SEBI | Margin Trading and Securities Lending and Borrowing

Baseball Card Flipping Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to Flipping [link] [comments]

Selling Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
I also keep a few cards for my personal collection (more on that below). Here are the cards I have kept so far.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to baseballcards [link] [comments]

Baseball Card Flipping Project - Part 16

Hey guys!
It has been FOREVER since my last update and a ton has happened. Sorry for the long post, but hopefully some people appreciate a detailed dive into everything.
A really really really brief recap of the past fifteen parts
I started in December of 2018 with $1,165 with the goal of making $10,000 in one year. In 2019, I had bought and sold over $40k in baseball, football and various sports trading cards. I had a few great successes ($1,165 into $3,085 before fees - $2,771.20 into $6,200.10 before fees - $1,086.68 into $3,190.54 before fees) and a few duds. I generally sell my cards on ebay, but utilize auction houses every now and then. The biggest bottleneck I face is submitting cards to PSA (a third party grading company), a card might have a 2-4 month turnaround time. To successfully "flip" you need to balance some of these purchases with shorter flips. In 2019, I ended with a final profit of $9,262.28 – a tad bit short of my goal. In 2020, my goal is $20,000 (fitting). Using my margins from 2019, I would need to sell around $85k in cards.
You can find the previous installment here
PERSONAL UPDATE
First, I hope everyone is doing well and staying sane. It has been an absolutely wild three months for me, I found out I’m going to be an uncle, I got a cat and I decided I was going to propose to my girlfriend this weekend! I have still been keeping up with this project, the prices for baseball cards have absolutely skyrocketed over the past couple months, so there hasn’t been the same amount of buying as usual. I am going insane with working from home and trying to keep my head above water with everything, but flipping has been (at times) a nice escape. I am fortunate enough to be flipping something that I am passionate about, baseball cards, so I am able to enjoy this and see a lot of neat cards along the way.
In that spirit I have decided to begin keeping some cards for my personal collection as I go along. I read somewhere an interesting method of collecting, reducing your collection to 25 cards. I wanted to give it a shot with a bit of a twist, I want to keep a collection of 25 cards, but still make a profit along the way. So a couple ground rules I set for myself: * The collection is limited to vintage baseball cards (generally 1980’s and older). This was my first collecting passion and I’d like to try to keep to it.
So, without further ado, here are the first four cards in this project. The 1949 Berra came from the Yogi Berra lot I bought from SCP in January. The grades finally came back last week and I did very well on a few cards, so I felt that I deserved to spoil myself a bit. The 1949 Bowman set holds a special spot in my heart for me, my best flip ever was a group of 1949 Bowman cards I purchased for $300 which included a Jackie Robinson rookie that graded PSA 8! I sold it for over $10k. This Yogi Berra card is well centered, nice registration and a great mid-grade example of a baseball icon. I love it. The Ted Williams card and the Willie Mays both came from the December Heritage lot that I had purchased. PSA took FOREVER on this order. I was a little disappointed in the overall grades, but am confident I will turn a profit. The 1956 Topps Ted Williams is such a cool card and a staple in post-war collecting. The Mays I always liked – it’s a little beat up, but the centering is near perfect and the color looks sharp. Finally, I nabbed the 1969 Yaz. This was mostly done because I love the set. 1969 Topps was the last set to feature Mickey Mantle, something that I think goes underappreciated. The set design has always been pretty crisp, it has a couple great rookies and great all-star rookie cards. I’m a fan. Anyways! None of these cards are permanent, I can sell them at any time, but I’d imagine they will be in the collection a while.
Purchased
What Sold
PSA Update
Here is a link to the Google Doc with the status of all of my PSA cards. The spreadsheet also includes a summary of where the project is.
PSA is still extremely backlogged. For this project, I have 276 items with them. Luckily I was able to get quite a few cards back from them recently! As I previously mentioned, I received back the Yogi Berra cards I sent them in January and the Heritage cards I sent in December. Overall I am happy enough with the grades. I think they were fair on the Berra cards and they were rough on the Heritage cards (they were separate orders). I already listed or consigned these cards, so I will have updates next month on these.
Below is an updated summary:
For items purchased in 2019 (denoted with a “*”), the “cost” column represents the ending 2019 inventory valuation. For items purchased in 2020, the cost column is the cost. In the Google Sheet I included an in-depth P&L with full results and 2019 details.
Item Cost* Sold Fees Inventory^ Profit
1936 Goudey Lot (8) 50.00 56.50 (8.48) - (1.98)
Hank Aaron "Odd-Ball" Collection 150.00 777.29 (116.59) - 510.70
(16) Pre-WWII card lot w/ Cobb 1,300.00 1,708.52 (256.28) - 152.24
(23) Sandy Koufax 1950's and 1960's lot 250.00 299.50 (44.93) - 4.57
1977-1979 Topps Baseball Rack & Cello Packs (6) 250.00 380.00 (57.00) - 73.00
1957 Swift Meats Game Complete Set (18) 800.00 680.00 (102.00) (222.00)
(36) 1950s-2000s Multi-Sports Collection 500.00 1,528.51 (229.28) - 799.23
1933-1989 Wax Pack Wrapper Hoard (650+) 400.00 1,918.01 (287.70) - 1,230.31
1941-2004 Multi-Sport Group (33) 800.00 2,859.83 (428.97) 100.00 1,730.86
1912 B18 Blanket Find (100) 1,270.80 1,136.24 (170.44) 500.00 195.00
1962-63 Parkhurst Hockey Lot (45+) 500.00 287.26 (43.09) 400.00 144.17
1953 to 1969 Mickey Mantle Group (16) 1,000.00 2,747.85 (412.18) 150.00 1,485.67
1956-1959 Baseball Star Collection (48) 1,130.00 322.04 (48.31) 900.00 43.73
1961-1969 Baseball Star Collection (61) 804.95 257.78 (38.67) 600.00 14.16
1948-1965 Yogi Berra Collection (26) 1,400.00 399.50 (59.93) 1,050.00 (10.43)
Lot of (4) Signed Perez-Steele Postcards 676.59 - 676.59 -
1950's-1980's Football Wrapper Lot (42) 920.00 1,944.23 (291.63) 732.60
1953 Topps Partial Set (208) 1,472.00 2,855.13 (428.27) 100.00 1,054.86
1953-55 Dormand Postcard Set (47/52) 685.00 804.85 (120.73) 250.00 249.12
1959 & 1960 Venezuela Topps Lot (34) 216.00 58.66 (8.80) 200.00 33.86
1959 Topps Baseball High Grade Set 1,557.30 1,132.80 (169.92) 1,000.00 405.58
1970 Topps Super Proofs Lot (12) 405.41 493.75 (74.06) 200.00 214.28
1887 Allen & Ginter Boxing Lot (14) 403.40 403.40 -
1954 Topps Starter Set (119/250) 662.22 707.50 (106.13) 500.00 439.16
1947 Bond Bread Jackie Robinson Lot (6) 2,220.00 2,125.00 (318.75) 1,480.00 1,066.25
1934 R310 Butterfinger Ruth & Gehrig Lot (2) 720.00 720.00 -
1959 Topps Baseball Near Set (571/572) 3,620.00 3,620.00 -
1973 Topps Complete Set 2,512.40 6,347.41 (952.11) 600.00 3,482.90
1961 Topps PSA Graded Set 5,791.60 11,445.51 (1,716.83) 100.00 4,037.08
2013 Bowman Chrome Judge Black Wave Auto 1,940.00 1,940.00 -
1961-1982 Signed Card Lot (19) 1,364.40 1,120.00 (168.00) 800.00 387.60
35,772.07 44,393.67 (6,659.05) 16,289.99 18,252.54
*-denotes inventory purchased in 2019 valued at 2019 y/e figures. ^ -inventory on hand is valued at a conservative estimate of fair market value for remaining items. `-grading fees are expensed when the card is sent to PSA, fees are not paid until PSA has completed the order. Fees that are expensed, but not paid are sitting in Accounts Payable below.
2020 Grading Fees`: $2,944.79
Current On Hand
Cash: $5,588.15
Inventory See the Google sheet
ALSO! If anyone is interested in what the financials for this project would look like, see below. With 2019 officially in the book, I moved the final 2019 financial statement over for a year-over-year comparison:
As of 8/25/2020 2020 YTD 2019 Final
Cash $5,588.15 $1,680.15
Accounts Receivable $6,743.43 $-
Inventory^ 16,289.99 $10,605.75
Accounts Payable` ($2,886.54) ($1,858.62)
Retained Earnings ($9,262.28) $-
Initial Capital ($1,165.00) ($1,165.00)
Revenue ($44,393.67) ($40,163.15)
Cost of Goods Sold $19,482.08 $22,582.96
Fees (15% of Rev.) $6,659.05 $5,956.97
Grading Fees $2,944.79 $2,360.93
FORECAST
My goal is $20,000 profit for the year. Right now I’m $15,307.75 – PSA has dramatically slowed turnover, but I am definitely on pace to hit my goal, gross margins are up in 2020 compared to 2019 (56.1% vs. 43.8%) and net margins are also up (34.5% vs 23.1%). Sales more than doubled since the last installment and with orders finally coming back from PSA, I should continue to see steady sales.
I look forward to continuing to update everyone on this. Hope you enjoy as much as I do.
Jason
submitted by MachiavellianFuck to Entrepreneur [link] [comments]

r/ AFL Compendium of History – AFL Collapse: How the Carlton Blues almost built a dynasty, but then accidentally hit the self-destruct button.

