we expect EBIT margins will improve from ~30% toward its larger traditional fund managers peers due to economies of scale over time that we believe will more than offset any fee compression. AEF has also supported a very high ROE due to its sticky clientele and service-based business model. The combination of: (i) best in class monetization; (ii) high LTM and increasing membership base; (iii) improving margins; and (iv) high ROE will make for an incredible growth engine on earnings in the long term. Thus, AEF is a higher quality business with ~4x+ the LCM of a traditional fund trading at only a 2-3x premium using current ratios...

https://preview.redd.it/nffeuvef6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=e0aed3fcb4464355aa965ed151d6dc2e484ff4b8
Risks
We note the following investment risks with AEF:
  1. Fee Compression – The funds management industry is subject to fee compression across both funds and superannuation funds. There has already been a lot of restructuring of AEF’s fees since 2016. The investment product(s) they advocate is also one that serves an ethical / moral dimension and can arguably be charged at a premium above market. Notwithstanding fee compression beyond that which we have considered would place downward pressure on margins.
  2. Member Attrition – The stickiness of AEF's membership base is a hallmark of their competitive advantage although this could be reversed over time due to poor performance or corporate mismanagement. We encourage the reader to keep an eye on member growth and net inflows over time.
  3. Product Reproduction – There is no official IP upon ESG investing and new products are increasingly being promoted to capture market share of this growing market. We believe AEF's early mover and strong brand serve to mitigate this risk.
  4. Regulatory Risks – Changes in the superannuation regulatory environment can be material. This has long been debated within the public domain although it has been viewed as politically unfavourable to change the superannuation system without a reasonably long lead time and grandfathering provisions, which we hope would make any changes unlikely and less meaningful.
Investment Roadmap
Peers’ Earnings Updates: In summary, the FY20 results of peers indicate that businesses with revenues dependent on investment funds have performed quite strongly during this period.

https://preview.redd.it/np04rasg6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=0de02bee60036e9bd71068815e618c2f3711db24
Earnings Announcement: Earnings release on 26 August 2020 should provide for the first catalyst to remind the market of the AEF's fundamental performance. The key figures here will be superannuation FUM, superannuation members and FY20 earnings. AEF will also provide ongoing quarterly FUM announcements, with the following update due in early October. We may also see a mid-August FUM figure in the most recent announcement. Finally, AEF has historically provided updated FUM in back-dated results announcements. Evidence of this occurring can also be found in HUB's most recent announcement:

https://preview.redd.it/jz8frxfi6oj51.png?width=680&format=png&auto=webp&s=325d7973e1eb6c98e714dea69306b1ebf8ab0cc7
Private Market Activity: Whilst we think that a private equity buyout is unlikely for AEF, further media exposure and transaction data points should help the public value these assets. There have been some recently executed and rumoured deal activity in the space through 2020. Notably, KKR – one of the largest US-based global private equity funds – bought a 55% stake in Colonial First State valued at ~$3bn from CBA. The implied valuation was ~16x EBITDA, despite the quality of business model and LTM of members being substantially weaker than AEF. There is similar PE interest in NAB’s MLC Wealth, with US funds CC Capital and FC Flowers on second round bids for the asset. NAB's MLC Wealth business caught the attention of Carlyle, BlackRock, and KKR earlier in the year although deals were not executed. The interest from KKR in Colonial is particularly notable, given Scott Bookmyer (KKR partner) who refers to Australian superannuation as the ‘the envy of the western world’. We believe AEF may benefit indirectly from private equity interest, which will confirm both the long-term value and viability of their business model.
submitted by Bruticus91 to ASX_Bets [link] [comments]