Greetings everybody. The topic I wanted to cover for the History Compendium is inspired by SB Nation's Collapse, a really interesting series on how a sports team or athlete can collapse quickly, and go from a strong team, to a weak one. I don't even follow most of the sports they discuss, but I still find it interesting, as rarely does such a collapse happen due to a single event; normally it takes multiple events to truly make it set in, such as Sega dropping out of the console manufacturing business. The Carlton Football Club, after spending much of the 2000s in disarray, seemed on the precipice of success in the start of the 2012 season. They had returned to finals in 2009 through 2011, and had a strong list that was danger to contend with. Advertisements told their fans that “they know we’re coming” and “can you smell what the blues are cooking?”, building on the hype and anticipation many were having. Everyone knew that the list was on the verge of greatness, and one that had 16 players aged 22-25, and was absolutely entering its prime, with coach Brett Ratten, and a squad including Chris Judd, Chris Yarran, Jarrad Waite, Andrew Carazzo, Lachie Henderson, Zach Tuohy, Bryce Gibbs, Jeff Garlett, Heath Scotland, Andrew Walker, Bret Thornton and Mitch Robinson. The common thread between those players and coach? All of them were gone in just a few years.
Blue Velvet, 1995-2001
In 1995, the Carlton Football Club had been in serious discussions with other clubs, including St Kilda and North Melbourne, to merge into a new entity. Things were dire for some Victorian clubs, and the Blues saw the potential in forming a superteam by plundering other clubs players. The AFL was also offering financial incentives to merge, at a time when equalisation payments were nowhere near as high as they are now, and the AFL was actively seeking to reduce the number of clubs in the suburbs of Melbourne. These discussions were scattered to the wind when Carlton finished the 1995 season with a 20-2 record, their best ever, and won their 16th Premiership, putting them ahead of arch-nemesis Essendon as the most successful club in the AFL. Carlton was a strong team for basically its entire history, and it looked like smooth sailing up ahead. But the future was actually more like the Israelite’s 40 year trek to the promised land through a deserted wilderness. The club made finals every year from 1993-1996, and 1999-2001, and appeared in the 1993, 1995 and 1999 grand finals, winning 1995, but losing the others. 1999 was particularly infamous, as the club defied the odds to even be there, defeating heavily favoured minor premiers Essendon to get there, but losing heavily to the Kangaroos. But Carlton was a big club that could seemingly do no wrong, and they fell to the ultimate delusion; that they deserve success.
Blue Monday, 2002-2004
After solid performances in 2000 and 2001, the club’s 2002 season was a disaster, earning the club the indignity of its first ever wooden spoon, something unthinkable for a club used to success and dominance. The many aging star players of the 90s all fell off a cliff at once, resulting in such a massive loss in the quality of the list. However, the future still seemed bright; the club had earned a priority draft pick, and the first two players picked in that draft, Brendon Goddard and Daniel Wells, would have been excellent pick-ups. Unfortunately, the club were a pack of lousy no-good cheaters.
It came to media and AFL attention that the club had been playing four of its players under the table; Craig Bradley, Stephen Silvagni, Fraser Brown and Stephen O'Reilly. Carlton had traded in O'Reilly from Fremantle, but he didn't work out, retiring from injury after just one season. However, the O'Reilly trade would lead to the salary cap cheating becoming known to the AFL and becoming a scandal, and would also lead to one of the greatest copypastas bigfooty will ever produce, courtesy of former Richmond mod Weaver.
Worst trade ever?
That's easy. Pick 16 and 46 for Stephen O'Reilly who played 12 games for you. AND you had to pay him illegally outside the cap. AND he blew the whistle on you. AND you had to pay a fine. AND you got kicked out of the draft and had to recruit hacks. AND it meant that your mulit-million investment in Denis Pagan was a waste because he had no players.
Stephen O'Reilly for - Pick 16, pick 46, $1m fine, pick 1, 2, 17 and 33 in the 2003 draft, pick 1 in the 2003 PSD, 1st and 2nd round picks in the 2004 draft.
I reckon that would have the McMahon trade covered by a couple of laps of Flemington, then a trip down the highway for a run round Caulfield, before a backtrack to run the length of the Moone Valley straight.
Carlton was very harshly punished by the AFL as a consequence. Not only were their priority and first and second round draft picks (Picks 1, 2, 16 and 17) taken away, but they couldn’t trade back into those rounds, as the picks were taken away after the end of the trade period. They also lost their first and second round pick sin 2003, and similarly from prohibited from trading into those round there either, although they did earn a priority draft pick (Pick 2) in 2003. They also couldn’t participate in the pre-season draft, which was a commonly used method of recruiting mature talent in a time before delisted free agency, and finally, received a $930,000 fine ($1.4 million in todays money). The fine hit the club at a bad time, as they’d spent huge sums of money on poaching coach Denis Pagan from North Melbourne, and in renovating Princes Park. Pagan’s hiring would prove a costly mistake, as he failed to accomplish much with a list in a state more radioactive than the Chernobyl dead zone, and the money spent on Princes Park were wasted, as the AFL was moving games away from suburban grounds to the centralised MCG and Docklands stadium. Carlton had already lost $500,000 in 2002, and was forced to take a $1.3 million loan from the AFL. Pagan’s attempt to keep the list afloat ended up being a “dead cat’s bounce”, as the numerous recycled and rejected players failed to prop up the list. The club finally threw up its hands, and belatedly began to invest in youth.
Mr. Blue Sky, 2005-2007
In round 16 2007, a Brisbane team that wasn’t even that good destroyed Carlton 25.13 (163) to 6.10 (46), and just two days after the match, Pagan was fired, and assistant coach Brett Ratten was appointed as caretaker. Carlton was doing so badly that they were in the range or earning a priority draft pick before the first round if they didn't win another game. Then, in what I’m sure is just a coincidence, Carlton lost their remaining six games, earning them a priority pick before the first round of the draft (even though they finished 15th, with Richmond getting the wooden spoon), meaning that they had Picks 1 and 3; they traded Pick 3 as part of the deal for Chris Judd, and used Pick 1 on Matthew Kruezer. Getting Chris Judd was huge in the context of the time, as Judd was the captain of West Coast, and one of the greatest players the game had ever seen. The fact that Carlton could lure him over was a massive coup, and this along with their three first picks in a row, gave many people confidence that the core of a future great side would be in place. The club wasted no time in making Judd their new Captain.
West Coast, who had made it clear that they didn’t consider that any trade could replace Judd, got Pick 3 (which they used on future premiership player Chris Masten) and a young forward called Josh Kennedy, who would later win the Coleman medal twice and also be a premiership player. Debate still rages over who won that trade, as both clubs definitely gained from it.
In 2005 through 2007, the club ended up with the first pick in the draft each year. This was due to earning the 2005 and 2006 wooden spoons, and a priority draft pick in 2007. These three consecutive number one picks in 2005-2007 were Marc Murphy (who nearly went to Brisbane as a father-son), Bryce Gibbs (who nearly went to Adelaide as a father-son) and Matthew Kruezer. The 2007 priority pick proved to be highly contentious, and would be cited as a factor in removing the automatic allocation of priority picks in 2013. In Round 22, both Melbourne and Carlton played against each other with a record of 4-17, and whoever lost would get the priority draft pick; Melbourne would get Pick 19, as they hadn’t earned a pick the year before, while Carlton would get pick 1, as they had. Neither team could finish last, as Richmond had already finished 16th with a record of 3-17-1; the result was a farce, where neither team gained anything from winning, but plenty from losing. In what I’m sure is just a coincidence, the match was high scoring, played with low intensity, poor skills and very little defensive pressure, and Carlton lost, using the priority draft pick on Matthew Kruezer. The tanking was so obvious and predictable that observers and media referred to the game as “the Kruezer Cup”.
Blue (Da Ba Dee), 2008-2011
Chris Judd would prove to be just as brilliant as he was at West Coast, winning his second brownlow medal in 2010, and making the All-Australian team each year from 2008-2011. However, his time at the club was not always squeaky clean. It was revealed that paper and recycling company Visy was sponsoring him $200,000 a year to promote their environmentalism. In what I’m sure is just a coincidence, Visy was also a sponsor of Carlton, and many felt that this arrangement was an attempt from Carlton to get around the salary cap again, except instead of disgusting, brown paper bags under tables, they were using green and environmentally friendly side deals that was clearly just players getting sponsorships due to their high profile. The plan didn’t work, and the AFL revised rules so that such payments from sponsorships are now included by clubs in their Additional Services Agreement, and the AFL has to approve third-party deals now.
In 2008, Carlton improved significantly, finishing 11th with 10 wins. In 2009, they finished 7th with 13 wins, and returned to finals for the first time since 2001. Despite gaining a large lead in the fourth quarter, they fell apart to a comeback from Brisbane in the Elimination Final, and were defeated. They returned to finals again in 2010, with 11 wins, but were narrowly defeated by Sydney by just five points in the Elimination Final. In 2011, the club finished 5th with a 14-7-1 record, their best since 2001, and finally broke through the elimination finals, defeating Essendon 21.23 (149) to 13.9 (87). In the semi-finals, West Coast had a 21 point lead in the final quarter, but Carlton kicked the next three goals to bring the margin down to just two points. Controversially, with time running out, Andrew Walker was debatedly held near the goal square, but the umpire didn’t pay what should have been a free kick. Carlton’s finals campaign ended in heartbreak for the third consecutive year, going down to West Coast 15.11 (101) to 15.8 (98). In what I’m just is a coincidence, Ratten’s soon-to-expire contract was extended to 2013 shortly after the finals win.
Almost Blue, 2012
Early in the 2012 season, Carlton faced their arch-rivals Collingwood, fielding this squad, built over many years, with Kade Simpson the only holdover from the 2002 season. The hype for this Friday the 13th thriller was intense, and had a dope as hell promo featuring Dennis Commetti, a Werewolf and Michael Jackson.
Carlton Round 3 2012 Squad
FB Jeremy Laidler Lachie Henderson Chris Yarran
HB Heath Scotland Dennis Armfield Zach Tuohy
C Mitch Robinson Chris Judd Kade Simpson
HF Jeff Garlett Jarrad Waite Marc Murphy
FF Michael Jamison Matthew Kreuzer Eddie Betts
FOL Shaun Hampson Andrew Carrazzo Bryce Gibbs
I/C Kane Lucas Paul Bower Ed Curnow
I/C Nick Duigan
This team defeated Collingwood, who the previous year had 20 wins and a percentage of 167.7. And not just beat them, they flogged them 18.14 (122) to 9.8 (62). This wasn’t even their best team, as Levi Casboult, Brock McLean and Andrew Walker were omitted. But Collingwood would make the finals that year; Carlton didn't.
Carlton won five of their first six games, but then fell off a cliff, and won six of their next sixteen. What some view as the nail in the coffin was their loss against Gold Coast in Round 22, a team that only won three games that year; this, as well as losses against non-finalists Essendon, St Kilda and Port Adelaide, led to much frustration, and the perceived need to make a radical course correct. But perhaps this desire for a radical course correct should have been tempered with a realistic assessment of the club’s injury list.
Of 48 players on the senior and rookie lists, 20 players played more than 12 games, 21 played less than 12 games, and just seven didn’t play any. This is an especially high rate, especially for a team in the hunt for finals, which would typically try to play the same 22 players each week. For context, 2012 premiers Sydney had 23 players play more than 12 games, 8 played less than 12 games, and 13 wouldn’t play a single game. Matthew Kreuzer (hip), Mitch Robinson (calf), Zach Tuohy (back), Lachie Henderson (groin), Jeremy Laidler (knee), Shaun Hampson (knee), Chris Judd (suspension), Andrew Walker (calf), Jarrad Waite (back) and Kade Simpson (broken jaw) missed significant chunks of the season. Just Bryce Gibbs, Eddie Betts and Jeff Garlett would play every game. The season was also Bret Thornton's last at Carlton, who play his last season at GWS the next year. Thornton had been a reliable defender for years, and would be sorely missed.
Some great enterprises in history fail because of the lack of direction, the perception that everything is fine and nothing needs to chance. Carlton’s inevitable collapse would actually have the opposite cause; the club was already stable, and only needed reflection on what went wrong in 2012. Instead, the club made the fateful decision that would come to haunt their fans for years, and they sacked Brett Ratten despite his contract having another year to go, and hired Mick Malthouse as their new senior coach.
On paper, hiring Malthouse isn’t that bad of a decision; he’d been a senior coach since 1984, coaching Footscray, West Coast and Collingwood, and as coach, appeared in the 1991, 2002, 2003 and 2011 grand finals, and won the 1992, 1994 and 2010 premierships. Unlike many other old coaches, such as Robert Walls, Kevin Sheedy, Leigh Matthews or Dennis Pagan, he seemed just as capable as an old man as he had when he was younger, tactically innovating with the times. In particular, Collingwood was a dominant force in 2010-2011, and was the team others emulated and wanted to beat. On top of this, many felt that his departure from Collingwood in 2011 was unfair. Collingwood President Eddie Maguire had insisted that Malthouse hand over the reins to assistant Nathan Buckley, and after a transition period in 2010-2011, Buckley became senior coach and Malthouse was to be given the made-up position “directing of coaching”. The transition was not smooth, and there were arguments over who was in charge, who had responsibility for coaching, and players took sides in the arguments. Malthouse left, but was raring for the chance of coaching again; in what I’m sure is just a coincidence, with just 40 more games, he’d reach 700 games coached, and was seemingly close to breaking Jock McHale’s 64-year record of most senior games coached (indeed, he’d exceed it in 2015, and set a new record of 718 games).
Electric Blue, 2013
Despite Carlton’s hiring of Malthouse to get them into the top 8, he failed to do so, and they finished ninth. Despite this, they still made finals, as Essendon, who would have finished 7th, were expelled from the finals as punishment for their supplements program, just the start of the long and drawn out supplements saga. The result was that Port Adelaide and Carlton were bumped up into 7th and 8th place, and Carlton qualified for finals in the most bizarre way since Fitzroy did in 1916 despite finishing last (the 1916 had just 4 teams due to the first world war, and all of them qualified for finals; Fitzroy ended up winning the premiership as well).
Carlton went up against one of their greatest historical rivals, Richmond, who had qualified for finals for the first time 2001 after having their own on-field and off-field issues. Surely Richmond would wipe the floor with Carlton? After all, they weren’t even meant to be there. However, just like the 1999 Preliminary Final, and the 2019 AFLW Preliminary Final, Carlton has the annoying habit of winning finals they have no right to be in, and in the shock result of the year, Carlton defeated Richmond in a last quarter comeback. Richmond, the club many derided for regularly placing 9th (since their 1982 grand final appearance, they finished 9th in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2008) and just missing finals, had finally returned to finals, and then were defeated by a team that finished 9th, in what is possibly the greatest of ironies in sports history. As a supporter of the other sash team, I miss the days when Richmond was a joke. Carlton’s surprise finals campaign ended the next week, when they were defeated by Sydney in the semi-finals.
The off-season saw the club delist Jeremy Laidler, who was then signed by Sydney as a delisted free agent and played for another three years. According to Laidler “It was tough but I just wasn’t in Mick’s (Malthouse) plans and I just had to move on and I couldn’t be happier with where I’ve ended up.” Then, Eddie Betts, a generational small forward, left as a restricted free agent to Adelaide. Adelaide’s contract offer wasn’t much higher than what he was already receiving, and was happy to stay at Carlton, but Adelaide’s offer wasn’t matched, so he walked to Adelaide and became one of the game’s most iconic players. While he would eventually be traded back in 2019, he spent five of his best seasons at a different club. Betts later said that leaving Carlton was “the hardest decision I had to make in my life”.
Mitch Robinson would later say on his podcast to Betts that “I know for a fact that a lot of players, including myself, Jeffy (Garlett), (Chris) Yarran, Dennis Armfield, we all just felt shattered when you left” and admitted that the Blues “went off the rails” afterwards. He was so shattered by his departure, as were many other players that Robinson even looked into moving to Adelaide too in order to keep playing with him. Betts’ departure had another nail in the toblerone; he was well aware of what his departure could mean to the other indigenous players on the list, such as Chris Yarran and Jeff Garlett, who both went through personal troubles in the years after his departure.
Meanwhile, Carlton didn’t get compensation for either Betts or Laidler, as they signed Dale Thomas as a restricted free agent from Collingwood; if a club that loses a free agent gains a free agent, then they are not entitled to compensation. Dale Thomas was one of Malthouse’s favourites from his time there, and it was clear to outsiders that he was playing favourites, highly rating players like Thomas, and massively underrating players like Betts and Laidler; indeed, Thomas ended up being the second-highest paid player on the team. The club also traded out Shaun Hampson, who was a decent ruckman, and whose rucking freed Kruezer to be a key forward. What could have been a disastrous draft was salvaged by two players; they traded in Sam Docherty from Brisbane, and drafted Patrick Cripps, their current co-captains.
Goodbye Blue Sky, 2014
Carlton’s 2014 season was a whirlwind. After starting 0-4, they ended up 4-5 before their bye. Finals was still in reach, but the prospect of finals was like fruit and water in front of Tantalus, so close yet so far away, and they finished the season with a record of 7-14-1, and finished 12th.
Malthouse’s game plan was mis-matched with the skills of the players he had; this is a mistake coaches have made many times at many different teams. Some coaches think they must make their team play the way they want them to, rather than crafting a game plan that uses the strengths of the players currently on the list. Malthouse’s old-school, tough and uncompromising persona as coach crushed the confidence of players like Mitch Robinson, Jarrod Garlett, Troy Menzel and Chris Yarran. Robinson would reflect on his time at Carlton under Malthouse as unenjoyable, losing much of his passion to play football and dreading coming to work. In Yarran’s case, he developed severe mental health issues, and would quit from the AFL a few months after being traded to Richmond in 2015. His personal life later took a dark turn, and he developed a crystal meth addiction and would go to prison in 2019 after going on what the foxsports delicately called “a meth-fuelled crime spree”.