Amazon Will Be The Next $2T Company – Why it’s Undervalued

Forget the hype about Tesla, Amazon is undervalued and is the safest place to park your money. I breakdown the reasons why below. Excuse the long post, but I like helping people make $. TLDR at the end.
The only way to look at Amazon's business is to separate it out into three very large businesses, I will break down each and why I believe the company as a whole is undervalued:
A/ Retail & Marketplace - this is the consumer facing portion of their business where Amazon buys at wholesale and then sells to shoppers. The latter (Marketplace), is the faster growing and more profitable business unit, now accounting for over 55% of all orders. Sellers use FBA and sell their products to shoppers directly where Amazon takes a ~7%-~15% fee depending on the category.
B/ AWS – fast growing cloud business operating at 26% gross margins with a $50B run-rate growing 30% YoY (do you know how crazy it was typing that out?)
C/ Amazon Media Group - this includes their fast growing advertising business, Twitch, Amazon Music, and Amazon Prime Video. This is the least-known portion of their business, but is the fastest growing with highest margins.
Retail & Marketplace
There’s not much to say here, other than Amazon does roughly ~$250B in sales and growing 30% YoY on average here. For reference, Walmart does ~$500B. Even if you gave the retail/marketplace portion of Amazon’s business a conservative valuation of $500B (2x revenue), it’s a very large business. Now, take into consideration how much they are emphasizing 3P sellers and private label products, Amazon’s profitability metrics will greatly improve in this business as it lowers its overhead so the business in value will continue to grow. This also fails to mention their breadth of their FBA business and how many sellers use the product offering. If anyone has sold anything on Amazon or knows someone that does, 99% of sellers use FBA because of how easy, convenient, and cost-effective it is. With the tailwinds associated with COVID, this business will likely surpass 30% YoY growth, which is just incredible growth #s for a business this large. In comparison, Walmart is usually <10% YoY growth when it comes to their revenue metrics.
My valuation of the business = ~$500B - $750B
AWS
AWS is projected to do around $50B-$60B in sales for 2020. Latest public analyst valuations peg it around ~$500B, which I believe is unfair. For reference, MongoDB is trading at 20x revenue, Crowdstrike, DOCU, Datadog, all SAAS/cloud providers are trading at 20x or even more!
Valuing AWS as a standalone business for anything less than $500B would be under-representing just how large and fast-growing this business is. Growing at 30% YoY at a $50B run-rate is just unfathomable. If we were looking at this at a 20x revenue multiple (which I believe it would be valued at a 20x multiple if it was a standalone company), AWS would be at a $1 trillion market cap alone. It's the de-facto choice for start-ups, even as Azure continues to take customers away, AWS is the leader for all new tech/start-up companies and will continue to see massive tailwinds as the entire economy shifts to cloud-based offerings. COVID has also accelerated this business as usage is undoubtedly up for their core segment of customers, while customers that are most affected (restaurants) are not really AWS-like customers.
My valuation of this business unit = $650B
Amazon Media Group
Advertising – Many people don’t know much about this business, but you know the products you click on while you’re shopping around on Amazon? It’s safe to say a bunch of those products are paying Amazon significant dollars on a PPC basis (pay-per-click) to surface higher in the search results. This business generated $14 billion in revenue in 2019. Google, the leader in advertising, is valued at 10x revenue, so this business alone is probably worth close to $16B after 2020 alone. $FB did $73B in revenue trailing 12 months, this would mean FB is about 4.5x the size of Amazon's Advertising business ALONE. I just compared FB as a whole to Amazon's "side-business" in Advertising.
Twitch – this is a tough business to value, but Needham and others have pegged it at ~$15 billion alone. It’s the clear leader in online streaming and Microsoft recently shutdown Mixer (their Twitch competitor). The possibilities here are endless, look for Amazon Advertising to plug in their data capabilities to target viewers of live streaming events with products soon. Twitch will soon be merged into the advertising ecosystem to begin serving targeted ads to viewers. Think ad-supported streams where there is some sort of revenue share back to the streamers. This feeds into the ecosystem where content creators make more $ (won't leave), advertisers get access to a valuable niche audience, and Amazon reaps the benefits of high-value/profitable advertising at 65% gross margins.
Prime Video – the most surprising stat for Prime Video is that 20% of Prime members sign up primarily for Amazon Prime Video. With over 150M subscribers, analysts peg the value of Prime Video alone at $200b. Amazon has also entered the OTT ad-supported streaming market with IMDB TV (ad-supported free television). This is exclusive inventory that Amazon can offer to brands to advertise on, and compete directly with ROKU, which is valued at 15X revenue.
Lastly, Amazon Music has 30M subscribers. Apple has 60M, and Spotify 100M. Amazon Music (Who the fuck uses it, is already half the size of Apple Music and about a 3rd of Spotify...)
Because all the businesses aren’t broken out, it’s tough valuing the entire Media Group business, but it honestly could be in the range of anywhere b/w $300B-$600B off the synergies and potential for expansion. Again, as a standalone business, this suite of products would have public market investors salivating over the growth potential.
Hidden Value (Areas of Opportunity)
I went this entire DD without mentioning the huge competitive MOATs around voice (Echo = the leader), as well as their entire logistics/ground fulfillment network, Amazon GO stores, and their venture in the medical health space. Because it's nearly impossible to value these things as a whole, you can basically pencil w/e you want here from a valuation perspective.
Amazon Retail/Marketplace Business - $650B
AWS - $650B
Amazon Media Group - $400B
Hidden Value - Go stores, Fulfillment Network, Self-driving, Echo (voice), Whole Foods, Medical Venture with JP Morgan & Berkshire = $300B
Total = $2B
TLDR: Amazon is undervalued at a $1.6B market cap, and the stock will be up to $3500 in the next year. Business units valued as stand-alone companies would be valued way more, growth potential is endless, and COVID has accelerated trends in favor of Amazon for the next 5 yrs.
- Longterm bag holder
submitted by sharkbat3 to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Short Shopify, Long Square [2020 Tech Bubble DD]