In August 2014, Mitch Robinson, Jeff Garlett, Garlett’s brother Gerald and Garlett’s friend Matthew Johns got in a brawl outside a Melbourne nightclub. Garlett, who had apparently tried to jump into a taxi that already had two women in it, caused an incident that led to a brawl with their three male friends. Garlett was knocked unconscious and Robinson was king hit, knocked to the ground, and kicked several times, getting multiple bruises and a fractured eye socket before he was able to get up and run away. Making things worse, Robinson tried lying about what had happened to the club, saying that his injuries were from a boxing session at training, a lie that was quickly undone. Robinson had earlier gotten in a drunken fight at the Big Day Out festival in 2013, and the club was through with him. All three of the attackers were sentenced to community service for assault, but the incident served to cloud the club’s perception of the two players.
In the aftermath of this fight, Jeff Garlett was traded to Melbourne for peanuts, and Mitch Robinson was delisted. Garlett would have a decent five years left in his career, while Robinson would end up going to Brisbane as a delisted free agent and in his first season won their best-and-fairest, would turn his life around, and is now one of their most important players and leaders. These weren’t even the worst deals that they made in 2014.
Jarrad Waite left to North Melbourne as an unrestricted free agent. Waite was a father-son player (Vin Waite played in Carlton’s 1970 and 1972 premierships), and experienced old hand who was still best 22 quality, and was an important key forward, being their leading goalkicker in 2014, and North Melbourne’s in 2015. Waite’s contract had ended, and he decided to exercise his rights as a free agent after 12 years at Carlton, who didn’t get any compensation due to his age and the size of contract he received from North Melbourne. Once again, three good, important players were discarded by a club that for some reason drastically underestimated their value, and they would later suffer for it.
In the worst of their deals that season, they traded their first draft pick, Pick 7, for Kristian Jaksch, Mark Whiley and Pick 19 from GWS. The trade isn’t that bad in theory, as some clubs could find themselves in a situation where they’d prefer two players and a later pick to an early pick, but Jaksch and Whiley would be complete busts, and would both be gone by 2017. Pick 19, which could have been used on someone like Toby McLean or Hugh Goddard, was used on 21 year old Blaine Boekhurst, who lasted three years and 25 games. None of the players Carlton drafted in 2014 remain at the club today; the only one still playing in the AFL, Billy Gowers, was a rookie pick who would be delisted, picked up by the Western Bulldogs, and be their leading goalkicker in 2018. The four players they picked in the national draft played a combined 32 games, and two never even debuted, which cruelly denied us that chance for BT to commentate a game featuring Dillon Viojo-Rainbow.
Carlton’s 2014 draft is possibly the worst in recent memory, with the only upside being Liam Jones, who they traded in as a key forward, but ended up reinventing himself as a defender. Also, the pick they traded for him was used on premiership player Caleb Daniel. So their one positive was by complete accident, and debatably a worse decision than drafting Daniel. The 2014 draft was Shane Roger’s last as list manager, and he would be replaced by Carlton and AFL fullback of the century Stephen Silvagni.
It's All Over Now, Baby Blue, 2015
In front of the press before the start of the home-and-away season, Malthouse announced that;
I shouldn’t say this in front of the cameras, but it’s very, very difficult to see where we’re going to lose a game… I can’t see it. I’m an optimist. I look at them at think: ‘Gee, they’re a good bunch of kids’, I love them and I reckon they can get the best out of themselves and we can have a damn good year.
Such optimism lasted not very long after the pre-season, and Carlton had an even more dismal start to the season than the year before; by round 8, the club sat at the bottom of the ladder with a record of 1-7. These included a four losses by 69 points or more.
Despite the previously held optimism, Chief Executive Steven Trigg and President Mark LoGiudice publicly declared that the club was rebuilding not long into the season. On May 25, the Monday after round 8, it was announced that Malthouse’s position would be reviewed by the round 11 bye week. But they didn’t need to wait that long. The next day, Malthouse had an interview on SEN 1116, and openly criticised the way the club was run. Much like Joss Whedon after people saw the cinematic whatever Alien Resurrection, none of this was his fault, it was clearly everyone elses, blaming poor performances on the talk of rebuilding. “I will not be standing down,” he said on SEN. Asked if that meant he would have to be sacked, he answered “Either that or they reappoint me”. That afternoon, Malthouse’s contract was terminated. John Barker took over as the caretaker coach, and the club didn’t do much better, finishing with a record of 4-18.
The combination of multiple good players leaving for nothing in 2013-2014, the aging stars on the list suddenly retiring or about to be retired, the mostly poor drafting from 2008-2014, and the loss of coach and confidence in the playing group meant that the club was forced to take drastic action, and in the 2015 draft, Carlton did the best thing they could; acknowledge that the list was in complete disrepair, and set about fixing it in one of the most comprehensive rebuilds a side as ever seen. A club that had already seen many of its players depart under Malthouse saw many retirements and delistings, traded out Lachie Henderson, Tom Bell, Chris Yarran and Troy Menzel, and hit the draft hard. Chris Judd, David Ellard and Andrew Carazzo retired not with Carlton’s seventeenth premiership, but with its fourth wooden spoon.
The Real Folk Blues, In Summary
Malthouse’s time in charge of the Carlton football club was so incredibly awful, so impossibly destructive, and so unbelievably devastating, that some believe he was sent there as a Collingwood plant to ruin them, as few find it possible that a coach with a resume like Malthouse could possibly take an in its prime list, and shred it utterly in just three seasons by accident.
Many of the issues Carlton faced in 2015, if on their own, could have been dealt with; an ill-suited coach can be replaced, aging retired stars can give way to younger players, players leaving can be traded for good value. But the dominoes that had piled up for years fell down like a house of cards, and it was checkmate for the potential dynasty of the Carlton Blues.
The club’s drafting was exposed as flawed; they hadn’t drafted a great many skilled players since they’d acquired Judd and Kruezer in 2007. In 2005-2007, other than each year’s first pick, the only players they drafted who would play more than 50 games for Carlton were Paul Bower and Dennis Armfield. Their 2008 draft was actually quite good, as they drafted Mitch Robinson and Chris Yarran. But following this, Sam Rowe was the only player they drafted in the national draft from 2009-2012 would play more than 50 games at Carlton. In fact their best players they’d drafted in this time, Zach Touhy, Levi Casboult and Ed Curnow, were bizarrely all drafted in the rookie draft instead of the national draft.
In the 2015-2017 drafts, Carlton moved on a total of 42 players, including best 22 level Zach Tuohy and Bryce Gibbs, in an effort to rebuild again. And while this rebuild is slowly paying off, it meant the club endured more years of pain and heartache, as well another wooden spoon, and the knowledge that if they’d steadied the ship when they had the chance, then none of this would have needed to happen. Fans used to a powerful club that hadn’t won a single wooden spoon from 1897-2001 were now having to comprehend supporting a club that had suddenly acquired five in the next 18 (2002, 2005, 2006, 2015, 2018).
In the modern AFL, senior coaches rarely get second gigs, unlike other sports where coaches or managers having careers in charge of multiple clubs isn’t out of the ordinary; in the AFL, if you’re let go, then you’re toxic waste, and were clearly fired because you weren’t good enough. However Brett Ratten, in defiance of modern hiring practices, did get another senior coaching gig, and is currently the coach of St Kilda. The fact that Ratten got hired when other talented ex-coaches weren’t goes to show just how strong the perception is that it was a mistake it was for Carlton to fire him.
Many seem to have forgotten the 2008-2013 era of Carlton being decent, lumping it with the period of poor performances on either side of it, but Carlton in 2012 was a team on the verge of becoming something amazing. But a combination of poor recent drafts, an aging list, poorly timed injuries, a fractured playing group, a greedy and impatient administration, and an incredibly bad choice of senior coach would lead to the team stumbling at the last hurdle, and its fans, bereft of success, would find themselves waiting again, in sadness. I guess that’s why they call them the Blues.
Players on Carlton’s list in 2012 still at Carlton as of 2020 season
Players on Carlton’s list in 2012 not at Carlton as of 2020 season
I hope people enjoyed this AFL Collapse. I'm keen on possibly writing more, such as St Kilda's collapse after the 2010 grand final, and Sydney in the late 1980s. I also want to know if there's anything innaccurate in the post, or anything I missed that would be useful information to have. I've also written collapse articles on Brisbane after their threepeat, and Essendon after the 2001 Grand Final.
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Zoning: why it sucks, why it's hard to change, and how we can fix it

(First time effortposting - hopefully this isn't too long)
Zoning refers to policies that divide land into zones that are regulated for specific purposes. Zoning is used as a mechanism of urban planning to separate different uses of land that are seen as incompatible or to prevent activities that would interfere with and degrade existing uses of land.
TL;DR - Zoning reduces economic efficiency, increases inequality, increases racial segregation, and hurts the environment and our health - Zoning reform hasn't occurred due to concentrated costs and dispersed benefits - Zoning reform requires restructuring the political process and adjusting the incentives of homeowners
What is zoning?
There are three main types of policies associated with zoning. 1. Regulating what activity is permitted in certain zones e.g. residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, or open space 2. Regulating the density at which these activities can be performed e.g. from single family homes to high-rise apartments 3. Regulating the parameters of what is being built e.g. the height of buildings, the space it occupies etc.
What are the problems associated with zoning?
There are four main issues associated with zoning. 1. Reduced efficiency due to labour immobility 2. Increased inequality and reduced social mobility 3. Increased racial segregation 4. Miscellaneous harms to the environment and to personal health
Why does zoning cause inefficiency?
Zoning keeps affordable housing out of neighbourhoods, with minimum lot size requirements, single residence per lot requirements, minimum square footage requirements, and costly building codes. These prevent the building of multi-family rental units and reduce the supply of available land, driving up housing costs. - Glaeser and Gyourko 2002 show how the price of housing is mostly equal to the marginal physical costs of new construction in the USA, but where they aren't, they are associated with zoning and land use controls. - Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks 2003 demonstrate that often, the gap between the price of housing and the cost of construction is accounted for by zoning acting as a regulatory tax, with that tax rate reaching 53% in San Francisco. - Glaeser and Gyourko 2018 calculate the minimum profitable production cost (MPPC) of a house, adding up the costs of land, labour, construction, capital and an industry average 17% profit margin. The three cities where the price-to-MPPC ratio is greater than two are San Francisco, Los Angeles and Oxnard, all of which have more regulatory barriers and fewer building permits issued than in an average city.
The consequence is that people are less able to move around and find the best job for them, because they are unable to afford the inflated house prices. Instead, people, especially lower-income workers, remain trapped in low-productivity parts of the country. That is, we get booms without booming towns,
This leads to an inefficient allocation of labour and means the benefits of agglomeration are reduced. These benefits include lower transport costs, information spillovers and the ability to invest in human capital knowing that there will be job openings demanding your new skills. - Hsieh and Moretti 2019 calculate that these restrictions on labour mobility from zoning decreased aggregate US growth by 36% from 1964 to 2009. - Schleicher 2012 notes that the most successful parts of the country have seen large increases in housing prices but only small increases or even decreases in population e.g. San Francisco and Boston. In fact, Silicon Valley lost population in the late 1990s and lost domestic population from 2000 to 2010, due to housing prices rising faster than wages. Meanwhile, there were huge population inflows into less productive but unrestrictive regions like Houston and Atlanta.
This labour immobility hurts other macroeconomic goals, by limiting the gains from trade and making monetary policy less effective. - There can be harms from trade onto individual industries and areas. Traditionally, this should result in labour reallocating to industries and areas less exposed to trade. This didn't occur in the 2000s as Acemoglu et al. 2016 describe. - The role of zoning is confirmed by Autor et al. 2013, which finds "no robust evidence ... that shocks to local manufacturing lead to substantial changes in population", and by Autor et al. 2014, which says that "geographic mobility is not a primary mechanism for adjusting to trade shocks". Workers were unable to move around and mitigate the harms from trade. - The divergence of various regions within a country can cause asynchronous regional business cycles. Optimum currency area theory suggests that in order for it to make sense to have the same currency across different business cycles, there needs to be enough internal factor mobility. The labour immobility caused by zoning leads Beckworth 2009 to suggest that it limited the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy.
Why does zoning cause inequality and prevent social mobility?
Zoning denies lower-income families the chance to move to and access to the resources found in wealthier neighbourhoods. That means being denied better funded schools and better employment opportunities. Instead, lower-income families will be concentrated in the same area. Kahn, Vaughn and Zasloff 2010 note that after the creation of a coastal boundary zone to regulate construction near the California coastline, household income rose faster in Census tracts inside the zone than outside. The general impact is shown by Levine 1999, who observes that cities that enacted more growth control measures between 1979 and 1988 had higher incomes in 1990, controlling for 1980 income.
This results in cycles of poverty, seen in how poverty has become more concentrated. Jargowsky 2015 finds that between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of the poor that lived in high-poverty neighbourhoods went up from 10.3% to 14.4%, representing a jump from 7.2 million Americans to 13.8 million.
Zoning matters in causing this because the place where you grow up has a huge impact on your future prospects. Chetty and Hendren 2015 find that growing up in Baltimore, Maryland generated a total earnings penalty of approximately 14% compared to the national average, while growing up in DuPage County, Illinois yielded a 16% gain.
One reason for these sorts of disparities is shown by Shonkoff 2007, who notes that the prevalence of stressful factors in the environment, such as high crime rates, maternal depression, and family instability can cause damage to the development of brain architecture.
Another reason is that a more diverse neighbourhood and school district has many benefits, which zoning prevents. Wells, Fox and Cordova-Cobo 2016 show that there are large educational benefits of racial and economic diversity at school - cognitive, social, and emotional - and crucially, these don't just benefit students that are less privileged, but all the students. Zoning prevents this sort of diversity. - At a K-12 level, it has been found in Brown-Jeffy and Shelly 2005 that attending racially diverse schools is associated with higher average test scores and a decline in racial achievement gap in test scores. - It also results in a lower drop out rate (Mickelson 2008) and a higher likelihood of enrolling in college (Palardy 2013) - This is reaffirmed by Gurin et al. 2002, Antonio et al. 2004, and Richeson and Trawalter 2005, all of which demonstrate the positive relationship between diversity experiences and academic outcomes in college.
Zoning also means that lower-income families are further away from good job opportunities. - Kneebone and Holmes 2016 find that between 2000 and 2012, the number of jobs within the typical commute distance for residents in a major metro area fell by 7%. This was especially problematic for lower-income neighbourhoods, with 61% of high-poverty census tracts facing reduced job proximity. - Ewing and Hamidi 2014 confirm that for children born in the bottom quintile of the income spectrum, they are more likely to climb to the top quintile in cities that are less-sprawling. - Chetty and Hendren 2015 note that among the 5 million children they tracked, a neighborhood's average commuting time was the strongest single correlation with the ability to move to a higher income bracket compared to one's parents.
Consequently, Ganong and Shoag 2016 estimate that without zoning restrictions, the convergence in economic growth across states at the pace seen between 1940 to 1980 would have led to a 10% smaller rise in hourly wage inequality between 1980 to 2010. This is corroborated by Rognlie 2015, which attributes the increasing inequality to rising housing prices.
Why is zoning racist?
The words of the Kerner Commission that the United States was "moving towards two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal" rang true when they were written. They remained true at its 30th anniversary when reviewed in The Millenium Breach and Locked in the Poorhouse reports. They unfortunately persist today.
And a big part of the reason why is because the consequences of zoning occur on racial lines. That means racial minorities are excluded from economic opportunities and do not get the advantages of zoning inflating house prices. - Jargowsky 2015 finds that a quarter of black Americans living in poverty resided in high-poverty neighbourhoods, compared to only one-thirteenth of poor white Americans. This means they bear the brunt of the economic stagnation characterised above. - Shapiro, Meschede and Osoro 2013 note that the number of years families owned their homes is the largest predictor of the gap in wealth growth by race. This is because homeownership is the largest investment that most Americans families have, but especially so for black families, amounting to 53% of wealth for blacks and 39% for whites. - Unsurprisingly, Rothwell and Massey 2009 find that restrictive anti-density zoning laws increase racial segregation.
What are the miscellaneous harms of zoning?
One harm of zoning is environmental - because low-density zoning can create urban sprawl, they contribute towards the use of automobiles and highways instead of public transport, cycling and walking. Cervero and Duncan 2003 note that among environmental factors, land-use diversity was the most important factor in whether or not people chose to walk. This is corroborated by Frank and Pivo 2012, who demonstrate that the average land-use mix at the origin and destination points of work trips had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of walking. Johnson 2001 goes further and suggests that zoning and the related sprawl can lead to more air pollution, more energy use and disrupt ecosystems.
Another harm is medical. Although the development of urban planning and zoning allowed the creation of cities with proper sanitation that reduces infectious diseases, it has led to a rise in other medical conditions. In particular, Wilson, Hutson and Mujahid 2008 suggest that the reliance on cars caused by low-density zoning could be a contributing factor towards the obesity epidemic and cardio-vascular disease.
What are some justifications of exclusionary zoning?
The main argument for zoning as observed by Schleicher 2017 is the creation of residential stability. Those who own homes in the same area for a long time are more invested in the community. This can also incentivise business investment, which is often dependent upon a stable population. - DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998 found that homeownership is correlated with an increased likelihood to invest in social capital, with an increased level of citizenship and with a larger share of the government budget going to education and transport infrastructure. - Manturuk, Lindblad and Quercia 2009 confirm that there is a causal relationship where increased homeownership leads to increased voting. - Alperovitz, Williamson and Dubb 2012 argue that it is difficult to carry out coherent investment and planning with unstable populations. By contrast, a stable population that is less mobile reduces risk.
The other main argument for zoning revolves around preventing the decline of property values and the changing of the "local complexion". Behind these dogwhistles lie a desire to maintain segregated spaces, on both economic and racial lines, in order to prevent perceived harms to the social environment. However, Massey et al. 2013 found that following the construction of an affordable housing complex in the wealthy New Jersey suburb of Mount Laurel, there were no effects on taxes, on crime rates, and on property values. What did materialise was all of the benefits alluded to earlier - a 22% rise in employment compared to those on the waitlist, a 52% rise in average income and a 6 hours increase in the number of hours the children studied a week.
Why has zoning reform mostly failed?
Ever since the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, it has been clear that the US Department of Housing and Urban Development has a duty to "affirmatively further fair housing". That has not happened - and to quote the judgement from the 1985 case Young v. Pierce, HUD "has continued to actively support the system [of segregated housing] in perhaps the most effective possible way - by paying for it."
George Romney, who ran HUD, was driven to resign from the Cabinet in 1972, due to Nixon's opposition to him opposing discriminatory zoning practices. As Secretary of HUD, Andrew Cuomo's proposed regulation in 1998 to make HUD funding conditional upon a city's progress in fair housing goals led to the US Conference of Mayors saying that the "proposed rule would have a devastating impact on a city’s ability to achieve housing, economic development and fair housing goals". A 2009 internal HUD study found that many communities were not even bothering to complete the required fair housing paperwork when they applied for block grants.
Reforms against zoning have failed in the past - not just at the federal level described here, but at all levels. One of the reasons for this is because of the way the costs and benefits are distributed. The costs of new housing include increasing congestion, more competition for local schools and decreasing the value of the existing property. These are geographically concentrated upon existing property owners and landlords. By contrast, the benefits to renters, developers and future residents are highly spread out. This means that the costs of political organisation are lower for the homeowners and landlords.
This is exacerbated by the lack of partisan competition in local legislatures as Schleicher and Hills Jr. 2011 find, meaning that the role of parties in mobilising dispersed interests is unavailable to counteract the power of special interests groups.
How can zoning be reformed?
The immediate solution to exclusionary zoning is inclusionary zoning. In the 92% white Montgomery County, Maryland, they enacted a zoning ordinance requiring developers to include at least 15% of units in each large development to be sold or rented out at below market value for lower-income residents. After six years, this was passed in 1974 and has resulted in the construction of more than 13,000 affordable housing units. Its black population has tripled to 18%. The Baltimore Housing Mobility Program has moved 1,500 families from segregated high-poverty city neighborhoods into racially integrated low-poverty suburbs. Engdahl 2009 found that 62% of participants have stayed in their new homes, with 80% of these participants saying that they felt safer, more peaceful and less stressed.
However, Ellickson 1981 argues that inclusionary zoning could drive up prices overall, even if it provides for a few lower-income households. This is corroborated in some empirical studies, and so inclusionary zoning is a policy that has its costs. - Bento et al. 2009 find that inclusionary zoning in California caused prices to increase 3% faster relative to jurisdictions without the it. - Means and Stringham 2015 observe that in places with inclusionary zoning in California, housing supply reduced by 7% compared to those without it.
To deal with the more fundamental political problems associated with zoning, Schleicher 2012 compares them to issues associated with trade deals. As such, one solution he offers is to use "zoning budgets". That is, there would be an authority at a high enough level that they could set an overall annual zoning budget which described the number of potential units permitted - this could be at a state-wide level, or a city-wide level for some larger cities. It would figure out a way to reach that number, and when faced with lobbyists, any reduction in one area would be compensated for by an increase in another area. Once this budget was finished, the local legislature would vote on it as a whole. Individual NIMBY groups would be pitted against each other, while the dispersed interests of an entire area would be empowered. This operates in the same way trade deals do, where the President can propose a single piece of trade legislation to Congress to be voted for or against. However, this is dependent on it being too difficult for people who support zoning to simply overturn the power of this commission, as that would in fact lead to a NIMBY coalition coalescing.
Another idea he proposed was to use "tax increment local transfers", mirroring Trade Adjustment Assistance. Trade deals are Kaldor-Hick efficient but not Pareto efficient. The TAA allows some of the benefits of trade deals to be transferred to those who incurred the harms. TILTs would redistribute a proportion of the tax gains from new developments to those property owners who may be harmed in the process.
Stronger HUD enforcement would also be helpful. Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. in 2015 had SCOTUS finding 5-4 that Fair Housing Act protects Americans from discrimination in where they choose to live, even when the discrimination is unintentional. Governments or lending institutions can be sued based in part on statistical evidence that certain categories of residents had suffered “disparate impact” as a consequence of housing policies.
Finally, it is worth comparing the fundamental incentives that zoning advocates have to other places. For one, the USA disproportionately privileges real estate as an investment, via interest deductions, capital gains and property tax exemptions, and subsidized mortgages. In Japan, house prices fully depreciate in 22 years on average, which contributes to its much less restrictive zoning policy. In Switzerland, Fischel 2000 note that because imputed rents on owner-occupied housing is taxed, it has one of the lowest levels of homeownership in the developed world. Minimising the role of homeownership and real estate as the most important source of wealth and investment would go a long way.
Another factor is the incredible role of the municipality in the USA - not only are public services heavily dependent on which local area you live in, but so is the determination of zoning policy. By contrast, Japan has standardised local service provisions and a nationally imposed zoning regulations, which do not require projects to face arbitrary and arduous discretionary reviews if they fit the criterion of the zoning policy.
Where do we stand?
It is probably true that you don't want children playing behind an industrial sewage treatment plant - there are going to be externalities from various industrial plants. So zoning can be useful in certain circumstances, such as by separating industry from other areas, though Coaseian bargaining about rights to noise pollution etc. may be a possible alternative. What is clear however is that zoning by and large has problematic consequences for society as a whole, while disproportionately benefitting the incumbents and allowing the privileged to hoard opportunities. The counterfactual looks like Houston or Minneapolis or Japan, where single-use zoning, density restrictions, segregated residential housing, minimum lot sizes and arbitrary review processes do not inhibit the construction of new developments. The way to get there is by creating political systems that are better able to overcome the special interests groups that would support exclusionary and low-density zoning. In the long-run, that means fixing the fundamental incentives faced by homeowners and legislatures.
submitted by tmychow to neoliberal [link] [comments]