Shopify is currently valued at nearly 20x the entire hosted e-commerce market. Furthermore, they're neither the fastest growing nor have the best retention rates. In fact they have a lower retention rate than all but Wix and roughly half of first place Ecwid. For anyone here that actually bothers to read SEC filings and looked at their 20Q1 results you may have noticed that they announced they're redirecting growth resources into merchant solutions, but what you probably didn't bother checking is that merchant solutions have less than half the margins of subscription solutions.
The difference is that subscription solutions is essentially all the money they generate through software related to hosted online stores. This segment of their business is basically Wordpress for business, and it's a lot more literal than you would think given the market leader (by a sizeable amount and with a far higher retention rate) is WooCommerce -- literally a free and open source plugin for Wordpress. Merchant solutions on the other hand are more correlated with how well performing its stores are rather than how many they have. Essentially they know they stand to benefit far more from improving the relationships and business of their higher performing stores rather than expanding further into lower performing one. I've got a lot more details in my upcoming article on Seeking Alpha, it's currently with the editorial board but if you've read this far and want more you can read it as a blog in the meantime.
Now where does Square come into this? Well my only other post in this subreddit was also related to Shopify, when I recommended Wix at around $130. Obviously my timing was terrible on the short position, and maybe it is this time too, but Wix is trading at over $280 today. My strategy for hedging hyper bubbles like Shopify is to simply find high growth tech stocks that are nowhere near as expensive and, as long as this market continues, just pretty much wait for them to become a hyper bubble. Square is growing at ~45% since IPO, same growth rate as Shopify FY19 but exponential rather than the annual declines of Shopify who is projected for 36% FY20. On top of that, Shopify had a $135 million net loss from their $1.73 billion trailing revenue while Square is recently profitable with a net income of $307 million from their $5.135 billion in revenue.
So you've got a company growing just as quickly, with the benefit of being exponential, already roughly 3x larger, and is currently trading at "only" 10.5x in comparison to Shopify at more than 65x. On another note, Twitter ripped a couple weeks ago on a subscription platform job listing. Dorsey owns both Square and Twitter so I'll give you three guesses who will benefit the most from that. Of course this hedge, as it was with Wix, only makes sense while this 2020 tech bubble continues with everyone chasing high growth like it's 1999. Short Shopify at your own peril, my price target is $118 so it's got a long way to go, but I'm blown away by how resilient it's been. There's no way to time how long this irrational stupidity will last, but you can certainly outsmart it in the meantime.
tl;dr - Short Shopify if you've got balls of steel, long Square as a hedge if you think this market insanity will continue. Price target on Shopify is $118 so it's got a long way to go if you want to wait for momentum shift. Square is growing at the same rate (while being exponential rather than declining and actually earns money), it would be roughly $815 per share if it reached the same insane sales multiple as Shopify. If it somehow managed to reach Zoom's even more incredible sales multiple it would touch $1,225 per share.
*I posted my SA article on Hastebin because WSB blocks the site. The reason cited is because the payment structure incentivizes spam, but in my case it's posted as a blog which doesn't have any payment structure. The actual article itself that's pending is also published as a non-exlusive which means I don't make a penny from views on it.
submitted by oracle_of_alpha to wallstreetbets [link] [comments]

Purple Redux – Cash is King Part II – Carnage of the Robinhood Trader Clouding a Great Quarter