Why I am Long on ITM Power

ITM is a British manufacturer that provides hydrogen energy solutions. They are AIM-listed, which does limit the access to financials and analyst coverage, but they have been listed since 2004 giving us some history to judge. Looking at the fundamentals and what is happening in the industry, I'll try and work out if this is a good long term investment or not.

https://preview.redd.it/q97ud78qzw251.png?width=200&format=png&auto=webp&s=ebb658a09e6f99204c4886a303ece6f98798561e
What Does ITM Do?
Hydrogen energy solutions is a broad statement which doesn't tell us too much about the business. What we can do is look through their financial reports to see how they divide up their own business as well as the products they have on offer.
Their solutions include grid balancing, energy storage, production of green hydrogen for transport, and renewable heat and chemicals. However, this isn't what you will see on their balance sheet, there are two ways to breakdown their revenue, the type of operation and by sub-industry.

https://preview.redd.it/85j0e69rzw251.jpg?width=848&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=91b5911fd929ee6748b90e496af53c3f864149bf
Source: ITM Interim 2019 Report
Construction contracts make up the lion share of the revenue for ITM. A large part of their business is installing large bases for refuelling, energy containment, or even processing plants. For example, having a fleet of hydrogen busses means you need a specialist refuelling station. You could either lease one or pay ITM to construct one complete with their hydrogen converting machines.

https://preview.redd.it/uwcy4ljtzw251.jpg?width=1569&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f0490bacb8bb8237288dfc9f11101c456b41aa85
Source: ITM AGM 2019 Presentation
Consulting also makes up a large part of their revenue. Being experts in their field ITM also offers to consult for both their installations as well as others. Not only is this any additional revenue line, but it also means existing installations are kept at maximum capacity and clients are happy.
Maintenance is split out from consulting and very strict about the reoccurring revenue of their machines and sites. This is also an interesting measure of existing finished sites where they are making ongoing revenue versus lots of new projects. Seeing this number increase means we have more finished projects bringing in a stable base of revenue, for what we hope is dramatically less cost.
Fuel sales are direct sales where they own the site and equipment and clients are charged to purchase hydrogen for their machines. This also includes selling fuel in bulk.
Finally, we have the always present "other" category, for any minor revenues which don't live anywhere else. This line is different from other operating income or one-off gains like selling parts of the business or a previously owned site.

https://preview.redd.it/s4a43yfuzw251.jpg?width=839&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=e0dc86a322d2bf07f54b6ead9c467ae459ad60be
Source: ITM Interim 2019 Report
Alternatively, we can break down the business lines by what industry they relate to. This does mean some projects will be split across different segments, the totals always add up the same but it gives us some insight into why clients are coming to ITM.
Power-to-gas also is known as P2G is converting electrical energy into a gas, in this case, hydrogen. Two reasons for wanting to do this, firstly this is the end product (for ITM the next business line is where you see this as the end product), and secondly to store power. Electricity is a pain to store and can be expensive to keep as raw electricity. By converting this into a gas, it's easier to store and then use the gas as the power source. It's a great way to transport power without all the expensive infrastructure.
Refuelling is where ITM is powering machinery and vehicles. The main business for ITM is building refuelling depots. Buying a contract from ITM to build you a hydrogen refuel station for your new busses would show up as a construction contract and be created as part refuelling in this view.
The chemical industry is the leftover parts of the process which can still be sold and converted. It also includes taking P2G and performing more work to convert it into LPG. This means you can still produce liquid petroleum gas from ITM's equipment. Most of their customers won't want to be left with P2G and will want the extra steps to end up with LPG.
ITM also has another source of income not listed here.
Grants from different governments and bodies to further the research and development of clean energy. In 2019 ITM took £6.8m in grants, in the same period they made £4.6m in revenue. This is powering a significant about of R&D for the business, given we are in a situation where global governments have more pressing needs for their money, this is at risk of slipping.
What Do The Fundamentals Tell Us?
I mentioned an AIM listing makes this a bit harder. From a regulatory standpoint, they don't have to release as much information about their company as someone on the main exchange. AIM stocks are as a blanket rule, much higher risk because of this.

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Source: Genuine Impact
This kind of heavily skewed relative rank is expected. It's a small company which a lot of volatility. As always I want more context and will dive a bit deeper to understand what this means.
When looking at what ITM does I showed some financial statements and also highlight they historically have brought in more grants than revenue, which isn't a long term sustainable approach.
The revenue for the trailing twelve months was £5m, and they ended up with a -25.49% gross margin. Even before we look at the rest of the financials we can tell the cost of making revenue is painfully high and bleeding cash. If we take into account the rest of the costs with running the business we end up with a shocking -£9.45M loss. A profit margin of -205.88% is rare to see. The bulk of this heavy loss is down to two items, cost of revenue (as we know) followed by prototyping, which is considered separate to R&D.
Being so cash-intensive there are no dividends and as a shareholder, you can expect a negative EPS, currently sat at -2.90x.

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Source: Wallmine
What is interesting is the massive recent cash injection of £58.8m. This was completed as fundraise, meaning the company only has £18.11m in debt. Due to the way the reporting works all of this debt is listed as due within the year. If we face this off against current assets we see a very impressive £83.64m if we stretch ourselves and include long term assets we end up with a respectable £92.99m in assets.
While the company is bleeding cash, the assets are increasing. There is heavy investment in prototyping and developing new machinery to increase their reoccurring revenue beyond the first core sale. A riskier strategy but not an uncommon one for smaller companies. ITM can cover their liabilities and obligations in the short term, which does put them ahead of their similarly structured peers.
On the surface, the financials appear weaker than they are but based on the earnings we can expect this to be an overpriced stock.

https://preview.redd.it/qiafbrvwzw251.jpg?width=1489&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=cf3a891705ce7a776b4dd14927944597aa5ddfa8
Source: Yahoo Finance
We are trading at all-time highs, and the momentum behind the price movement is very strong. Which is going to drastically harm the value assessment.
A price to sales of 177.69x and price to book of 53.96x are both abysmal figures. The recent fundraising has helped push the cash to shares to 0.02x, still very weak compared to what we would expect but a move in the right direction.
This is not a value purchase in any sense. You are paying an extreme premium based on old figures for a company which doesn't have the same level of reporting requirements you would expect from a main market listed company.
At this point, I would expect you to be very put off. The sell-side analysts with their future growth predictions for ITM are pegged to be extremely high and aggressive.

https://preview.redd.it/vc8fy6oxzw251.png?width=1078&format=png&auto=webp&s=f94e1732af1a307e3adc3e53da43557d67111aa8
Source: Genuine Impact
We know that ITM has missed every single one of its revenue and EPS targets set by Wall St, and judging by the even split of analyst ratings I would say they are mostly out of date. This is a small AIM stock, it's not going to have a strong following or large amounts of analysis available.
What stood out to me was the biggest driver behind why the future is looking so promising, and this helps us to understand the aggressive price growth as well.

https://preview.redd.it/jp13qakyzw251.png?width=1080&format=png&auto=webp&s=b2766621d1e24075054f3bbd37ce5b215fb84684
Source: Genuine Impact
The smaller size of ITM means that in relative terms it is much easier to produce multiples in terms of future returns. Microsoft making an extra ten million a year won't have a big impact, you'd expect it. For ITM it's life-changing.
What Has Happened Since The Last Report?
With a lack of analysts, less frequent reporting, and lower coverage in general. It can be harder to understand. This is where I'm going to be a bit more predictive and look into the recent announcements since their last report.
ITM has won two new projects, new grant secured, and one other project is advanced to the next stage. This is huge news.
The last report mentioned £42.4m was currently in their backlog pipeline, with another £248m under negotiation. They have delivered on previous contracts and now executing on new deals.

https://preview.redd.it/ymm0icezzw251.jpg?width=1532&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=57c4299f23630bf6acf05e7306300628085a1a2c
Source: ITM Interim H1 2020 Results
We have a new JV kicking off, and these new deals entering testing to see if wider adoption is on the cards, there is a lot to be excited about.
Deploying Hydrogen Fuel Cell BusFleets for Public Transport across Australia
Funding Award to Supply an 8MW Electrolyser (£10m across 2021/2)
Green Hydrogen for Humberside Project DeploymentStudy
Industrial-scale renewable hydrogen project advances to the next phase
Right now ITM is losing out whenever it brings in revenue due to the higher costs, that is also why they are investing so heavily into prototypes and getting grants. To radically reduce the cost both to produce and buy.

https://preview.redd.it/vyc5b8700x251.jpg?width=1539&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=f9bce0b62a6636c44b56377a4660724f01eda512
Source: ITM Interim H1 2020 Results
Why Do I Like This Risky Buy?
Let me be clear, AIM stocks are sensitive and unpredictable beasts. It is a much riskier investment and can be way more volatile. As a smaller chunk of my portfolio, I am willing to take on some risk.
There is a lot for me to like here. They have a great pipeline of work and new contracts, which are spread across Europe, with some in Asia, but the biggest focus is here in the UK. ITM has 37 contracts they are trying to close currently. The cost of goods is decreasing and the prototype funding is not coming from their pocket or shareholders, it's coming in the form of grants.
The latest fundraising has been done to address the working capital and to keep the books in balance while they keep delivering projects. Projects which once delivered still yield a return in the long run.
A company like this I would typically call an acquisition target and paint that as the exit. Here I feel there is more to give. Expanding with more JVs like the Linde deal, deepening their partnerships with Shell and Toyota, and pushing forward the deal to supply the infrastructure for keeping Australia's hydrogen busses going are all huge prospects.
The renewable space is huge, and ITM is pushing the core technologies and requirements forward. For me, they are making the right noises and show a lot of promise. There is a big risk in terms of cash flow and deals falling out the pipeline, but I have a bullish outlook for longer-term infrastructure work, and COVID-19 has only pushed forward the demand for cleaner energy and living.
Let me know what you think of my assessment, is this a stock you have looked into yourself? One to watch or are you avoiding it?
I had a great time writing this and I hope you found it insightful, let me know if there is anything you feel is missing or I should add.
Thanks for reading and stay safe.
submitted by kano2005 to UKInvesting [link] [comments]

r/AFL Compendium of History - AFL Collapse: How the (almost) undefeated 2000 Essendon Bombers disappeared in the (almost) blink of an eye

Greetings everybody. The topic I wanted to cover for the History Compendium is inspired by SB Nation's Collapse, a really interesting series on how a sports team or athlete can collapse quickly, and go from a strong team, to a weak one. I don't even follow most of the sports they discuss, but I still find it interesting, as rarely does such a collapse happen due to a single event; normally it takes multiple events to truly make it set in, such as Sega dropping out of the console manufacturing business. And now for a collapse that is particularly painful to me. The Essendon Football Club in 2000 had the greatest season a team has ever had in the history of VFL / AFL. In 30 games (5 pre-season, 22 regular season, 3 finals), they only lost once, culminating in their 16th Premiership flag, an AFL record only equalled by Carlton (VFA and SANFL flags are another discussion). The team was made up of numerous star players such as James Hird, Matthew Lloyd, Blake Caracella, Steven Alessio, Mark Mercuri, Joe Misiti and Gary Moorcroft, and led Kevin Sheedy, who in his 20th season in charge had won his fourth premiership as senior coach. The Essendon 2000 team had a single year of dominance never equalled, and many couldn’t see how it could possibly go wrong from here.
See the bombers fly up, 1993-1999
The seeds for 2000 were sown in 1993. Essendon was a team in transition; after being a strong club in the 1980s, winning the 1984 and 1985 Grand Finals, they lost the 1990 Premiership and many felt like they were due for a lean period, their premiership Captain Terry Daniher retired, and the club thought their best prospect was to blood the kids, and maybe make finals. Instead, 1993 would be one of the most even seasons ever, with Essendon and Carlton finishing top of the ladder with a record of 13-6-1. This was a season so even, that there was just two wins and a draw separating Essendon and Carlton from 7th and 8th placed Collingwood and Footscray. It was in this remarkable season that Essendon would scrape through and win a remarkable premiership, defeating Carlton in the Grand Final. While 32 year old Tim Watson wound back the clock, it was the seven players aged 21 and under, called the "baby bombers", that had people excited. By 2000, Gavin Wanganeen, David Calthorpe and Rick Olarenshaw had moved on, but Dustin Fletcher, Mark Mercuri, James Hird and Joe Misiti were all still at Essendon.
The lean period many had expected never happened; after 1993, the club made finals each season from 1995-2004 (except 1997). The club lost the qualifying and preliminary finals in 1996 by just a point each, going down to a kick after the siren to Tony Lockett in the Prelim. In 1999, they were minor premiers with a record of 18-4, and seemed a lock to the grand final, drawn against Carlton in the preliminary final. Essendon had beaten Carlton in both of their home and away matches with a combined margin of 115 points, and had six more wins in the home and away season. Carlton was sixth place, and many felt that they’d only made it this far due to an unfair fixture, playing against higher ranked interstate teams at the MCG in the finals due to the finals system in place at the time. In the shock of the season, Essendon went down by just one point again, with Dean Wallis getting tackled by Fraser Brown in the dying seconds and allowing Carlton to regain possession. Carlton would be flogged in the grand final by Wayne Carey and Dennis Pagan’s Kangaroos, but many of their fans weren’t that mad; they’d denied Essendon its sixteenth premiership, which would have made them equal with Carlton for the most in the VFL/AFL. Sheedy would force his team to watch the game, a painful lesson in what they had allowed to happen; the team learned.
Glory and fame, 2000-2001
Essendon’s 2000 season is the closest a team has ever gone to been undefeated, losing just one game. In the regular season and finals, they scored 150 points or more six times, and scored over 100 points another 15 times. At no point was Essendon not top of the ladder, and ended Round 22 with a percentage of 159.1. This is the fourth highest percentage a team has ever had at the end of the home and away season since 1945, and has only been eclipsed by Collingwood 2011, Geelong 2008, and West Coast 1991 (fun fact, none of those teams won the premiership that year).
Their only loss of the year came in Round 21, in a game that would prove to be a vision of what football would look like in the future. The Western Bulldogs needed to win the game to be a chance for finals, and their coach Terry Wallace employed a flooding game plan, playing most of his players in defence, and players playing to a part of the field, and not onto an opposing player, which was the norm for most of the games history. This innovative strategy would restrict Essendon’s attack, and was the only thing keeping the Bulldogs in the game. Flooding and zone defence were not commonplace tactics at the time, would become the dominant one in the 2000s, most notably used by Sydney and Collingwood in the 2005 and 2010 premierships. Even then, it was a close match, with Essendon losing 12.9 (81) to 14.8 (92) due to late goal from Chris Grant, following by a kick after the siren from Rohan Smith.
Essendon’s solitary loss meant they still finished top of the ladder, and Matthew Lloyd kicked 109 goals to win the Coleman Medal. Essendon broke records their qualifying final against the Kangaroos, when they kicked 31.12 (198) to 11.7 (73), margin of 125 points; not only Essendon’s highest ever score and margin, but the highest score ever and margin in an AFL final. Essendon in 2000 was so far above their competition that it was practically a forgone conclusion when they defeated Melbourne in the Grand Final 19.21 (135) to 11.9 (75). Essendon’s almost perfect season was capped by a premiership, and Darren Bewick got to retire a winner.
After two strong seasons, much was expected of Essendon in 2001. They were very good, but not as dominant as before. And by not as dominant, I mean they still won their third consecutive minor premiership, with 17 wins, but they were not leagues above the competition anymore; they were ahead of second-place Brisbane on percentage. A massive highlight of the season was their Round 16 game against the Kangaroos, where after being 69 (hue hue hue) points down in the second quarter, they launched a massive comeback, and ended up winning 27.9 (171) to 25.9 (159) in the highest scoring match ever since 1994 (when quarters were shortened form 25 minutes to 20). Whenever I watch a game, I know to switch off when a team gets 70 points in front, because a 69 point comeback is always on the cards.
In addition to being minor premiers again, Matthew Lloyd would win his second consecutive Coleman Medal, with 91 goals. After breezing through their qualifying final against Richmond, they had a massive scare against rank outsiders Hawthorn, but beat them by 9 points. It was here that very worrying signs began to emerge; many of their players were carrying injuries, and their late season form was struggling, as they won just three of their last six games in the home and away season. Their dream of a second premiership in a row went down in flames as they became the first victims of the Brisbane Lions’ threepeat. Essendon was outplayed for most of the game after the first quarter, the abnormally hot day also playing to Brisbane’s advantage, being used to playing in the warmer Queensland weather. More crucially, James Hird, John Barnes and Mark Mercuri were playing injured, and were not able to play at their best. The game was a repeat of the 1990 Grand Final, where Essendon was defeated by Collingwood; both teams were coached by Leigh Matthews, who as Captain of Hawthorn had beaten Essendon in 1983, but lost to them in the 1984 and 1985 grand finals. The final margin of 26 points flattered Essendon, who scored junk time goals after trailing by 39 points.
After the 2001 Grand Final, John Barnes, as well as Michael Long and Dean Wallis, who missed the grand final due to age and injury, retired. As well as this, Damien Hardwick was traded to Port Adelaide. Essendon was struggling to fit their players in their salary cap, and Port Adelaide offered him a three-year deal that Essendon couldn’t match. Hardwick was a key part of Essendon’s defence, and would go on to be part of Port Adelaide’s 2004 premiership.
Justin Blumfield, Chris Heffernan, Joe Misiti, Blake Caracella all would face injury concerns in the 2001 season and afterwards. So five of the players from the 2000 Premiership were already gone, and more were no longer at their best; despite this things were about to get much worse.
They all try their best, 2002-2004
The AFL at the time had a veterans allowance, were players who had been at their club for 10 years had part of their salary not counted to the cap; this allowance was scrapped in 2017 as part of a new CBA the AFLPA agreed to, which saw an increase to total player payments. Depending on the number of veterans, as much as 50% of their salary could be excluded from the cap. The purpose of the veterans allowance was to encourage clubs to retain older players, as well as reward them for long service, but was phased out after Gold Coast and GWS entered, and were unable to have any players qualify. It was also felt that clubs like Geelong were abusing the veterans allowance to keep their 2007-2011 superteam together.
At some point in the 2002, a grave error had been noticed in Essendon’s player salaries; the club was paying over the cap, but assumed it was fair spending in the veteran’s allowance. Much of their team had been recruited and developed over many years, rather than being traded in. However, Essendon had massively miscalculated how much money they were actually allowed to have covered by the veteran’s allowance, and realised that they couldn’t keep all of their stars. Chief Executie Peter Jackson declared that they needed to keep “marquee players James Hird, Dustin Fletcher and Matthew Lloyd”, which let a lot of other players at risk of being traded. Scrambling, they were forced to trade out three of their premiership players; Chris Heffernan to Melbourne, Blake Caracella to Brisbane, and Justin Blumfield to Richmond. Caracella would go on to win another premiership at Brisbane. At the same time, Gary Moorcroft, battling injury issues, was delisted, played one more year at Melbourne, then retired. Replacing them were Damian Cupido, a promising junior player who never reached his potential, and some drafts picks. The club would blow pick 10 on Jason Laycock, who was nowhere near the quality of the players lost. They did have some success with the other player they traded in, Adam McPhee, but one decent player can't replace several important ones.
According to Kevin Sheedy "They didn't want to go, the club didn't want them to leave. But salary cap rules cannot be broken." Assistant coach Robert Shaw would later say “We were around $600,000 over the cap. We had to bring the salary cap down and ultimately Essendon had to sack three premiership stars and ultimately tore the heart out of the club.”
Jackson concluded the trade period with this statement;
“Through this difficult period and in the cool light of day, I’m certain our members and supporters will see that this club has maintained a list that will be more than competitive in 2003. We are in good hands with the likes of James Hird, Matthew Lloyd, the Johnsons, Scott Lucas, Dean Solomon, Danny Jacobs, Adam Ramanauskas, Joe Misiti, Mark Mercuri, Dustin Fletcher, Sean Wellman and others.”