As I got a comment snarkily saying “good call” from u/should_have_RAN in response to my post on Purple on 6/29 (at the time PRPL was trading at $18 - current price now is $21-$22), I thought it would make sense to provide an update on the results.
The original post: https://www.reddit.com/investing/comments/hi3m1y/prpl_cash_is_king_significant_upside/
Note in the original thread I had estimated EBITDA to come in at around $35-$40MM to base my assumption on upside to a $35-$40 share price. Purple released earnings yesterday and reported an adjusted EBITDA of $35.2MM despite sales being lighter than what I thought and an implied adjusted, diluted EPS of about $0.57 / share. On the heels of that, Wall Street firms have upgraded their price targets: KeyBanc ($22->$26), Raymond James ($19->$28), B. Riley ($23->$26). You will note that from the prior post, this EBITDA level is supportive of a $2-$2.5B TEV assuming a $140-$150M annualized EBITDA figure and $2-2.50 of annualized EPS (mid teens TEV EBITDA multiple and a 15-20x PE ratio, in line or lower than peers despite the growth and margin story).
For those following the story, the shares are trading ~10% lower today following the news release. Well, gee, if everyone’s raising their estimates and people congratulated them on a great quarter in the call, why the hell is it trading lower? In my view, this is driven by a few things: 1) revenue came in lighter than estimates 2) people are not understanding the earnings story due to nuanced GAAP accounting and 3) they did not provide any guidance or perspective on 2H outlook, which is creating uncertainty. I will take each of these in pieces and follow up with some other observations from the release and the call that should further support the upside case.
1) Revenue was lower at $165M vs. the $175M consensus estimate. What happened here was that estimates increased on the heels of commentary PRPL released on orders data for DTC and wholesale. As I indicated in my earlier post, you can’t assume this is pure revenue as there is a revenue recognition delay between order and booked sale. Sure enough, this is what happened even though orders trends maintained momentum through the full quarter. There was a substantial runup in the share price over the last two weeks, including a crowd from WSB and Robinhood, who were banking on a blowout due to not understanding this difference. On the earnings CC, mgmt cited a backlog going into July that has now been filled, all the while, there still is a one week day lead time on DTC orders and wholesale orders are continuing to grow month over month with all 1800 partner stores now open. Net net, this means that the demand picture is still as good if not better than advertised and Q3 will have the benefit of 1) backlog from Q2, which could be upwards of $10-$20MM (Q2 implied orders were close to $230MM, less the $165MM of booked sales, less 10% reserve for warranties and cancellations, less wholesale orders which will always carry a backlog). I would also note that Q2 included the month of April, which was peak COVID. Monthly runrate revenues exiting Q2 were likely around $70-$80MM, implying a $200-$250MM quarterly runrate. Per mgmt on the earnings call, they are shipping every mattress they can make and are working fast to expand production in Georgia. Q3 could likely end up between $210-$270MM of revenue assuming they maintain the Q2 runrate and have shipped the backlog, which they said they did by the end of July. Note that the top end of this revenue range is likely difficult to execute with current capacity.
2) The company reported negative EPS of ($0.11) a share as a headline number. The problem with this figure is that it includes a couple of major non-cash expenses: the first is the warrant expense. PRPL has 14MM warrants with a strike price of $11.50. From an accounting perspective, when the value of the shares increase, the warrants then require you to increase the liability on the balance sheet as they have become more valuable and are viewed from an accounting perspective as a liability to the company (this is very similar to non-cash expense related to stock options – the warrants are dilutive, but that is already a fixed, known quantity). Secondly, the company had changes in its Tax Receivable Agreement which compensates the prior sellers for the tax basis they contribute to the company by converting their shares to from founder shares to common stock. Note that this has no economic impact to the business. These were the two major expenses contributing the gap between what was a GAAP $(0.11) EPS to a positive $0.57 EPS. Put differently, excluding the non cash charges that don’t matter, EPS is really $0.57 in one quarter, and in a quarter that included the impacts of COVID in April. Adjusted EBITDA was reported at $35.2MM which is the best proxy for apples to apples cash flow and how businesses are valued. This is why the company’s cash increased from $26MM to nearly $100MM in three months even though GAAP earnings were negative. Cash is King.
3) The company provided no guidance for the rest of 2020. Usually this is a sign of uncertainty and an unclear demand outlook – the market does not like this. When you sift through the conference call, you will appreciate that on the contrary, demand up through the date of the call has remained as robust and if not more so than what was the case in Q2. Note that we are 50% through Q3 already. Mgmt mentioned on the call accelerating and investing in its Georgia facility and ramping up SG&A expenses and hires. The logical question would be why do this if you think your demand will be weak or uncertain for the next 3-6 months. Mgmt mentioned on the call that there is still one week lead times on DTC orders (meaning there’s not enough inventory to ship next day), that competitors are struggling to source spring coils for mattresses due to shortages, and that DTC channel remains strong while wholesale is increasing relative to Q2. Take all these together and this provides support that Q3 will match the runrate of Q2 (the $200-$250M I mentioned before with June monthly sales around $70-$80MM based on the runrate orders adjusted for returns, etc). Separately, they mentioned that they have capped retail stores at 1,800 due to capacity constraints (meaning demand is more than they can meet at this time).
Assuming a $225-250MM revenue quarter, this means they will likely hit $40-$50MM of EBITDA in Q3 assuming gross margins of 45-50% (compared to 49% in Q2) and SG&A % in line with Q2. This would translate into EPS (excluding warrants and non-cash) approaching $0.65-0.85 / share, so nearly 1.20-1.40 in just two quarters. Let that sink in a bit. The performance still supports a much higher share price with TPX at a 23x PE ratio and 14x EBITDA multiple and lower growth. That’s how you get to a $35-$40 share price or greater.
Note that $250MM hits and exceeds the upper limit of their traditional capacity, though DTC has allowed them to drive a higher $/unit expanding how much they can sell per manufacturing line. There is a risk that capacity constraints keep the quarterly revenue to the lower end of this range.
A few other observations from the quarter that may have been missed: 1) the company has increased pricing during COVID with no demand drop off 2) wholesale is now growing in line or above PY despite retail traffic being lower 3) DTC demand holding firm and thus showing it is sustainable (the company is managing to capacity that is now growing by holding off on promotions) 4) gross margins and operating margins drastically increased due to fixed cost leverage (and some COVID cost containment) – “the story we’ve had on demand outpacing our ability to manufacture continues to be more true than ever” per the CC transcript
Resources for DD:
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/TPX/key-statistics?p=TPX
https://investors.purple.com/press-releases/news-details/2020/Purple-Innovation-Provides-Business-Update-Ahead-of-Participation-in-Oppenheimer-20th-Annual-Consumer-Growth-Conference/default.aspx
https://investors.purple.com/press-releases/news-details/2020/Purple-Innovation-Reports-Record-Second-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx
CapIQ for information on analyst targets
submitted by SanitysLastRefuge to investing [link] [comments]