Just five of the players he mentioned were still at the club just five years later. The club failed to capitalise on the trades; few of the players they drafted in 2001-2006 would be long-term and successful players, and players traded in, such as Justin Murphy and Matthew Allen wouldn’t have much impact. The departing veterans were also exposing the list for what it was; incredibly shallow. Other than the players in the Grand Finals, just three would have respectable careers at Essendon; Damian Peverill, Mark Bolton and David Hille. A fourth, James Podsiadly would be delisted, Essendon having no idea that 10 years later as a mature-aged rookie, he would play in Geelong’s 2011 Premiership (fun fact, you too can purchase this amazing picture of James Podsaidly back when he had hair for the amazing price of $650). A fifth, Ted Richards, was traded to Sydney and would play in their 2012 premiership. The club’s incredible strength in their 1999-2001 era hid the fact that just about half the list was barely AFL qualify, and therefore when the older players left the club or needed breaks from playing, the other half was unable to replace them. The club also neglected in drafting youth, and would spend some of their picks on older players in an attempt to keep the list afloat, most notably in 2001 when they drafted 37 year old Paul Salmon with Pick 50, when future Collingwood leading goalkicker (and much younger) Paul Medhurst was taken by Fremantle with Pick 56.
The pattern was similar in 2003. Steven Alessio and Paul Barnard retired, Danny Jacobs was traded to Hawthorn, and cruellest of all, Adam Ramanauskas was diagnosed with cancer. Fortunately, he did eventually recover, and was able to play more games, but the treatments, as well as a knee injury, affected his playing ability, and robbed the club of a great player during his prime. The exodus continued, and in 2004, Mark Mercuri, Joe Misiti and Sean Wellman retired. In the 2002 season, 20 of the players involved in the 2000 and 2001 Grand Finals were still at Essendon, but by the 2005 season, there were just 10.
In 2002, they finished 5th, defeated 8th placed West Coast, and were defeated in the semi-finals by Port Adelaide. In 2003, they finished 8th, flogged 5th placed Fremantle, but were defeated in the semi-finals, once again by Port Adelaide. 2004 was a repeat of 2003; they finished 8th, narrowly defeated 5th placed Melbourne, but were then defeated in the semi-finals by Geelong. That’s three wasted years, where youth development was neglected in the chase for success, and ultimately, the result was three semi-final blowouts in a row. Infamously, their 2004 elimination final win is their most recent, a 16-year finals win drought that is the league’s current longest. Only Brisbane, who hasn’t won a final since 2009, and Gold Coast who hasn’t even made finals ever since they entered the competition in 2011, have comparable droughts. After Aaron Sandilands retired in 2019, the AFL has no current players who have lost to Essendon in a final. In fact, some mad lad who I am totally not annoyed at has made a twitter account about how lolworthy and memetic Essendon’s inability to win finals is.
But they can’t get near, 2005-2007
The decline the club was in steepened sharply, and the once former powerhouse of the AFL was no struggling on-field, missing finals in all three years. The club’s inability to recruit enough talent was now obvious, as multiple early draft picks were blown on players who would be disappointing for multiple reasons, including injury, poor form, bad development, and flawed drafting strategies;
Players they could have drafted with those picks include Jason Gram, Jay Schulz, David Mundy, Joel Selwood and Shane Edwards. They also picked up Bachar Houli, who would later be delisted and play in two Premierships at Richmond.
In 2005, Essendon not only missed this shot at goal but also missed the finals for the first time since 1997. They were far away from the top teams of the day, Adelaide, Sydney and West Coast, and in 2005-2007, won 21 out of 66 games. Kevin Sheedy’s insistence on drafting tall players meant that the list was slow, and poorly skilled. The consensus with drafting at the time was to take athletes, and train them the skills, the opposite of today, where the best skilled players are picked, then made into athletes.
At the end of 2005, Chris Heffernan returned from Melbourne, but in 2006, Dean Solomon was traded to Fremantle, and Dean Rioli retired. Finally in 2007, the end of an era occurred when Captain James Hird and Coach Kevin Sheedy announced their departures. In their last game together, they launched a courageous effort at defending premiers West Coast, with Scott Lucas kicking seven goals in the fourth quarter to deliver what could have been a miraculous comeback win for the departing legends, but fell short, and were defeated 21.6 (132) to 19.10 (124). As well as Sheedy and Hird, Mark Johnson, Chris Heffernan, Mark Bolton and recent arrival Scott Camporale all retired, and the club looked beyond 2007 into 2008 and the future, a future that had seemed impossibly far away in 2000, but was now here.
A Hardwick in shining armour
When Essendon searched for a replacement for Sheedy, the two final candidates were former player Damian Hardwick, by this stage an assistant at Hawthorn, and former Richmond player Matthew Knights, who was the coach of the Bendigo Bombers reserves team. Hawthorn refused to let Hardwick use any intellectual property that belonged to Hawthorn, which badly impacted his multimedia presentation to the board. As a result, the job went to Knights.
Supposedly, Hardwick planned to institute a hardcore youth policy, trading whatever valuable players the club had left in order to hit the draft, inspired by what Hawthorn had done in his time as an assistant to Alistair Clarkson. This would have led to an extended period near the bottom of the ladder, and the heartbreaking trades of beloved players, but had the club's longterm interests in mind. However Knights, whose presentation claimed that the list was fine and only needed minor retooling, won the board over. Hardwick is currently in his eleventh season as coach of Richmond, and has won two premierships. Meanwhile, Knights’ time at Essendon was a failure, and he would be sacked a year before his contract was to run out. The club did make finals in 2009, despite having just 10 wins, only to get blown away by Adelaide. He ended up arguing with Matthew Lloyd over his role in the team, leading to him losing passion for the game and retiring perhaps earlier than he should have.
Many outsiders felt that Essendon was a club stuck in the past, with their head in the sand of the VFL days, where big clubs like Essendon never had to be terrible for too long, success could be bought, and investing in a youth policy just wasn’t the way. To a club like Essendon, not making finals for three years was unacceptable, and a good reason to sack a coach; indeed, Kevin Sheedy would be sacked after three consecutive seasons of not making finals. It is indeed possible that the club grew impatient with the lack of progress under Knights, which led to a scapegoat culture and the desire to do whatever it took to win, which set the club down the dark path of the supplements saga.
Always striving, 2008 and beyond
The last remnants of the 2000 season would slowly trickle away. Adam Ramanauskas and Jason Johnson retired in 2008, and Scott Lucas and Matthew Lloyd retired in 2009. Mark McVeigh retired in 2011, and finally, Dustin Fletcher, retired in 2015 at the ridiculous age of 40 and having played 400 games, a club record and among the most ever. He was so old that he debuted a month before his teammate Dyson Heppell had been born.
I don’t want this article to go into too much detail about the complete failures that were the Matthew Knights era, the supplements saga that ruined the promising 2012 team coached by James Hird, or the 2016 season where 12 of Essendon’s players were suspended, as I wanted this article to focus on the 2000 Premiership team. What I will say is that Essendon has failed to reach anywhere near the lofty heights they did in 2000, and has yet to win a final since 2004, despite five attempts (in 2009, 2011, 2014, 2017 and 2019), and was even expelled from the finals in 2013, where they would have finished 7th, as part of their punishment for their supplements program. But at least it led to the most Richmond thing Richmond has ever done. Essendon is currently through its longest premiership drought, sitting at 20 seasons as of 2020, with the previous longest being the 19-year drought between 1965 and 1984. The current team, coached by John Worsfold, is a very different one to the one Sheedy left behind in 2007, but has been slowly rebuilding since the supplements saga, and looks to be (finally) in the right track. Much of the squad remained loyal to the club despite the saga, the membership continues to grow, and the club currently has many players that opposition fans would be envious of.
In summary
The club failed to replace the outgoing talent, either with list depth or new arrivals; only the seemingly immortal Dustin Fletcher, Mark McVeigh, Damien Peverill and David Hille would stay longterm, and of the new arrivals from 2001-2006, just 12 would play 100 games or more for Essendon (Andrew Welsh, Adam McPhee, Jason Winderlich, Jobe Watson, Brent Stanton, Ricky Dyson, Nathan Lovett-Murray, Angus Monfries, Paddy Ryder, Courtney Dempsey, Heath Hocking and Alwyn Davey).
Much like Brisbane after their threepeat, the club’s reliance on old hands and veterans would mean that the bottom fell out of the list as they retired or were moved on. The club's inability to see the writing on the wall and invest in youth sooner would cause them to pay dearly in the future. Finally, the game was beginning to move past Kevin Sheedy, and his 27-year tenure as Essendon’s coach was brought to an end. He would return as GWS' coach for their first two seasons, mainly as a mentor to the players and their next coach Leon Cameron, and still remains prominent in the game, but is no longer the coaching force he once was.
The 1999-2001 era was ultimately a disappointment if viewed objectively; in three seasons, Essendon had 62 wins and 12 losses, but just the one Premiership. For context, Hawthorn in 2013-2015 had 61 wins and 15 losses, but won three Premierships in a row. But for Bomber fans, the 2000 season, and its 16th premiership, will always be something to be proud of, and to rub in people’s faces. I suppose the moral of the story is to gloat and be arrogant when you can, because no champion teams lasts forever, even if it seems impossible.
Season to season summary
25 players played in Essendon’s squads in the two Grand Finals.
2000 / 2001 Grand Final players
2000 Grand Final players
2001 Grand Final players
I hope people enjoyed this AFL Collapse. I'm keen on possibly writing more, such as Collingwood’s after Mick Malthouse, and Carlton's when Mick Malthouse joined. I also want to know if there's anything innaccurate in the post, or anything I missed that would be useful information to have.
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What trading on margin means and how to use it  The Dough ... Understanding Margin Rules and Requirements WHAT IS MARGIN TRADING AND SEBI NEW RULES . New SEBI Rules For Intraday & Margin Trading SEBI NEW INTRADAY TRADING MARGIN RULES, REDUCED INTRADAY LEVERAGE SEBI MARGIN CIRCULAR #wealthfirst

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What trading on margin means and how to use it The Dough ...

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