Trading Jargon ?

I dont understand why people always put the leverage amount in their trading info? Like unless you tell us your volume (Btc traded) why would it matter? It doesn't mean anything.
Ex: 20X long at 10000 with 0.1 BTC position means Your used margin = 500$ only
Ex: 3X long at 10000 with 1 BTC position means Your used margin = 3333.3 $
As you can see, the volume changes everything. In the second Ex, with 3X you would lose more money than the first at 20X, when considering the volume you're trading.
submitted by UnusualEngineer to BitcoinMarkets [link] [comments]

What is Margin Trading in Share Market {HINDI}  Share मिलेगा उधार पर  20X Margin With AliceBlue WHAT IS MARGIN TRADING  how to trade in margin trade in hindi How to Make 20x on an Options Trade  ShadowTrader Video 02.16.20 BITCOIN MOVE INCOMING?!  Binance 20x Margin Vs. BitMEX & Bybit Option Leverage  Get Up to 20X Leverage in Option Trading with Samco  Leverage in Option Trading

The trading space has evolved over the past few years, with new methods of making predictions on cryptocurrencies being introduced into the market. One of these methods is through Margin Trading. In this guide, we’ll explain what Bitcoin margin trading is, and how you can use it to your advantage: In This Article: What is … Now let’s take a closer look at the specifics of margin trading with Binance. Margin trading with Binance. In late May, Binance announced that its margin trading feature would support up to 20x leverage. Yet the exchange’s tutorial on the new feature reveals you can now borrow funds at a fixed rate of 3x. “If you have 1 BTC, you can Margin trading also refers to intraday or day trading in India. Many stock brokers provide this service including asthatrade. Margin trading involves buying and selling of securities same day. Margin is the portion of money collected by exchanges upfront before giving exposure to brokers for trading in the equity and derivatives segment. Binance, the largest crypto-to-crypto exchange, announced that will be launching a futures trading platform, dubbed Binance Futures, in the coming months. Speaking at Asia Blockchain Summit in Taipei, Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao said that Binance Futu Binance announces futures trading platform with up to 20x leverage. Margin trading became highly popular among ordinal markets. Perhaps, many of you not only have heard but also have already tried to trade through Forex currency market brokers.

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What is Margin Trading in Share Market {HINDI} Share मिलेगा उधार पर 20X Margin With AliceBlue

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